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Dissertation

A TRANSLATION OF C. J. BOSTRÖM'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION WITH A CRITICAL COMMENTARY

by

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
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INTRODUCTION

1. The purpose of this dissertation

i. Main purpose

The primary purpose of this dissertation is to provide a critical introduction to the Philosophy of Religion of the Swedish philosopher, Christopher Jacob Boström, with a translation and a critical commentary.

There will be an attempt to discover Boström's historical relations, his unique contribution, and the validity of his ideas.

ii. Incidental purpose

A secondary purpose of this dissertation is to introduce Boström to those who speak the English language. This will be done by including some of the essential facts of his life, a summary of his own system, and a statement concerning his influence.

Beyond the Scandinavian countries, Boström is comparatively unknown. It is true that the Encyclopedia Britannica has an article of one hundred words on him.[1] The Philosophen-Lexikon, edited by Hauer,

1. 14th ed., III, 939-940.

Ziegenfuss, and Jung, has a somewhat longer article on his life and work.[2] His absence from Hastings' Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics is striking. The recent Diccionario de Filosofía by José Ferrater Mora includes him,[3] and he is accorded a paragraph in Webster's Biographical Dictionary.[4] He is treated at greater length by Üeberweg,[5] and is included in Eisler.[6] Höffding includes Boström in his story of philosophy.[7] Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology lists Boström's works.[8]

But aside from such recognitions it is safe to say that he is scarcely known, unless it be as a name, even in philosophical circles. Höffding says that Swedish philosophy has been little known beyond the homeland, even though Sweden has produced a line of energetic and independent thinkers, such as Thorild, Höijer, Geijer, and

2. Berlin: E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 1937, 112-113.
3. Mexico City: Editorial Atlante, 1941, 63.
4. William Allan Neilson (ed.), (Springfield: G. & C. Merriam Co., Publishers, 1943), 175.
5. Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie (Fünfter Teil, 12. Auflage), (Berlin: E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 1928), 240, 248-254.
6. Philosophen-Lexikon (Berlin: Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1912), 72-73.
7. A History of Modern Philosophy (tr. B. E. Meyer), London: Macmillan and Company, 1935), II, 284-285.
8. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1905, III, Part 1, 130.

Boström. He complains that the other Scandinavian countries had not done likewise.[9] Yet Kierkegaard had lived and died practically unrecognized by his fellow-countrymen. (There was a good reason why; he found fault with them all the time.) Höffding himself has since the time those words were written won a place among the great philosophers of modern times.

The solicitude of Höffding speaks for itself. Waldemar Dons, of Norway, who is generally critical, admits that if Boström had accomplished nothing else, he has, nevertheless, indebted Sweden to him for laying the foundation for a scientific interest, which has vastly benefited the Swedish people.[10]

The works of Höffding and Dons indicate that interest in Boström had extended to the other Scandinavian countries. He has also been translated into German.[11] Wikner says that an unnamed German called Boström "The Plato of the North."[12] A man whose thought has continued to be a source of interest and study for more than a century deserves attention. Fortunately, new books continue

9. FS, 5.
10. OB, 8.
11. Reinhold Geijer and Hans Gerloff: Grundlinien eines Philosophischen Systems (Der Philosophischen Bibliothek, Band 30), (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1923).
12. STB, 27.

to be published about him, one appearing as late as 1937.[13] Books by or about him make a library of more than fifty volumes.[14] Indeed, in 1908 a society was formed to perpetuate the philosophy of Boström.[15] Its roster includes the names of leading men of all walks of life, including some of the bishops of the Church of Sweden.

2. Survey of previous work

A survey of the work done in this field reveals that up to the present time very little has been done in English about Boström. No translation of any of his work has been discovered. In 1892 L. H. Beck wrote a doctor's dissertation at Yale University on the subject, A Comparison of the Doctrines of Reality in the Philosophies of Lotze and Boström, which includes a study of the reality of being, finite and infinite, the phenomenal world, and the psychic life. This dissertation, however, has not been published, and the amount of actual translation of any of Boström's work is very

13. Wedberg, LSBF.

14. The Harvard University library contains this number. According to correspondence with Professor A. Karitz of Uppsala University, Sweden, this list appears to be quite complete.

15. Boströmsförbundet. In all quotations the modern Swedish spelling is used. The Swedish letter å is given as a.

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13. Nadberg, 1897.

14. The Harvard University library contains this number. According to correspondence with Professor A. Karlin of Uppsala University, Sweden, this list appears to be quite complete.

15. Boströmstiftelsen. In all quotations the modern Swedish spelling is used. The Swedish letter å is given as a.

limited. The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature discloses one article, written by Axel Lundeberg, on the subject, "Sweden's Contribution to Philosophy," in which the philosophy of Boström is presented.[16] Beyond this apparently no research has been attempted in this field.

3. Plan and method of the dissertation

The lectures in the Philosophy of Religion by C. J. Boström, which will herewith be given in translation, were recorded from class lectures and edited by Sigurd Ribbing, one of his students. This was true of many of the works of Hegel. Ribbing has also edited Boström's lectures in Ethics.[17] He was later professor at Uppsala University. Because Boström himself did not write his Philosophy of Religion, it is not always presented in as clear and concise a form as if it had come from his own pen. Some sentences are incomplete, and occasionally it is difficult to get their meaning. In such instances, parts of the original text are included in the footnotes.[18]

In the commentary which will be appended to the

16. Open Court, 41 (1927), 410-423.
17. Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksells boktryckeri-aktiebolag, 1897.
18. Ribbing was aware of this deficiency, and speaks of it in his Foreword. See FR, VII.

translation, some of the special thoughts of Boström are further discussed and analyzed, and in some cases compared and contrasted with those of other thinkers. Owing to the necessity of limitation, and to the fact that a summary exposition of Boström's central thought is included in the opening chapters of this dissertation, the commentary will be focused on the fundamental problems which, though already noted or expounded, call for added consideration in their special context.

Boström's lectures in the Philosophy of Religion include three sections: Theology, Anthropology, and Philosophy of Religion. The translation included in this dissertation is the third section. Boström's general introduction to the entire work will precede the translation of his Philosophy of Religion. Boström himself wrote an Outline of the Philosophy of Religion, which will also be included in the translation as Appendix.

The plan is to make known as much of Boström as possible within the scope of this dissertation. In doing this, special effort will be made to evaluate Boström, and to see him as his fellow-Scandinavians saw, and see, him. The sources for this dissertation will, therefore, be almost entirely from the Scandinavian languages. They will always be given in trans-

translation, some of the special troubles of Boehme are further discussed and analyzed, and in some cases compared and contrasted with those of other thinkers. Owing to the necessity of limitation, and to the fact that a summary exposition of Boehme's central thought is included in the opening chapters of this dissertation, the commentary will be focused on the fundamental problems which, though already noted or expounded, call for added consideration in their special context.

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The plan is to make known as much of Boehme as possible within the scope of this dissertation. In doing this, special effort will be made to evaluate Boehme, and to see him as his fellow-Swabians saw, and see, him. The sources for this dissertation will, therefore, be almost entirely from the Swabian language. They will always be given in trans-

lation, but occasionally the original words will be reproduced in footnotes.

CHAPTER I.

WHO IS CHRISTOPHER JACOB BOSTRÖM?

The question, "Who is Boström?" is important in view of the general lack of information about him. Boström himself did not lay great stress on the biographies of thinkers. He held that their thoughts, if they really had any, comprised the real element of their life, and were all that was worth leaving to posterity.

Boström lived in his thoughts. Wikner says of him that he walked the Alpine heights of speculation with perfect calm, apparently unconscious of the abysses that yawned to the right and to the left below him. There was in him a sublime naïveté and, in the best sense of the word, a childlike confidence in the omnipotence of truth.[1]

1. Boström the Man

Boström wrote a brief autobiography in connection with a résumé of his philosophical system.[2] This is apparently what he wished to have known about himself,

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1. STB, 15.
2. SB, II, 479-480. These references are to Boström unless otherwise stated.

and is herewith given in a free translation.

He was born at Piteå, January 1, 1797. At the age of nine he was adopted as a foster-son by an uncle on his mother's side, the naval architect, Erik Nordlund, by whom he was supported as he attended the grammar school at Piteå. At the beginning of 1812 he went to college at Hernösand, where his interest in philosophy was aroused by the lecturer, N. M. Berlin.

As a consequence of this interest in philosophy, he enrolled at Uppsala University in the summer of 1815, and remained there as much as his means permitted. The professors in whose instruction he was most interested were Biberg and Grubbe. Both while at college and at the university, (until 1829), he practically supported himself by tutoring, spending several years away from Uppsala for this purpose. For this reason he did not receive the Master's degree until the spring of 1824. At graduation he received the highest honors. During the next few years he studied theology at Uppsala University.

In 1827 he discontinued the study of theology, and went back to philosophy, and at the beginning of 1828 he was appointed lecturer in practical philosophy. He was undoubtedly the most active lecturer at the university, and also the one most in demand. This con-

tinued until the beginning of 1833, when he was appointed tutor at the royal family, and moved to Stockholm.

In the fall of 1837 he returned to the university as assistant professor in philosophy, and the following spring he was appointed professor. In September, 1840, he succeeded Professor Samuel Grubbe in the chair of practical philosophy, and at the beginning of 1842 he was appointed regular professor in this department. In this position he continued until the time of his retirement. During his incumbency philosophy rose to a very high position in the life of the university. In the year 1853 he was created Knight Commander of the Order of the North Star.[3]

Dons says that he became fatherless in childhood,[4] which explains his adoption by an uncle. His mother lived to a ripe old age. Dons accords Boström the tribute that it was not only in the professor's chair that he was a philosopher, but both at home and away from home, and even on the sick-bed. In everything that came into his experience he saw new occasions for continued research or for verification of results already attained.[5]

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3. K. N. O.
4. OB, 5.
5. Ibid., 7.

Boström suffered from physical illness during a good portion of his life. In his letters to students and associates he complains frequently of the fact that he had been prevented from doing as much as he wanted to, because of sickness.[6] He died March 22, 1866, at the age of 69. He had already been pensioned some years previously.

He was apt to be intolerant with those who differed with him. In many instances he said of them that they did not have the capacity for the study of philosophy. His argument with Borelius[7] caused Höffding to speak of his "sneering reply"[8] and to remark laconically, "You are wrong, Zeus, because you become angry."[9] Dons also, with subtle irony, says that Boström's philosophy is only for those for whom it is sufficient that the master has said it.[10] But they who knew him most intimately said that it was not from any ill will that he sometimes spoke and wrote in such words, but rather from a sense of duty to what he considered to be the truth.[11]

There could also be tenderness in his words, and there was a spirit of optimism in his soul. When his mother

6. SB, III, 489-599.
7. Ibid., 181-245.
8. FS, 5. "Hånende svar."
9. Ibid., 5. "Du har uret, Zeus, ti du bliver vred."
10. OB, 78. "Mesteren har sagt det."
11. Wikner in SB, III, XXIV, note; 541-542.

died, he wrote a letter to his sister that breathes genuine warmth and devotion.[12] To a niece he wrote on the occasion of her marriage:

> One ought to make as reasonable demands on life and what it has to offer as possible ...and not expect all or even much of it... By the use of this rule of life I have never found myself dissatisfied or unhappy, but have been the happiest and most fortunate person in the world, so that not even my infirmity has been a disturbing influence....But it is certainly not my intention to teach you any kind of contempt of the world or indifference to the advantages in life. These, too, are the gifts of God which we should seek earnestly, receive gratefully, and enjoy wisely. One does not indeed live chiefly to have a good time, but in order to fulfill the most important duties of life. But the one can easily be united with the other, and it is a great mistake to think that our Lord begrudges us our happiness. He Himself is the fountain of joy and of every other good thing, and sorrows and afflictions do not proceed from Him...Remain, therefore, as far as you can, a healthy and hearty individual, because thereby you please our Lord as well as your fellow men.[13]

This healthy attitude toward life he maintained to the end of his days. In 1861 he wrote:

> The only thing I regret is that I shall stop at work half done, and that I would have the mental ability to do much more, but lack the physical strength.[14]

At another time he wrote:

> For my own part, I am remarkably

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12. See below, 105.
13. Ljunghoff, BSP, 9-10.
14. SB, III, 521.

> calm, because I am satisfied with what happens. For nearly ten years I have been ready to pack up; and these latter years that I have lived I have regarded as borrowed time.[15, 16]

In 1862, only a year before he retired, he wrote to a friend:

> But God be praised for what has been. I am now 65 years, and can soon retire. I have the joy of seeing others continue what I have only been able to begin. Thus I have not lived in vain.[17]

2. Boström the Teacher

For Boström his work as professor at Uppsala University was always his chief task. Everything else was subordinate.[18] His duties there were heavy; but, though his strength was limited, he carried on his teaching with the devotion of one who loves his work.

His lectures aroused great enthusiasm in his listeners. Edfeldt speaks of his genuine personality and the earnestness and love that characterized his public and private teaching, as well as his entire life. Of Boström it was true that, "Nemo potest inflammare alios, nisi ardet ipse."[19]

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15. "Haft på köpet."
16. Larsson, MOB, 53.
17. SB, III, 523.
18. Leander, LGI, 2.
19. SB, III, XIV.

Nyblaeus has described Boström as a teacher in these words:

> At the beginning of his lecture, after he had adjusted his glasses, he produced a long and narrow pamphlet from which he now and then sought guidance for his line of thought. His voice was usually somewhat weak and faint as the lecture began, but gained in strength and firmness as he continued, without, however, overstepping the boundary of harmonious proportion. At times he would raise to his chin the gold-headed cane that he used for his promenades. After the lecture was concluded he would step down from the chair, with a slight bow to his listeners, and with the same courteous and kindly smile as the one with which he had taken his place.[20]

Closely related to his work as a teacher was his writing. Boström was often distressed about the fact that the demands of his duties as a teacher, together with physical weakness, prevented him from writing. Sahlin expresses regret that he made the request that papers left at his death, for whose publication he had not made definite provision, should be destroyed.[21]

In his writing Boström insisted on brevity. He said, "If the metal that has been acquired is genuine, it does not need much volume to be of value."[22] It was generally believed when Boström died that he had left extremely little writing. But as his editors began to

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20. FFS, IV, Part 1, 6.
21. In [Pira and Keijser, ed.], SS, 2 (1909), X, 10.
22. SB, III, 552.

collect it, it was soon discovered that it was not so meager as had at first been supposed. His works comprise three large volumes, and afford a quite complete presentation of his philosophical system.[23]

Boström's style is plain and transparent. There is a classical simplicity in his writings, as there was in his extemporary delivery, that cannot but affect the reader, and convince him of the earnestness of the thinker.[24] Wikner, evaluating Boström's style, makes the observation that he cannot be compared with Plato in the playfulness of fancy, the flexibility of his thoughts, and his fine irony. But he adds that when Boström could devote himself to his thoughts in peace, and give expression to them from his viewpoint, he could be likened to a son of Hellas in artistically clear and measured plastic.[25]

Nils Linder in an article that gives special attention to Boström's use of the Swedish language, says it is by its logical clarity and incisiveness, the stability of its composition, its correctness, conciseness, and unostentatious simplicity, that his style merits the attribute of artistic. He says that the Swedish

23. Nyblaeus, TUBF, 2.
24. Beck, RLB, 13.
25. STB, 27-28.

writers are few in whom the words and what they are to signify harmonize so well as in Boström.[26]

26. Art. (1897), 380-381.

CHAPTER II

BOSTRÖM'S HISTORICAL RELATIONS, HIS ORIGINALITY, AND THE VALIDITY OF HIS IDEAS

An investigation of Boström's historical relations reveals the fact that he had a thorough knowledge of philosophy. His Outline of the History of Philosophy[1] covers the field of philosophic thought, beginning with Oriental philosophy, and continuing to his own time. Hans Edfeldt, one of his intimate students who edited his works, wrote an introductory chapter which bears the significant title, "The Relation of Boström's Philosophy to the Historically Given Philosophical Systems, Which Are its Antecedents."[2] The systems included as having had influence on Boström are those of Plato, Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. Although in his Outline Boström devotes eleven pages[3] to Aristotle, he is not included.

From Plato he received his system of ideas, rational idealism, and the truth that being is spiritual and has the content of consciousness. He also accepted the doctrine that there is a non-sensuous, timeless, and eternal ground of becoming as the ultimate source of all develop-

1. SB, II, 7-144.
2. Ibid., I, 1-92a.
3. Ibid., II, 29-40.

1. Ibid., II, 7-114.
2. Ibid., I, 1-92a.
3. Ibid., II, 29-40.

ment[4], and that God is Providence, or the personal guide of man and his world. In Boström there is also found Plato's thought that man's purpose is to come to a clear consciousness of the Ideas and their unity, as well as of the idea of the Good; and to order his life so that he attains the Idea.

But Boström holds that Plato falters when he ascribes moments to God that are sensuous, thus introducing a dualism into his system of Ideas.[5] He finds this to be due to the fact that Plato's idealism is relative, since the Idea with him is not originally a subject, or person, but only something that can be the content of a person.[6] Thus the soul cannot be explained from the Idea, because it is not identical with it, as it is for Boström.

Boström persistently maintains the distinction between the empirical and the rational. Plato thinks

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4. This strongly reminds one of Aristotle's unmoved mover.

5. Boström says that we must not transfer moments to the Divine self-consciousness which belong to the empirical self-consciousness, or moments that are laws and forms of the sensuous world. SB, I, 15.

6. By relative Boström means a philosophical viewpoint which begins, not principally with the subject as such, but only with its content or determinations. See Edfeldt, Art.(1897), 223. Relative determinations are determinations for the senses, and thus temporary and changeable. Absolute determinations are determinations directly for consciousness, and therefore something in themselves, necessary, and unchangeable. SB, I, 7.

of the Ideas as being only the original and true content of consciousness, but Boström thinks of them as also themselves being self-conscious and rational beings.[7] With Plato the Ideas are regarded as forms of divine reason, as spiritual objects, while Boström thinks of them as spiritual subjects. Thus there are many similarities and some dissimilarities between Plato and Boström.

Pontus Wikner, one of Boström's favorite pupils, who for a while was professor in Kristiania (now Oslo), draws this comparison between Plato and Boström:

> The one as well as the other has erected, not simply a city in which to dwell, but a temple in which to worship. If there is something that can be called speculative devotion, it is the feeling that grips us as we enter this sanctuary of the eternal beings. The trouble and din of the world is there silenced. Everything has stopped: the struggle and striving of life, the activity, yes, time itself. The world is reduced to a shadow, nothing more. Both Plato and Boström know that this shadow is but the obscure image of the temple; the only difference is that Boström knows why the shadow must fall here, that it is an optical phenomenon bounded by law. And the temple itself is very much alike in both of them. It is built of ideas, and has its completion in the idea of the good. But Boström knows that within these radiant walls there dwells a varied personal life. This life is a beholding. Every idea is a spiritual eye,

7. Walter Pater says that in their first stage Plato's Ideas are abstract, but that in the second stage the abstract Ideas themselves become animated, living persons, almost corporeal, as if with hands and eyes. See Plato and Platonism (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1903), 152. Boström's answer would be that there is no "as if" about them. They are living persons.

> and all behold each other, and are beheld by each other. But they do nothing else, and nothing happens in this temple. It is a service without ritual, without song, without words, without mobile thoughts. It is an existence without activity, a life without history. At this point the two philosophers meet anew. Twenty-two hundred years of history intervenes, but they are united in banishing history from the world of truth.[8] The question is whether man will be satisfied with the shadowy existence which is thus assigned to him; but he will, nevertheless, admit that the prospect of a world of clarity and harmony, which Plato and Boström have opened for him, is something beautiful to think about, when he is to determine the goal, in the direction of which he is to guide the development of humanity and of the world.[9]

Leibniz, a rational idealist who emphasizes personality, had a great influence on Boström, whose first writing was a study of the philosophy of Leibniz.[10] Both stress the importance of the individual, and in the explanation of the physical world by imperfect perceptions there is also a close relationship. With Leibniz the monads are centers of force; Boström ascribes the same qualities to the ideas.

Leibniz and Boström differ, however, in their conception of God's relationship to the outer world. For

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8. Yet in Plato the demigods, at the bidding of the creator, make history. See Timaeus, 41. In Boström man is ever striving to bring his idea to perfection. Passim.

9. STB, 28-29. See also SB, I, 5-25, 109, 311; Leander, LGI, 120-123; Beck, RLB, 10; Ribbing (ed.), FR, 29.

10. SB, I, 93-111. See further SB, I, 27-54; II, 77-86; Ribbing (ed.), FR, 29, 34-38, 54, 77, 92-96; Edfeldt, Art.(1897), 223, 252-253; Nyblaeus, TUBF, 3-4; Wikner, STB, 27.

Leibniz God is the source of the best possible world; Boström holds that the ideas are eternal in God, Who stands in a mediate relationship to the world, in and through man's spirit, for which the sensuous world is immediate.[11] Boström says that the system of Leibniz brings God into the sensuous world, whereas his own does not.

Leibniz has a pre-established harmony, which makes his monadology deterministic, while in Boström the eternal ideas in God are free and independent beings. Boström criticizes the system of Leibniz as relative, by which he means that it is not concerned with the subject alone, but with its content and determinations, and that it grasps the relationship of the monads under the analogy of that which is in space, or as a "spiritual mechanism."

Kant's view of the sensuous world as phenomenal, and his doctrine of the ideality of space, are a part of the system of Boström.[12] Both emphasize the forms of understanding, Boström accepting the a priori prin-

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11. See below, 37-38.

12. SB, I, 54-61; Edfeldt, Art.(1897), 224, 245-246; Nyblaeus, Art.(1897), 2-6, 11-12; Sahlin, KSB, 17-18; Ribbing,(ed.), FR, 98-100.

ciples of Kant, as well as Kant's emphasis on consciousness as self-active intelligence.[13] Boström agrees with Kant that man cannot go outside of his own consciousness.

For Kant, however, the world is a phenomenon of an unknown thing-in-itself, whereas for Boström it is a phenomenon of an idea as a spiritual and concrete reality. Thus Kant becomes concerned with the phenomenal, and God becomes a postulate; with Boström God is central, and the phenomenal world is the system of God's thoughts imperfectly perceived by man. Thus Boström is nearer to Berkeley and Hegel than to Kant at this point.

Boström believes that Kant has performed a great service to practical philosophy in directing attention to duty; and with Kant Boström holds that man is to be regarded as an end, and not as a means only. Boström criticizes Kant's thing-in-itself as something lying outside of consciousness, and thus creating a dualism. For Boström consciousness is reality, and therefore for him there can be no metaphysical dualism between consciousness and anything external to it. While freedom and immortality are postulates with Kant, they are fundamental in Boström.

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13. Kant says: "...Only in so far as I can grasp the manifold of the representations in one consciousness, do I call them one and all mine." Critique of Pure Reason (tr. Norman Kemp Smith),(London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1933), 154. Boström holds that it is by an independent act of our thinking that we understand anything. (Kalling, OK, 78.)

For Boström the important element in Fichte is the thought that there are no objects and no existence that can be considered as falling outside of consciousness. Self-consciousness is an independent existence without any underlying substratum, but is its own substratum. Self-consciousness plus will, i.e., subject or person, is the substance, and all substance is self-consciousness and will. Boström emphasizes the identity of life and self-consciousness as the first and simplest substance in the universe, and holds that everything that exists is a form of life or self-consciousness. Beyond this, Boström had nothing essential in common with Fichte.[14]

Schelling had a great influence on Boström. In this connection mention must be made about the influence on Boström of his teachers, Biberg and Grubbe, who were influenced by Schelling. They held that the sensuous world had its final ground and purpose in an independent and perfect immaterial reality, i.e., in a divine intelligence. Biberg held that the ground of man must be an idea in God, and Grubbe separated God from space and time, teaching that God must be a self-conscious being, a personality. Boström was, therefore, directed toward giving attention to the world of eternal ideas

14. Ribbing (ed.), FR, 31, 99; SB, I, 61-66; Nyblaeus, Art.(1897), 3; Edfeldt, Art.(1897), 224, 256-257; SB, II, 117-130.

that is found in God's consciousness, thus moving further in the development of his philosophy of personalism.

The fundamental thought of Schelling's philosophy, which prevailed in Sweden at that time, was, briefly, that nature and man exist, not only through God, but in God. They comprised forms in and through which the Divine Being, which is just consciousness itself, thought of as an infinite activity beholding and determining itself, expresses and perceives itself. In this view, however, God is brought into time, and is subjected to its imperfections, and man becomes a dependent expression of the divine power, is bound by time, and subject to corruption.

Boström differs and, as he holds, advances, from this position by his development of the principle of idealism to the principle of personality. By this principle the self-consciousness that corresponds to its idea is not only a person, but the absolute personality itself, whose moments are composed of original or independent personal beings. But the influence of Schelling on Boström came largely through his teachers, Biberg and Grubbe.[15]

Toward Hegel Boström took a critical attitude;

15. Edfeldt, Art.(1897), 224-225; 256-257; Nyblaeus, TUBF, 4-17; SB, I, 67-80; II, 131-144; Ribbing (ed.), FR, 100-103; Nyblaeus, FFS, IV, Part 1, 12-13; Beck, RLB, 9.

but the fact seems, nevertheless, to be that he was influenced by him to a considerable degree. Boström is said to have received three principles from Hegel, which are a part of Boström's central system. The first one is: to be is the same as to be for someone, or to be perceived.[16] The second one is: nothing can be a determination without being something in consciousness. The third: God could not be omniscient, if He did not possess the form of system. There does not, however, appear to be clarity or agreement among Boström's students in regard to the inference that Boström derived these principles from Hegel.

There is similarity between Hegel and Boström in the emphasis of both on reason as the highest approach to God; and there are repeated statements in Boström which strongly remind one of Hegel's emphasis on the true as the whole. A survey of their respective philosophies of religion reveals more similarity than dissimilarity,[17] except as regards Hegel's dialectical movement.

Boström, however, frequently charges Hegel with pantheism. He says that Hegel brings God into time. The pantheism, says Boström, is due to his system of nature as process in one world, where man appears,

16. It is apparent that we here have the words of Berkeley.

17. See below, 133-136.

works, thinks, and perishes. With Boström reality does not include nature, which is only phenomenal; the sensuous world is the product of man's imperfect perceptions. God, according to Boström, does not need a concretion in and through nature, because He is complete in Himself, independent of the senses, and timeless.[18]

Berkeley should be added to Edfeldt's catalog of men whose thought has influenced Boström. Boström's central thought--to be is to be perceived--is the same as Berkeley's esse is percipi. Boström was familiar with Berkeley, and directs his readers to Berkeley's works. He expresses appreciation of Berkeley's refutation of the view that our perceptions are images of the things.

Boström's criticism of Berkeley is that he could only rise to a lower empirical idealism or to a subjective idealism, which could not reveal anything existing in and for itself in an absolute sense as the content of our perceptions.[19]

Boström was fully aware of the fact that in philos-

18. SB, I, 79-90; II, 321; Nyblaeus, Art.(1897), 13-15; Wedberg, LSBF, 176-177; Edfeldt, Art.(1897), 257-258; Dons, OB, 14; Åberg, BV, 44-45, 84; Ribbing (ed.), FR, 61, 71, 103, 114, 117.

19. SB, I, 279; II, 91, 95, 118; III, 218-219, note 100; Nyblaeus, Art.(1897), 5; TUBF, 14; Wedberg, LSBF, 92; Ribbing (ed.), FR, 24-26; Edfeldt, Art.(1897), 223, 244, 254.

ophy the field for originality is more limited than in art; he, therefore, did not lay claim to all the originality that his admirers wished to ascribe to him. But he was certain that he had made discoveries that were of the greatest importance. Among these he counted his doctrine that life and self-consciousness are not two separate realities, but are one and the same, that is, that life is self-consciousness, and self-consciousness is life. He often said that he was the first thinker that had given an answer to the question as to what life is.

Boström believed that he was the first one who had investigated the concept of being in its pure generality. It seems certain that he was led to his position by his own reflection on the idea of the concrete reality in the determinate self-consciousness. From the concrete self-conscious being he presented consciousness as a systematic principle.[20]

In a letter to Nyblaeus in 1861 Boström wrote:

> My philosophy is new, and no one has measured what it contains. I fear that it will die out with me and my nearest disciples. It makes such great demands of the human faculty of thought and on spiritual development in general that only a few will become familiar with it. For that reason I am regarded by the masses as half-crazy. But the idealistic philosopher has to be satisfied

20. Nyblaeus, TUBF, 13-16.

> with this. He understands that it cannot be otherwise...If I do not receive any recognition of my efforts, I can, nevertheless, be satisfied.[21]

The years that have passed since then reveal that there was truth in these words.[22] His system has not gained an extensive adherence. His influence during his lifetime was pronounced and general in Sweden, and to some extent beyond Sweden, but it has never reached very far. On the other hand, there have always been followers, and there is interest today.

Boström's relationship to other philosophical systems is apparent. There are, however, some elements in his own thought, such as his development of the doctrine that self-consciousness is life, his driving his rational idealism to its logical conclusion, and his emphasis on personality, that indicate original thinking, and that have continuing validity. One hundred years are a comparatively short time in the history of thought; but they do give some opportunity for perspective. Through this perspective he appears as a man who could think, and who dared to think, independently.

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21. Nyblaeus (ed.), FFS, IV, Part 1, 5-6.
22. For a discussion of Boström's influence, see below, 42-47.

CHAPTER III

A BRIEF SURVEY OF BOSTRÖM'S PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM

Boström's high regard for philosophy is evident in all his writings. He holds that philosophy in its essence is God's thoughts, which man strives to think after Him.[1] With him the problem in all philosophizing is to secure harmony with one's reason,[2] because God is rational.

Man's interest in philosophy is a necessary consequence of his eternal essence, and appears when he has reached a certain degree of development. It is, in fact, nothing else than his interest in himself as rational, that is, in his true life. The first and last question in philosophy is how we are to grasp, or understand, the absolute being, or God, and how we are to understand the relationship between the absolute and the relative.[3] The problem is to reconcile man's independence with his being in God.[4]

Boström's thought is pursued from a religious point of view. He says that all philosophy which does not satisfy man's religious and moral consciousness must be false, a conviction which had become his at the age of twenty.[5]

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1. SB, II, 481-482.
2. Karl Pira, in [Pira and Keijser, ed.], SS, 6 (1913), XXXIX, 12.
3. SB, II, 193.
4. Nyblaeus, TUBF, 4.
5. Wedberg, LSBF, 9.

1. Boström's Philosophical Method[6]

In Boström we have a psychological and epistemological approach to the problem of reality. L. H. Beck says:

> Boström aims to be speculative and and philosophical in all his writings. He disregards all individual and concrete facts and dwells exclusively with his reasoning among the generals. With a kind of intellectual "Anschauung" he intuits his whole system, and then proceeds to explain its inner connection and development with great dialectical skill and astuteness. What is thus logically explained and proved is beyond question the ultimate truth.[7]

Wedberg says that Boström's philosophy is a decided metaphysical thought-structure,[8] and that in his practical philosophy the axiological principle is dominant.[9] Boström speaks of philosophy as the science of ideas.[10] He says that "in reality the whole method consists in this: through analysis and abstraction a person goes back to the most simple element in his consciousness, and then, by means of this, he synthesizes the more concrete, in order by synthesis to illuminate the concrete with the clarity he has gained

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6. In general, this chapter follows the material in SB, II, 481-508. For presentations of Boström's system see also Wedberg, LSBF, 21-24; Dons, OB, 26-27; Ljunghoff, BSP, 120; Vannérus, BTF, 115-116; Åberg, BV, 76-80, SB, II, 239-310, I, 216-353.
7. RLB, 12-13.
8. See also Larsson, MOB, 13-15.
9. LSBF, 207. See also Ribbing (ed.), FR, 13-16.
10. SB, II, 149.

in the more abstract.[11]

Sahlin says that, according to Boström, philosophical method is the constitutionally determined[12] form of the systematic activity of thought. This constitutionally determined form reveals itself in continuous reflection, which by abstraction or analysis always leads to a development of more complete ideas in a definite sequence. This sequence has its ground in the systematic form of the original content of human consciousness, and this systematic form of self-development by which the thinking person develops his original content to the highest possible clarity, and arrives at a relatively systematic knowledge of this content.[13] The influence of Kant on Boström is here noticeable.

Boström declares:

> Originally, there is nothing else than the infinite reason and its content, i.e., nothing but God and His eternal determinations --His ideas, or conceptions, all of which also are absolutely living or self-conscious, and consequently perfectly perceiving or rational beings.[14]

From rather dogmatic assertions of this type Boström builds his thought-structure on a deductively logical basis. Such a system will be rejected by those who reject a priori principles.

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11. See below, 61.
12. "Lagbestämd."
13. Art.(1897), 378. See also 360-378.
14. SB, II, 270.

2. Summary of Boström's Philosophical System

Boström's philosophy is idealistic and rationalistic. It differs from all systems in which there is something realistic and empirical. Not only space, extension, and matter, but also time, motion, and change are excluded from the true and original being.

i. Philosophy the Essential Science

Philosophy in itself is regarded by Boström as the highest and the essential science; it is the absolutely perfect perceiving or knowing. In this sense philosophy is God's own omniscience, i.e., God Himself, regarded simply as knowing and perceiving.

Man's philosophy is the same knowing, but with the negations, limitations, and imperfections which are a consequence of his finiteness in relation to God's infinity.

True philosophy, according to Boström, cannot have anything else than rational beings, or persons, as its objects, and since the truth is the identity of knowing and being, it can only have beings, or persons, as its content. It can deal with the sensuous and material things only as phenomena in and for finite-rational beings. The non-sensuous, or spiritual, is always present in them, but it is not grasped or perceived as such when the perception is imperfect; it then appears

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in its relative antithesis--as something more or less sensuous or material.

ii. Life is Self-consciousness

According to Boström, life is self-consciousness, and self-consciousness is life. Life, or self-consciousness, is not connected with any substratum or anything substantial, but itself comprises the primary and substantial element in everything. It is the material of which everything in the last analysis consists.

iii. The Philosophy of Man

The philosophy of man is divided into theoretical and practical.[15] This depends on whether its content--the rational beings--is considered from a theoretical or practical viewpoint. From the theoretical viewpoint beings are regarded only as perceived, or existing; from the practical viewpoint they are regarded as also working and acting in and for man. From man's viewpoint the theoretical philosophy is regarded as determining his theoretical capacity--his intellect and knowledge; and the practical philosophy is regarded as determining

15. With Boström the theoretical philosophy deals with the true, and the practical philosophy deals with the good and its attainment. Ribbing, (ed.), FR, 10.

his practical capacity--his will and activity.

The theoretical philosophy is divided into three main sections: 1) Rational Theology; 2) Rational Anthropology; 3) Rational Ethnology. The practical philosophy is also divided into three main divisions: 1) Rational or Philosophical Science of Religion; 2) Ethics; 3) Rational Jurisprudence.

iv. God

Boström holds that absolute idealism is the true and necessary world view. This view requires a perfectly perceiving Being, or God.[16] For Boström, Infinite Reason and God are two expressions for one and the same being, since he holds that the rational is the true, and the true is the rational. Man is not the reason itself, but only a rational being, whose reason is eternal, unchangeable, and holy. Therefore, it is not reason, but only the sensuous-rational man himself, that can be depraved, or imperfect, when he does not use his reason.

As to His form, God has the general attribute of infinity, which is more closely determined as absoluteness, independence, and perfection, system, unity, and omnipresence. As to His content, considered ontologically, God has the attributes: absolute non-sensuousness, which

16. God comes near to being a postulate here.

means that He is spiritual or immaterial, eternal or non-changeable; absolute system which includes power, or unity in plurality of being; and omnipotence, or unity in multiplex. Considered noologically, God has the attributes, absolute reason, including self-consciousness and absolute self-consciousness; absolute personality, including knowledge and omniscience.

In relation to man's theoretical capacity, God is apprehended as the true; in relation to man's practical capacity, as the good; and in relation to his aesthetic capacity, as the beautiful.

In God's thoughts or conceptions, the perception and the perceived, or knowing and being, are identical. The perceptions, or ideas, in so far as they are thought by God, are absolute, perfect, and determined. They are his own self-consciousness in its individual determinations.

In themselves, the ideas are self-conscious, perceiving, or rational beings. They are not created by God, but He is regarded as their ultimate ground in Whom they are all contained.

v. The One and the Many

The rational beings comprise a system, or an absolutely ideal organism. The moments that comprise a system must in relationship to the whole be more or

less imperfect. In the case of self-conscious beings they perceive more or less perfectly. They stand in relation to each other as higher and lower in the sense that the lower being has fewer other beings (those still lower) as its positive determinations and more other beings (all the higher ones) as its negative determinations. It is itself taken up as a positive determination in all the higher beings, whereby it has a fuller determination than it has in itself alone. For example, much more can be said about the number 10 when it is considered in the number 100, or some higher number, than when it is considered alone. In this series, the highest number would be God, who has only positive determinations.

Against the possible charge that this view could be considered pantheistic, Boström holds it is absolutely idealistic, or spiritual, and, therefore, completely inconsistent with pantheism.[17] He says that

17. That Boström was much concerned with pantheism is evident from the fact that some of his early writings dealt with the subject. See SB, I, 157-182. In a rather lengthy discussion of the subject, Boström presents his position with regard to pantheism. He says that we have learned from our Catechism that God is everywhere present, which means that He is in our spirit. Even to speak about God, we must have Him in our self-consciousness. Our religion also teaches us not only that we live, and move, and have our being in God, but also that He, Who Himself is a Spirit, has given us of His Spirit, and that He dwells in us, i.e., in our spirit. (Acts 17:28; I Corinthians, 3:16). Boström says that if one wishes to call this pantheism, it may be done, but that the Christian religion is then also pantheism, which he says

the number 10, for instance, is independent, even though it is a determination in 20, 30, or any other number.[18]

All the finite-rational beings, in their development, strive to realize themselves in the higher beings, even to the highest and most perfect Being, in whom they find their complete determination and their true and perfect life.

vi. The Sensuous World

The sensuous world in space and time, according to Boström, is only a phenomenon for man of the non-sensuous, or real, due to the fact that as finite we do not perceive it perfectly. There is thus an infinite number of phenomenal worlds. What we call nature does not have any existence independent of man. What is substantial in nature is rational and non-sensuous. For plants and animals there are no ideas in God, since they are only phenomena for man of rational beings. Otherwise,

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no one is willing to admit. According to Boström's view, the sensuous world cannot exist without God, but God does not need the sensuous world any more than the real sun needs the visible sun. For Boström the spiritual is the true and original existence, and when God is considered as the absolute Spirit, all true existence must be thought of as in Him, and He must not be placed in immediate relationship to anything external. Boström grasps the sensuous world as the phenomenon of the spiritual and super-sensuous [world] and as standing in the same relationship to it as dusk to daylight, or the visible sun to the real sun. Boström holds that, if this must be called pantheism, it is at least not the usual kind (SB, I, 399-400). Eisler calls Boström a pan-entheist, for whom God is the eternal personality in Whom all is contained (Philosophen-Lexikon), 72. It is thus apparent that Boström has difficulty in freeing himself from the charge of pantheism. See also Bowne, MET, 102-103.

18. SB, III, 13, note; II, 273-274.

says Boström, man could not use them for his purpose.[19]

God is the ground of the finite beings. With regard to their origin and duration, He is their original Being. Considered in this relation as a person, God is their creator and sustainer. They are begotten of God in eternity. As ground of their development, God is their religion, their highest law and end. Thought of in this relationship as a person, God is their highest regent, their providence, and their savior. As creator and sustainer, God is omnipotent, all-wise, all-good, righteous, and holy. The system of finite-rational beings is the kingdom of God. Boström's system is thus teleological.

vii. Man

Man is not a union of body and soul, because he is essentially one spirit, and his body is nothing else than his sensuous and phenomenal form. Man is rational in so far as the content of self-consciousness is God, and sensuous to the extent that the content of his self-consciousness is the phenomenal, which is the result of

19. Boström faced the consequences of this doctrine, and accepted them. He says: "My idea can enter the phenomenal world of other beings and for them be impenetrable; if I become the ingredient of iron, I may be forged; if I become the ingredient of wood, I may be used in carpentry; if I become the ingredient of food, one can eat and digest me. But this does not concern me, because it does not enter my consciousness, but only into theirs." Quoted by Wedberg, LSBF, 180. Original source not available.

man's imperfect perceptions. He may have degrees of development, so that he has feeling, consciousness, or self-consciousness. By the theoretical activity man seeks a higher self-consciousness by changing the inner man; and by the practical activity he seeks a higher independence by changing the external conditions.

viii. Theory of Knowledge

Man's rational capacity expresses itself as feeling, imagination, and thought. His sensuous capacity expresses itself as instinct, desire, and will. Man's freedom is a capacity to choose between antithetical grounds of determination, which he can do since the world is his own possession, and since his life is a continuous development of what is potential in his being. In this development his intellect and will have a part.[20]

Boström speaks of a lower and a higher cognitive faculty. The lower faculty expresses itself progressively as spiritual feeling, fantasy, or allegorizing imagination, and reason.[21] A fundamental thought in Boström's idealism is that everything that exists is

20. For further discussion of Boström's view of freedom see below, 280-282.

21. SB, III, 15-16.

self-consciousness and its determinations.[22]

xi. Philosophy of Religion, Ethics, the State

Boström's Philosophy of Religion comprises the body of this dissertation. Boström says that it corresponds essentially with the Christian doctrine of religion, but that it differs from the current theology at certain points. He does not accept the doctrine of the Trinity, revelation, or satisfactio vicaria. He accepts immortality, and denies eternal damnation.[23]

Boström's ethics is Kantian and Platonic. In his own summary of his philosophical system he devoted only one paragraph to his ethics. The world of the individual must be held in high regard. We are to make our higher nature the principle of our life. Moral activity is a free self-development for the attainment of life in God. In this activity man's sensuousness receives a positive meaning as a means for reaching the self-development which is man's prerogative, because the

22. Ribbing (ed.), FR, 22. See also Wedberg, LSBF, 33, note, 79-80, 135; Sahlin, Art.(1897), 364; Edfeldt, Art.(1897), 246 f; Beck, RLB, 18-21; Vannérus, BTF, 62; Kalling, OK, 78; SB, I, 154-156, 229-251; II, 243-246.

23. SB, II, 494-497.

activity is a purposeful, conscious, free, and rational activity which has to do directly with the control of the sensuous in man. Boström calls his ethics a positive rational ethical system.[24]

Boström holds that the state is a rational personal being as well as man. He defends the monarchial system and the classes of society as they existed in Sweden in his day. He also holds that his theory of state is the most liberal of any that up to that time had been proposed, because it requires the most complete independence not only for the state itself, but for all persons in it.[25]

24. Åberg, BV, 84, 88; SB, II, 497; Sahlin, KSB, 100.
25. SB, II, 501-508.

CHAPTER IV

THE INFLUENCE OF C. J. BOSTRÖM

The third and final volume of Boström's works, edited by Hans Edfeldt and G. J. Keijser, contains this dedicatory page:

To the Memory
of
Our Revered and Beloved Teacher
Christopher Jacob Boström
His Nation's and His Period's Greatest
and most Independent Thinker
This Concluding Collection of His Works
Is now Dedicated
by
The Editors..

Such enthusiastic admiration and devotion indicates that Boström was regarded as a true philosopher by those who knew him most intimately. While it must be evaluated in this setting, there can no be/serious question but that Boström made a deep impression on his own nation.

1. Boström's Influence in Sweden

Johannes Ljunghoff, in 1916, wrote:

CHAPTER IV

THE INFLUENCE OF O. A. BOSTRÖM

> In the history of Sweden, Boström is the only one who has founded a school [of philosophy], and it is certainly no exaggeration to designate the days of the glory of Boströmism as the "classic period" in Swedish philosophy. Never has the study of philosophy stood higher in our nation than at that time. Scientists, teachers, ministers, poets, authors, and statesmen, each in his profession, and according to his ability, endeavored to make fruitful the doctrines that their revered teacher in practical philosophy once had taught them, as he kindled in their youthful souls a spark of enthusiasm that never died.[1]

The same writer speaks of Boström's idealistic philosophy of personalism[2] as his testament to his people.[3] From Uppsala University, where he was professor for a period of nearly forty years, his influence extended to the other great center of learning in Sweden, Lund University, through two of his students, Axel Nyblaeus and Carl Yngve Sahlin.[4]

Wikner, in a lecture given at Kristiania, Norway, in 1886, gives something of the background of Boström's influence:

> ...The idealistic tendency has been preponderant [in Sweden], and it corresponds with the Swedish temperament, which is rather introspective and easily yields to a more or less deep dream-life that is rich in presentiment... This idealism has received its most complete

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1. BSP, 11-12.
2. Personalism is defined as "A philosophical system in which persons (or selves) are the sole (or dominant) metaphysical realities, as well as the only ultimate intrinsic values." In Ferm (ed.) ENC REL, 576. For a discussion of Boström and personalism see below, 221-223.
3. BSP, 3.
4. Linder, Art.(1897), 379.

> expression in the philosophy of Boström. According to my opinion, this philosophy is a faithful and harmonious reproduction of the Swedish temperament in the form of thought. It has exerted an unprecedented influence, and will long continue to do so in spite of individual protests that are raised against it.[5]

Nyblaeus says that the wish had been expressed in Denmark that the works of Boström could be published there.[6] Höffding gives the information that Denmark had sent a student to Uppsala in 1869 to become familiar with Boström's philosophy.[7] Though he maintains that Boström's influence is already waning (1874), Dons, nevertheless, admits that it is assured of an extended existence, due to the fact that the leading men in the various professions are his followers.[8]

Anathon Aall, in a comparatively recent book,[9] dealing with philosophy in the Scandinavian countries, declares that traces of the influence of Geijer, Grubbe, and Boström can be found even at the present time in the concept of religion and justice, not only among the educated, but in the general rank and file of the people. He says that their influence has only in part receded.[10]

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5. STB, 11, 13.
6. TUBF, 1.
7. FS, 5-6.
8. OB, 8.
9. FN, 1919.
10. FN, 3, 6.

In Aall's book Boström is accorded vastly the major share in the section on Swedish philosophers.[11]

Axel Lundeberg, while asserting that Boström's philosophical system occupies a high rank in the history of philosophy, poses the question, nevertheless, as to whether Boström has succeeded in placing his system on a vantage-ground that is unassailable for all time to come, and leaves the answer to the development of philosophical research.[12]

Anders Wedberg, one of the most recent writers on Boström, admits that during the second half of the nineteenth century Boström's influence in Sweden was like Hegel's in Germany in his day, so that from 1860 to 1890 Swedish philosophical thought was entirely in Boström's spirit. But he adds that late in the nineteenth century his influence began to wane. Wedberg makes the assertion that it is not as the founder of a school of philosophy, but as the object of criticism, that Boström is of the greatest importance in the history of philosophy.[13] He further claims that much of Boström's philosophy now has only idea- and cultural-historical value, but makes the concession that from some points of view Boström's thinking is always worthy

11. Ibid., 12-42.
12. Art.(1927), 418-419.
13. LSBF, 14-15.

In Asplund's book Boström is accorded vastly the major share in the reception on Swedish philosophers.[11]

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11. Idid., 12-42.
12. Axt.(1927), 418-419.
13. 1888, 14-15.

of study by the student of the history of philosophy.[14]

Ljunghoff faces the question of Boström's influence in these words:

> There is, finally, the question of the abiding value in Boström's thought. It is not correct to say that all intellectual interest in it is lacking. For even if the aspect of the problem is different now from what it was in Boström's day, it must, nevertheless, be admitted that the fundamental thoughts of his philosophy are in these very days beginning to revive. It is also certain that the one who, though ignorant of Boström, has only a shrug of the shoulder for him does not possess much of the "genuine philosophical spirit and temper which seeks the true and essential in things and strives for its realization and improvement in the world." No doubt there is much in Boström's thought that belongs to the past alone...Modern knowledge does not present a unified picture. It rather reminds us in many ways of the unrest and agitation which in history has always been the harbinger of something new. There is perhaps this difference that the world events that are shaping up[15] at the present have more of the character of world-judgment than at any previous time. It may, however, not be impossible to discern certain fundamental tendencies in the general manner of thinking, and see how from various directions they seem to point especially toward a renewed personal idealism.[16]

In 1908 the Boström Society was formed in Sweden.[17] In the Introduction to the first issue of its publication, Smärre skrifter, Karl Pira and G. J. Keijser in

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14. Ibid., 1.
15. This was written during the first World War.
16. BSP, 117-118.
17. Supra, 3.

a joint article say that Sweden has passed through a period that was inimical to idealism, but that there are signs of a desire to return.[18]

It is thus apparent that Boström had his day of almost complete philosophical influence in Sweden. It is also apparent that his influence has waned since the beginning of the present century. Whether his followers will be able to effect a new-Boströmism remains for the future years to disclose.

2. Boström's Influence Beyond Sweden

From the investigations that have been made concerning Boström's influence it is apparent that beyond Sweden his influence has been almost negligible.

18. In [Pira and Keijser, ed.], SS, 1(1908), I, 4.

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18. In [Fire and Reliner, ed.], 33, I(1908), 1, 4.

CHAPTER V

TRANSLATION OF BOSTRÖM'S INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION[1]

Religion is not equivalent in meaning to a certain dogmatic manner of representation [dogmatism], or to certain feelings and actions; but it is man's actual rationality,[2] his highest form of life, and highest destiny.[3] Hence religion includes the determinations previously mentioned [dogmatism, feeling, action], but as consequences of the essence of religion. When religion is comprehended in this manner, the philosophy of religion has as its purpose the highest end of man. On this fact its importance depends. One could say that to have religion is more important than to know it. Religion, however, as a spiritual activity, has no more important ingredient than clear consciousness, which is better than obscurity, and contains greater certainty.[4]

The Greeks, after they had begun to engage in practical philosophy, were concerned chiefly with ethics and politics. With Plato and Aristotle philos-

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1. This chapter comprises pages 1 to 18 of Boström's Philosophy of Religion, as recorded from class lectures and edited by his student, Sigurd Ribbing. This translation is in part selected. **Omissions are shown by dots.**
2. "Aktuela förnuftighet."
3. "Högsta bestämmelse."
4. The Cartesian tradition of clear and distinct ideas. See Edfeldt, Art.(1897), 251.

CHAPTER V

TRANSLATION OF SCHLEIER'S INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION[1]

Religion is not equivalent in meaning to a certain dogmatic manner of representation [Vorstellung], or to certain feelings and actions; but it is man's actual rationality,[2] his highest form of life, and highest destiny.[3] Hence religion includes the determinations previously mentioned [knowledge, feeling, action], but as consequences of the essence of religion. When religion is comprehended in this manner, the philosophy of religion has as its purpose the highest end of man. On this rest its importance depends. One could say that to have religion is more important than to know it. Religion, however, as a spiritual activity, has no more important ingredient than clear consciousness, which is better than obscurity, and contains greater certainty.[4]

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1. This chapter comprises pages 1 to 18 of Boeckh's Philosophy of Religion, as recorded from class lectures and edited by his students, Eduard Hübling. This translation is in part selected. Omissions are shown by dots.
2. "Wirkliche Vernünftigkeit."
3. "Höchste Bestimmung."
4. The Cartesian tradition of clear and distinct ideas. See Reflexh, Art.(1897), 29f.

ophy of religion was the first part of ethics, without the insight that religion is a concept by itself, which is the foundation of ethics and politics.[5] Neo-Platonism indeed began with religion, but was so engaged with the starting-point that it did not arrive at the practical use of it as applied to humanity and the state.[6]

It is true that, within Christianity, man early engaged in religious problems, but for a long time rather under the form of positive doctrine than as philosophy. When, at the beginning of modern times, one [a philosophy] was developed, it was at first directed toward the outer world; and when it encountered difficulties with regard to the possibility of knowledge of the outer [world], the chief question centered around the objectivity of knowledge, and man's character and nature as a condition for answering this question.[7]

In the thought of Kant and Fichte, philosophy of

5. Boström here fails to distinguish properly between Aristotle, who had almost no religion at all, and Plato, who was a mystic and who made religion autonomous. See E. S. Brightman in Ferm (ed.), ENC REL, 592-595.

6. This statement may be due to the fact that Boström was deeply interested in political science. Some of his extensive writings are in this field. SB, I, 355-416; II, 311-476; III, 85-163, 330-346.

7. For a brief presentation of Boström's epistemology see supra, 30.

V. Translation of Boethius's Introduction

religion is still an appendage to ethics. It is only in more recent times that philosophy has been compelled to return to the ultimate principles of the spirit and of nature, even as it has been recognized that religion is indispensable for practical philosophy in its entirety. Thus we have in our own days [1848] witnessed a philosophical point of view which has directed philosophy and religion to each other, although indeed in an improper way, since it has regarded religion simply as a lower form of that which, in a higher form, constitutes philosophy, and comprises its contents.[8]

...[It is, therefore, necessary] to present something positive and satisfactory in religion from a philosophical point of view, because reason must in all problems be decisive, since it is what lies outside reason that is questioned; and from what lies outside reason no arguments can be produced.[9]

...The principle of philosophy must be such that it can be considered as correct in itself,[10] because otherwise it would not be the highest principle. The

8. This statement, which is directed especially against Hegel, does not appear to be a true evaluation of Hegel's position. Hegel speaks of the reciprocal relations of philosophy and religion. He says that the content of religion and philosophy is the same, except for details of external nature and finite mind which falls outside the range of religion. Hegel holds that religion should not set herself against comprehending reason and against philosophy in general, especially against a philosophy of which the doctrine is speculation, and so religion. See Hegel, PM, 182-183.

9. Indication of Boström's rational idealism.

10. Boström holds that philosophy is the science of the principles of the other sciences. See below, 54-55.

psychological education that is required for it may be diversified, but the means for understanding its principle and for perceiving its truth does not lie in it; this must be accomplished through analysis of the principle itself.

What is the philosophy of religion, and what is its place in the system of philosophy? This question raises two others: What is philosophy? and, What is religion? Each of these can be considered from two viewpoints: What is philosophy, and what is religion: 1) in itself? 2) for us? These two must not be confused, but each question must be answered differently. If they are confused, the answer for the one will not be valid for the other.

The question as to what philosophy is in itself can also be expressed by: What is philosophy in its purity and perfection, i.e., without any negations except those which are essential to it? This expression is synonymous with: in itself,[11] because nothing can be more than itself. In like manner the same question finds another expression: What is it in its essence? For the truth and perfection of a thing is its essence in contrast with the phenomena (the manner in which a thing reveals itself to another). Likewise: What is

11. From the immediate context it appears that Boström here means "intrinsically."

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it as to its concept or its idea? Idea is intensification of apprehending or comprehending,[12] just as _percipere_ (or perceiving) is of _capere_, namely, _well and securely_, by which [intensification] the apprehending power unites the apprehended with itself, and remains in it as a force. The correctness of what has been said can be seen through reflection on analogous expressions: to penetrate into something, to gain insight into it, etc. Thus idea is clear and distinct, and thereby true perception; such a perception is identical with its object.[13] We, therefore, do not seek philosophy outside of ourselves, but in the spirit's own essence or idea.

Again, the latter question, What is man's philosophy? does not have the same meaning as the former. [This] is clear from the fact that our philosophy can have many shortcomings [for human experience], which it does not have in itself. Our philosophy is the result of our effort to understand philosophy in itself, and this effort can succeed only relatively, because of our finiteness. Philosophy in itself is related to _our_ philosophy as, for example, pure gold to impure...

12. "Omfatta."

13. Boström's metaphysical monism is found in his repeated statement that nothing originally exists but God and His ideas. Here he also includes epistemological monism.

A preparatory reflection may here be added: Philosophy in itself postulates a similarly perfect subject, whose knowledge it is, since all knowledge must be someone's...Philosophy, therefore, requires a subject, and if it should reveal itself as infinite, then God alone could be its subject, and then philosophy becomes God Himself, seen, namely, as simply knowing.[14] Therefore the human philosophy is not the wisdom of the world, but the wisdom of God,[15] because it has God more than the world as object, and the effort is to make the content of one's consciousness similar to the content of God's consciousness.

It may, further, be observed that we cannot answer the second question--what philosophy is for man--without first having determined what it is in itself. This seems to imply a contradiction, since mine is nearest to me, and it can be questioned whether we can ever arrive at insight of anything else, or anything different. But here it is to be observed that man, as finite, has feelings and representations before he has ideas; consequently he also has faith before he has knowledge. Through the former he acquires

14. Boström employs several different words for God, as "Gudomlighet," "Gud." In this translation "God" will be used in each instance, since Boström uses them interchangeably.

15. "Världsvishet" and "Gudsvishet."

a certain acquaintance with the objects; but to gain an idea he must get to the ground of it,[16] whereas, when he wishes to understand by faith and opinion, he does the opposite. Thus [it is] in the present instance. We must begin with what philosophy is in and for us, in order that therefrom we may conclude what it is in itself. On the other hand, we cannot fully know the former so long as we seek only the latter, just as the the phenomenon, as the first with which we are acquainted, gives occasion to seek the being, but can properly be understood only through the latter...

By way of introduction, we may finally be reminded of the fact that the question as to what philosophy is for us can itself be taken in a two-fold sense: What has it been up to the present? The answer here must come from the history of philosophy. Secondly: What must it always remain for us? This is what we here have to clarify.

What is philosophy in itself? To answer this question, we must proceed from something known, namely, that philosophy is a science, and the highest science. Someone could question the latter. To such a question we should give the answer that, if there is an higher [science], then that is just the one we here mean and and define...As the science that deals with the prin-

16. "Gå till följd från grund."

ciples for the other sciences, philosophy is the ground for them, and that on which they rest...Therefore philosophy, as the ground of the other sciences, includes all that they contain plus something more; that is to say, they are phenomena of philosophy, as the visible sun is of the real sun. If we possessed all philosophy, or if our philosophy were philosophy in itself, then no other knowledge would be possible beside this, because it would include everything, except its own negations.

As a science, philosophy is a knowledge, and a knowledge about something; it has form and content. Form and content are the same, considered more generally and more specifically, namely, as that according to which we answer the questions how and what the thing is. As a science, philosophy is formally determined, 1) as knowing, which again includes, a) a self-consciousness, the unity itself, and b) a certain form of it, i.e., a perceiving.

To perceive is to be self-conscious in a determinate way, so that one can answer how and of what consciousness is conscious. That the word has this meaning can by way of example be illuminated from the

ancient scripture, that "the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God,"[17] i.e., he is not self-conscious to such an extent that he is conscious of them.[18] As to its form, perceiving is: dim, or noticeable only to others; or clear: noticeable to the conscious person himself. The former is feeling; the latter is representation, clearer or more abstract, and more inner, affording a form in space, either of something present, or absent, in which case, however, the perceived is not yet fully clear, because the spirit is not in it, but it is for him an object.[19] If a person grasps a portion of the representation with complete clearness, then it becomes idea, which is the highest form of perceiving. Ideas, namely, are certain, and are known as unchangeable, which again coincides with the form of perfection and completeness. Thus understood, nothing can be more, or in any other way, than it is perceived.

Philosophy as knowing is consequently c) an understanding, but one which is not transition from one perception to another on the level of perceiving. Thus philosophy, as knowledge and science, is a

17. I Corinthians 2:14.

18. One of Boström's basic words is "förnimma": "to perceive." In this quotation the Swedish has "förnimmer" where the English has "receiveth." The Greek word δέχομαι, which is translated as "förnimmer" and "receiveth," also means "embrace," "make one's own." Perhaps here is a relation to his word, "omfatta," supra, 52.

19. "Objectum."

a) fixed, b) clear, c) necessary, and d) systematic perceiving, because it aims at everything in its object, and thus includes a manifold, whose moments do not nullify, but postulate each other. Clear perceptions cannot contradict each other. Philosophy is, further, 2) the highest science, a) qualitatively, i.e., as science, fully clear; and b) quantitatively, the all-embracing, namely, God in His omniscience.[20]

As to its contents (determined in a general way),[21] philosophy is the science of that which is in itself, or of the absolutely existing, i.e., of being in a restricted and true[22] sense. It is perfect perceiving. But nothing can be perceived better than as it is in itself, in contrast with the phenomenon, which is the being imperfectly perceived. Since conception is the highest and the perfect form of perceiving; and since the true perception must be a correspondence between the perceived and the absolutely true, i.e., since there must be absolute similarity or identity; or since the perception and the perceived[23] are divided only as quod and quid; therefore, philosophy, as science of the being, becomes the science of the concepts or ideas, that is to say, of the

20. Boström here seems to say that philosophy is God. Elsewhere he actually does so. See supra, 53.
21. "I allmänhet bestämt."
22. "I inskränkt och egentlig bemärkelse."
23. "Perceptionen och perceptum."

absolute reason and its content, which is just the true being.

Conception, or clear perception, and idea are the same...It may, furthermore, be observed that even in the sensuous and in the empirical sciences we also seek the absolute reason and its content, not immediately, but as referred to us: thus, however, the Divine, provided we, as far as regards our essence, are ideas in the Absolute Reason, and consequently are what constitutes its determination, is apprehended by this reason in and with the apprehension of the idea.[24]

...It is thus apparent that philosophy is a knowledge which is absolutely independent,...since there is nothing besides the absolute knowledge. Philosophy is, furthermore, an organic whole of ideas, and thus is not sensuous, or divisible, or changeable. It is also a form of life and self-consciousness, namely, the absolute reason with its content, which includes everything in itself. This means that philosophy in itself is 1) not a system, but the system; 2) yet it is a system, namely, the infinite system...; 3) is knowl-

24. Beginning with "thus, however," the Swedish is involved. "Således dock det Gudomliga, såvida vi till vårt väsen och äro ideer hos det absoluta förnuftet och följaktligen vad som utgör dess bestämdhet, fattas av detta förnuft i och med fattandet av idén."

edge about the being, or beings, and hence about reason in its concept. Aristotle already saw that the highest form of thought was νόησις νοήσεως; Plato understood the ideas in a similar manner.[25]

The phenomena, on the other hand, are excluded from this philosophy. If someone should ask whether the Absolute Reason, or God, does not have knowledge of them, the answer must be, Yes, from Him no knowledge is excluded, but He knows the phenomena, not as the determinations of His consciousness, but of man's. Finally...philosophy in itself is God's self-consciousness of Himself in the totality of His determinations or ideas, or His life as knowing. If, therefore, philosophy is found in man, it is a participation in God's consciousness and life.[26]

The concept of motion does not belong to the concept of life; what constitutes life in the finite living beings is not motion, but their independence, and this again is found only in self-conscious beings,

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25. The text here is so fragmentary that it is impossible to determine what Boström means. The words are: "Likasá Plato: om ideerna." Literally: "As Plato: concerning the ideas." The context seems to indicate that Boström means that for Plato the highest forms of thought were the ideas. With Plato, however, the ideas are independent and unchangeable. Phaedo 78, 100-105.

26. That Boström means this in a metaphysical sense seems evident from his statement that man's philosophy is an effort to make the content of one's consciousness similar to the content of God's consciousness. Supra, 53.

and the degree of the one is, therefore, equal to that of the other.

Man's philosophy...is his consciousness of himself in God and in His system of ideas. Again, it is philosophy in itself with the negations under which it appears in man as a result of his limitations. [Once again] it is the result of the striving of man's spirit to realize himself as absolutely knowing, or in himself to achieve philosophy in itself; in other words, it is his highest life as a sentient being. Such a philosophy is possible for man, provided he is rational, and a participant of the Divine; namely, when he is considered in his truth and essence, i.e., that he is an idea in God, or enters into His knowledge, and that this knowledge--the system of His ideas--is found in the unity of his consciousness, even though more or less clearly.

On the other hand, man's philosophy differs from philosophy in itself in the same way as man differs from God: he partakes of His reason--is rationis particeps--but is not the reason. Rational is related to reason as the golden to gold; man indeed grasps all of His ideas, but only a few clearly in each instant of time.[27] Therefore his philosophy also has the same character as philosophy in itself, but only relatively:

27. "Tidsmoment." Compare Royce's "Time-span." See WI, II, 122-142.

it is potentially infinite,, or has the infinite in itself--as ground,--but actually finite;...it is more or less organic; is indeed (as to its content) infinite, but only in connection with knowing about something material; and it is eternal...and develops in various ways. Thus man's philosophy is generally only relatively identical with God's.

...Wherever there is clarity in the apprehension, there is also philosophical apprehension <u>of</u> or <u>with respect to</u> the phenomenal world. On this depends the <u>manner</u> in which man must proceed to attain philosophy. Much has been said about a method peculiar to philosophy, according to which philosophy should,, as it were, follow of itself, or the method coincide with the construction and reality of the object itself. If such a help[28] could be found, it would be very comfortable for philosophizing; but it is not to be found, and is superfluous for the one who can walk by himself. In reality the whole method consists in this: through analysis and abstraction a person goes back to the most simple element in his consciousness, and by means of this he synthesizes the more concrete, in order by synthesis to illuminate the concrete with the clarity he has gained in the more abstract...This method has

28. "Ledstol."

from the beginning of knowledge been the only one, and the correct one...

Philosophy in itself does not have parts, but is an organic whole. The same kind of knowledge permeates the whole. But man's philosophy permits a division, because man must develop the multiplicity of his determinations in time, or be active, and he can thereby apprehend himself and his world from various points of view, whereby a division arises between theoretical and practical activity. There is for man, as finite, an outer and an inner, and the relation of his activity to these different poles determines the difference in his activity. He can pose as the goal of his efforts the bringing of the obscure to clarity. Under these circumstances he moves from the outer to the inner--which also per se is his highest goal. Here he reflects less upon the fact that he is active, although this also enters into his perceiving.

There is, furthermore, however, more or less of struggle between the outer and the inner, which calls forth effort to remove this contradiction by changing the external to conform to the internal, in which case he reflects less upon the fact that here also there is perceiving. In both instances he seeks harmony, but in the theoretical he seeks it in the things themselves or their being, and in the practical he seeks it in the

relation between himself and them...Only free activity has a purpose. Therefore practical philosophy deals only with it, and thus determines what the activity should be in order to attain the goal.

When we thus divide man's philosophy into theoretical and practical, this is not a division of philosophy itself as such, but only with regard to the point of view from which it conceives its object and its relation to the given. Theoretical philosophy thus deals with the given, which does not depend on man's free activity, but only on the absolute as ground. The practical philosophy does not have anything to do with what is actual in man's world, but with what should become actual in it through man's free activity...The difference between theoretical and practical philosophy can also be expressed in this way: The former deals with the true, the latter with the good...

The theoretical philosophy is divided into: 1) Theology: concerning the being, or the absolute reason in itself and in its relation to man and his world as the ultimate ground in general, and thereby an explanation of these; 2) Anthropology: concerning the essence of the individual man, i.e., in a rational being existing in a physical nature; and 3) Ethnology:...the doctrine of tribes, races, and families, as natural societies. The philosophical doctrine of nature does not

constitute a special philosophical discipline, but only implies a completion of what is included in the doctrine of man, since nature, as such, exists only in relation to man...

The practical philosophy also includes three parts: this practical philosophy is the doctrine of reason as purpose and law, whose unity is religion--whence all practical philosophy is the science of religion. This purpose and law can be regarded 1) as such, or for man in general, when it is the Science of Religion in a restricted sense; 2) for the individual man: Ethics or Moral Philosophy; and 3) for the community or the state, as such, Statecraft or Political Science...

The correctness of what has just been said about religion and philosophy of religion can easily be seen by the following general remarks, in and by which we also gain the concept of religion in itself as man's [religion]. No one can be religious without being rational, and vice versa. If the contrary were true, one could be more or less rational without being religious, and thus also absolutely rational without being religious. Religion would then have no relation to reason, and if such were the case, it could thus not be made man's highest goal, i.e., would not be religion.

The conclusion of this is that a person is religious in the same degree that he is rational, and vice

versa, and that, therefore, religion and reason are identical. Since no one can be more religious or rational than reason, religion in itself is consequently God Himself.

Man's religion again stands in the same relation to the absolute religion as his philosophy to philosophy in and for itself. God does not <u>have</u> religion, but He <u>is</u> religion, and it is wrong to limit its meaning to that of merely human qualification. As thus understood, we can see the importance of religion for man...Man cannot place any higher goal for himself than God. Man's religion has also been called <u>faith</u>, which is not the mere conviction, but also a life conforming to it. Here the reason for the name was that from a certain standpoint we do not distinguish between faith and knowledge.

When I say, however, that <u>religion and reason</u> in and for themselves are <u>both God</u>, this does not mean that they are to be regarded as purely identical, but that in each one we <u>see God</u> from a somewhat different point of view. God is the Highest Being with all its determinations; and this we call reason when we think of it only as absolute self-consciousness or perceiving. Religion again is this same reason as binding or determining man's free activity...Only man's innermost being can bind him, but then his being is God's.

Therefore man's religion is not something merely theoretical--a manner of representation--but rather something practical; it is willing and doing, even as philosophy of religion is a practical discipline.[29] Every determination in man, even actual knowledge, or consciousness, is immediately united with practical activity, or the results of it. Man's life is a continuous activity in time, and, therefore his original nature is to be active practically, i.e., to be will. The will determines the end, and directs the activity toward it.

The correctness of the division of philosophy which has been presented gains confirmation by giving attention to the manner in which philosophy has shaped itself historically, in which no other division has been satisfactory, except the one now made by me.[30] In the Orient there is no philosophy;[31] it is related to Europe as fancy to reason, but without organization.

The Greeks were the first to develop philosophy with a certain organization. At the beginning it was

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29. In this statement lies an explanation of the character of Boström's Philosophy of Religion.

30. Boström had implicit confidence that he had presented a new and unimpeachable philosophical system. See supra, 27.

31. This statement seems extreme in view of the fact that Boström accepted some of the Oriental thought, as, for instance, transmigration. See below, 100-101. The explanation to this statement may be Boström's view that Oriental thought was not critical enough. See below, 111-112.

merely theoretical philosophy without divisions, such as, Cosmology, Anthropology, Theology, because the external and the internal fused. Toward the end of the first period, however, a two-fold reality was distinguished, as also a two-fold science: the one concerning the Being, or Theology, and the other an empirical science, Physics. Plato accepted this division, and added a third, Ethics, which was first developed by the Sophists and Socrates. The ethics of Socrates was also statecraft, both in one, because among the Greeks there was no state, but only communities.[32] With Socrates, therefore, as with the Greeks generally, the entire practical philosophy became ethics, whereof the science of religion merely became a part, and politics a major part.

Aristotle took a forward step in the organization, using the same three-fold division. With him, however, there is another, in accordance with the division of human activity: the theoretical and the practical. Thus he also divided philosophy into theoretical and practical. But in Aristotle's philosophy the economy[33] is not a philosophical consideration, and ethics and politics fall together. The subsequent

32. The influence of Plato is evident in Boström's interest in statecraft.

33. "Ekonomiken."

Greek philosophers retained the three-fold division, but the first division with them became only a formal part--as a residuum of Aristotle's Logic--which is only a part of Anthropology. Neo-Platonism was without organization because of Oriental influence. It contained only Theology and Philosophy of Religion.

At the beginning of modern times there was only imperfect organization. Bacon divided [philosophy] according to imagination,[34] memory, and reason; but his philosophy is only empirical. Wolff was the first to divide philosophy into theoretical and practical, the former (the theoretical) into Logic and Metaphysics, and Metaphysics into Ontology, Cosmology, Psychology, and Theology; and the practical into Ethics and Natural Law, Politics and International Law...

Kant has made his division in transcendental philosophy, which investigates the cognitive faculties, divided into the different critiques, and a metaphysics, the theoretical dealing with nature, and the practical dealing with morals. This is an unfortunate division, because according to Kant, nature is itself a phenomenon and, therefore, belongs to Anthropology. The practical philosophy is incomplete, because practical philosophy also has to do with the law...Fichte also

34. "Fantasi."

has only a theoretical and a practical part, and the former only Anthropology, the latter Ethics and Natural Law.

Hegel has made a new division. Nature and Spirit are equally real and, therefore, his philosophy has become a philosophy of nature and Spirit, in which both have something in common.[35] But while with Schelling this became empty in content--the abstract identity between nature and Spirit,, or a negation of both--Hegel, on the other hand, presented Logic as the common general form or concept of nature and Spirit, in the sense of a metaphysical science (just as the dialectic in Plato).

This three-fold division by Hegel is neither like that of the Greeks, nor an improvement of it, nor can it be justified in the system. Logic, which is supposed to contain the general forms of thought, and is related to the rest as general grammar is to the special languages, does not in this way have any special content. Plato's dialectic did have it, because its object, the Ideas, did not need the other parts of philosophy, although, on the contrary, with these it was also Theology.[36] Hegel's Physics is not similar to Plato's Physics,, because the latter refers only to the sensuous

35. Nature and Spirit, however, are not on an equal plane in Hegel's dialectic. His ultimate synthesis is the Absolute Spirit.

36. "Ehuruväl tvärtom med dessa, den var alltså teologi."

existence; this however, completely understood, also includes man as phenomenon.

Hegel also assigns man's sensuousness to the philosophy of Spirit, but considers that of the animals under natural philosophy, though there is no difference in nature between them. Ethics in Hegel is only a physics, because it does not consider what ought to be done, but morality is regarded as that which has become reality. Moral philosophy thus becomes equivalent to the history of philosophy and, therefore, not practical, as if only a plus or a minus of ideality is the difference between nature and Spirit. Here, then, a difficulty appears in the system itself, namely, that nature and Spirit comprise thesis and antithesis, whence Logic does not become thesis; but the parts of philosophy become, <u>first</u>, the philosophy of nature, <u>then</u> of the Spirit, and for the third, Logic. Finally, the philosophy of Spirit includes the doctrine of the subjective, the objective, and the absolute Spirit. But such a philosophy is not found in the Hegelian system. According to Hegel's system, Spirit is the inner[37] side of nature, and does

37. "Den inre sidan."

not exist without it.[38] The content of the doctrine of absolute Spirit, therefore, becomes: Art, Religion, and Philosophy. But art is always a product of the human spirit, and, therefore, not absolute. Religion is regarded only as historical or mythological, whereas religion has a much wider signification, to which its imperfect form does not belong, but to man. With us philosophy is merely knowing alone, without also being will.

Philosophy of Religion, as a new, separate, and practical division of philosophy, is concerned with religion for man, or man's religion. The science of religion in itself, as is evident from its meaning as previously mentioned, belongs to Theology.[39] As such, it must first present the human religion, or the religious state of mind, in its purity, with conviction, and with beauty; it must also present the immediate

38. Boström's statement here does not seem to harmonize with Hegel's words: "From our point of view Mind (or Spirit) has for presupposition Nature, of which it is the truth, and for that reason its absolute prius. In this its truth Nature is vanished, and mind has resulted as the 'Idea' entered on possession of itself. Here the subject and object of the Idea are one--either is the intelligent unity, the notion. This identity is absolute negativity--for whereas in Nature the intelligent unity has its objectivity perfect but externalized, this self-externalization has been nullified and the unity in that way been made one and the same with itself. Thus at the same time it is this identity only so far as it is a return out of nature." PM, 6.

39. Supra, 63.

products of it, as well as man's hopes united with it; and this is the true Philosophy of Religion. Besides this, it must likewise account for religion in the limitations and frailties with which it appears in time in mankind, such as sin or false and imperfect religion. It must also account for the way in which man is brought back to religion, i.e., salvation and improvement. It must also provide the means for it--the Church and revelation.

Finally, the history of religion may also be subjected to a philosophical observation, namely, how the idea of religion has successively appeared and the reasons for the order of development. Before Philosophy of Religion, and as a necessary introduction to it, we must, however, give a presentation of Theology and Anthropology--just as theoretic conviction is itself a moment in religion, and the religious conviction should indeed be the fully correct theology. The doctrine of freedom prepares the transition from the theoretical propadeutics to the true practical science of religion.

One could ask about the importance of, and the interest in, philosophy of religion. Here it may be remarked that, strictly speaking, it is improper to talk about the importance of that which has worth in and for itself. And, by way of information, it may also be mentioned that a thing has interest for a person in so

far as it enters, as a moment, into his innermost being, or has a necessary relationship to it.

Spinoza says that all that man strives for is good, but not, on the contrary, that he strives for something because it is good; and this remark, properly understood, is true. As to his essence, man is a force, and the nature of such a force is not to work for something exterior, yet according to its own nature; and in the measure that something stands in relation to it, it becomes a good for the active individual. Thus, for example, the object of a sensuous desire is a good when it is sought, although it can be an evil in relation to man's total tendency, according to which all without exception is measured.

But just <u>that</u> is religion, which, therefore, has absolute value and interest...In this value and interest philosophy of religion has a part. It is not religion itself, but an activity which seeks to bring religion to clarity, and thereby also man in his religion to freedom, both in relation to God and to other people. Because that which is clear to him is also something inner and his very own, and not merely an external.

The meaning of philosophy of religion for the practical philosophy has already been touched. Without a correct philosophy of religion ethics and politics

40. Supra, 71.

are impossible. It is important, finally, for life to be able to retain the purely rational and free in religion without mingling it with anything sensuous which, especially in times of religious unrest, so often happens when expressions of sensuous instincts and desires are assumed, and people believe that they can further religion with them, as for example, persecutions.

With the possession of philosophy of religion it is possible calmly to observe, judge, and measure the worth of the positive religions, without discarding everything in them, because certain elements in them have the significance of a covering for the truly religious.[41]

A positive religion arises in the same way as the individual himself in his various degrees of development, i.e., his different ways of thinking and acting. Usually a certain religious consciousness appears in <u>one</u> person, and since this consciousness is an expression of the age in which he lives, it is accepted by the rest. In the founder of the religion, however, all of <u>this</u> religious consciousness is found, and all subsequent development

41. Boström believed that he presented Philosophy of Religion from the Christian standpoint. It is presumable that he was concerned with the form of Christianity in which he was brought up. See below, 94.

of <u>that</u> religion simply becomes a growth in the comprehension or presentation of what already existed in the founder. When the cult has been established, and the teachings of the founder collected, the need arises to build them into a unity, so that the scattered doctrines of the founder are apprehended under certain rubrics and in certain statements, which are supported by the authority of the founder, and also not found to be internally inconsistent.[42]

These positive religious doctrines thus arise in the same way as the positive systems of jurisprudence: through the repetition of similar procedure, according to the sense of right, in several similar instances, this procedure is determined to constitute law, and the laws are then assembled and arranged into an empirical system.

Later the philosophic sciences of religion arise. When several churches, or different authorities in the same church, arise, a reconciliation of those engaged in the strife can naturally not be from these themselves, because they all constitute, or base themselves on, historical-empirical authority. For the settlement of the struggle we must, rather, seek a higher principle. Thus it was in Greece at the time of the Sophists; thus also at the Reformation. <u>This</u> is the meaning of

42. "I strid med sitt eget inre."

the philosophic science of religion: it is an attempt to determine religion by reason.

The purpose and function of the philosophic science of religion is, therefore, not necessarily to war against the positive religious doctrines. On the other hand, a dispute can arise as to whether the standpoint of the philosophical science of religion is higher than that of the positive, or lower. This can be true with regard to philosophical views at variance with Christianity, which have been such as have developed out of lower principles than Christianity. On the other hand, a philosophy which has attained the highest principle cannot easily come into conflict with Christianity, except in that which for religion itself is immaterial.

A philosopher cannot readily get away from the religion into which he was born, except as to what concerns the non-essential in it. He may possibly give another explanation of the content of the positive religious doctrines, as Copernicus did about the motion of the heavenly bodies, but thereby the positive still remains with <u>its</u> worth. So far as religion is concerned, therefore, we do not need to be afraid of the development of philosophy, but we only need to turn polemically against what from a lower view than that of religion wishes to establish itself as philosophy.

The question may be asked as to how, since philos-

ophy has arisen, we can be assured that it will not annul the positive religion. It can be done only through insight as to their relationship, as essence and phenomenon, in which case no annulment can come into question. But this must be acknowledged, that in a battle within the positive religious teaching the rational must be the norm for the decision. Correspondence with the empirical religious doctrine may be taken as an indication of the perfection in principle of the rational, so that it is suspicious, if the latter discards any of the leading features in the positive. Should it, however, become apparent that this must be done, then it is patently unreasonable that the one who has seen something clearly should abandon it because of external compulsion.[43]

But, some one may say, the rational science of religion can proceed from false principles, and is variable. Indeed, but it is the same way with the positive religious doctrine as soon as it develops into a system. In any case it is clear that, if a rational system offends anyone's feelings, he will not accept it.[44]

The one who is to study Philosophy of Religion must

43. Compare with Brightman's coherence-theory. See his PR, 189-193.

44. This may be what is often done, but such procedure cannot be defended. Reason ought to conquer feelings.

have interest in religion and the higher life of man. This implies that this life in some measure already is real in him, because the one who feels the need of instruction already has some knowledge. This study also posits a need to gain clarity as to one's position[45] with relation to the whole more than to any special part of it. Such a study, therefore, is not for all, but nature itself has divided the aptitudes and talents.[46] But this much can be required of each one, namely, that he may have a view of the whole, and thus see himself, in his branch, as a part of the whole. The one who gives himself chiefly to philosophy of religion has thereby indeed also chosen a branch, but the chief one. In addition, acumen and depth are needed, as well as the power of independent research. Through an apprehension only of what others have taught, one receives a lower and merely historical viewpoint.

45. "Bestämdhet."
46. In a controversy with Borelius, Boström says of him that he was not intended by our Lord to be a thinker. SB, III, 181.

CHAPTER VI

TRANSLATION OF BOSTRÖM'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION[1]

The meaning of religion--in itself and as man's religion--we have already clarified in the introduction to these lectures, and have considered it further in the teaching concerning God's metaphysical attributes.[2] In this teaching we have also presented the [doctrine] of religion in itself, inasmuch as this is God Himself in a certain relation to man. The true philosophy of religion, on the other hand, as essentially practical,[3] is, as to its content and object, a doctrine concerning religion as it exists in and for man; or, in other words, it is the doctrine concerning the religious man.

Here we only add a few clarifying remarks to what has been said about religion in general. One can ask: How can one distinguish between man's religion in itself, and for man? [We can do it] for the reason that, when we speak of man, we can mean man as he is in his

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1. The remainder of this translation comprises pages 192-260 of C. J. Boström's Philosophy of Religion, as recorded from class lectures and edited by Sigurd Ribbing. These lectures were delivered at Uppsala during the spring term of 1844, the school year, 1848-1849, and the fall term of 1849.

2. Ribbing (ed.), FR, 115-131.

3. Boström divides his philosophy into the theoretical and the practical. Philosophy of Religion is included in the practical philosophy. For explanation of Boström's use of the words "theoretical" and "practical," see supra, 63.

present temporal state[4] or life; then we think of him from a religious point of view. When we think of the religious man, we have to consider his human religion. Or [we can think of] man as an idea in God, or man as he is, not actu in a certain period of time for himself, but for God; and thus, from a religious point of view, [we can] consider his Divine religion.

Furthermore: How can God be active in the finite being?[5] God is the ground of the finite being, since nothing exists except life, which, therefore, as such, or as to its general nature, is included in everything; an outside and inside does not exist in the spiritual, but only an existence in each other.[6] That which is in itself unchangeable can indeed be active in something else, if this stands in such a relation to it that the former is a force, i.e., operates in it. Thus, for example, with the power of repulsion of things upon others without any change in the repelling, God acts upon man by being the ground of his life and activity, because the last in time, or that into which the activity develops itself, becomes the ground in an active life;

4. "Tidsmoment."

5. In the original this part is a continuation of the previous paragraph. Since the paragraphs are usually lengthy, the liberty is taken of breaking them up into shorter ones.

6. A difficult expression: "blott ett i hvartannat vara."

ground, therefore, has here the meaning of end and law, i.e., the end in each moment of the developing series.

To what does God lead man? To Himself, i.e., to rationality as actual in him [man]; or He gives him the power of self-determination to the same end, or to become a guiding unity for all the forces subordinated under his unity; that is to say, He gives man reason's form, content, and life--all of this in so far as it is possible for man because of his limitations; or He gives him power [to enjoy] the beautiful, the true, and the good. But [He leads man] to something even still greater, since religion gives man power to determine himself for this end, namely: He leads him to holiness and righteousness; or to wisdom, goodness, and perfection; although, due to man's finiteness, this can occur in each moment of time only to a certain degree.

Here, then, we have the meaning of man's religion as human or, what is the same, of the religious man. It is man himself, provided he is a participant in the absolute religion, thus with the same end, but in a lower sphere. In this he is himself the leader, although led by the Divine, that is to say, by freely accepting[7] this [guidance]. That man himself thus guides,[8] though guided, is no contradiction, but means

7. "Ett fritt upptagande."
8. "Styra."

that he, though guiding, is regarded, and stands, under a still higher principle, just as the state guides all its members, but just therein, as itself not absolute, itself is guided by a higher principle; and likewise as the citizens of a state, if they absorb the spirit of the state, thereafter themselves control their environment.

CHAPTER VII

THE HUMAN[1] RELIGION AND THE RELIGIOUS ACTIVITY CONSIDERED IN ITS UNITY: AS THE WORSHIP OF GOD.

By way of introduction to the presentation of the Philosophy of Religion, it is necessary that we rid ourselves of some common elements of one-sidedness[2] with regard to the meaning of religion in and for man, in order that we thereupon may proceed to the consideration of the activity in and with which the religious life as such immediately appears.

Religion in man is man himself as a unity in all his multiplicity,[3] accordingly, religion also becomes such a unity in and for all the moments[4] in man. It is this, however, not simply as an abstract unity or identity in all the moments, but as a unity which develops itself into multiplicity, and them again reveals itself as the unity in and by it. Religion does not have any special relationship to certain human faculties, but rather stands in antithesis to them all as a regulating unity and passes over into all of man's

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1. "Mänskliga."
2. "Ensidigheter."
3. "Mångfald."
4. "Momenter."

powers as a unity and all-ness[5] present in them, and thus becomes man himself as present in all his functions.

From this it can be seen that religion is not merely feeling, as Jacobi and Schleiermacher defined it. The former said that religion is merely feeling of God, and faith founded on this feeling, which did not admit of any evidence. This, however, would make religion merely subjective and an actus without content, whereby religion closes itself against all elucidation. But since the understanding requires clarity, the Jacobian contention is properly to be understood in such a manner that, though religion also is feeling, it is not only that.

Schleiermacher defined religion as an absolute feeling ofman's absolute dependence on God. But, no matter how absolute the feeling may be, it is never identical with God Himself, provided one does not wish to make Him into simply an abstract unity. An absolute feeling is, furthermore, a contradiction, and: religion does not go out of itself in order to determine the multiple as something beside itself, or as something upon which it exercised no power.

Another--the contrary extreme--is Hegel's insistence

5. "Allhet." This is apparently a word that Boström coined. It conveys the idea of inclusiveness.

that religion is only the power of the general[6] in man, or simply knowing and willing: religion would then be the objective, or with its object identical, knowing, or ethical conduct according to general maxims. But religion is found in man even when he has not risen to this stage of development; it is in the time-process first and predominantly feeling, and never ceases also to be feeling; it is, therefore, just as well a form of knowing and willing, as also of feeling and struggle.-- If religion, therefore, is not merely feeling, but also not merely a knowing and a willing, but the one as well as the other, as a unity of them all, then it includes all the human functions, or comprises them in their harmonious development for man's highest end.

The form of activity which is directly religious is the cult, or the worship of God, by which is understood neither the merely theoretical or the merely practical activity in man, which immediately tends toward the general realization of religion in him, or the incorporation of the Divine in his consciousness and the subordination under it of his activity. It must be distinguished from all other functions, which deal with something special, although it is not without influence on them. [It is] like the activity of the citizen, which consists in making himself conscious of

6. "Det generalas makt."

the meaning and importance of the community, in order to stir up his consciousness about them, or to incorporate them in his consciousness and gain the power of the community spirit in relation to, or as determining in, all his other activity.

This religious activity can be partly private, by the individual, partly public, in connection with [the activity] of others, as the citizen strengthens the community spirit, not only in himself, but also in others. Thus one has to distinguish between an individual and a public cult; both need to be united, because the individual reaches completeness principally in the congregation. The combined cult can, moreover, appear in various circles, as in the family, or the community--par préférence as a result of the possibility of its members coming together;--nevertheless, [it can] also [appear] in the state through common festive days.

The moments in the purpose of the cult are: the elevation of the human spirit to God, and inspiration by God; also subordination or submission under and ovation in and of the Divine, or: elevation to God; devotion and submission, or piety (as one virtue or expression of the religious manner of thinking, not as all of this); and peace and joy in God. The elevation and the devotion differ from each other only as the beginning and the conclusion of the same ceremony:[7] to

7. "Akt."

raise man to the immaterial--or a partial victory over the evil, not triumph, which is the total annihilation of the enemy,--of which devotion is the result. Devotion can be called enthusiasm; this word, however, like Begeisterung, really only indicates the theoretical in connection with it; devotion is man's entire being completely filled by God. Piety is the state of mind in which one freely subordinates one's activity to the demands on it which lie in religion. It is always a constraint, namely, of sensuousness, but not as a loss of freedom, but quite the contrary: man's power is heightened through piety, and it is just this state of mind, to feel oneself more perfect, which is the other side of piety--just as the case is with the citizen who feels his purpose to be gained because he realizes or works for that of the state.

It is these two sides in goodness or piety which are designated by submission and ovation, just as it (piety) as a whole is the more practical side in the purpose of the cult, as over against devotion as the more theoretical.

After indicating the purposes of the cult the question becomes the one as to the means through which these shall be attained: the acts which we call religious adoration, and which can be several and of different kinds, according to varying stages of development. The lowest form of it (for the feeling)

is the collecting of feeling away from the external, which is gained through quiet, wherefore the service begins with it. Of similar significance are such symbolic acts as, for example, the folding of the hands: external rest. Here, further, the religious music belongs, with another character than that of the aesthetic: not a definite presentation of a certain idea of art, but of the religious feeling in general; wherefore the melody in it is lowly in order not to elicit particular fancies, and more indefinite, whereas the harmony is preponderant. Likewise [it is with] other aesthetic meditations: a beautiful day, etc.

Thereupon the collected spirit breaks forth in prayer and song, expressions partly of the majesty of God, and partly of man's insignificance, which already are higher than the mere feeling and achieve results on man's higher theoretical capacities. Here the highest consists of meditations and admonitions which not only have a theoretical purpose, but also a practical and an aesthetic one. From the purpose of the prayer it follows that it is not a petition, but an adoration in general; it does not enter in upon anything special, but upon that which is general; if it moves to something special, then it has lost its religious purpose, and one does not then receive that for which one

prays, because one prays amiss. The prayer may indeed be concerned with numerous individual interests, especially the higher ones,, but only for the purpose of achieving a certain breadth, not to receive something in particular or everything as such, but only in general to lift man to God. The same is also true about the song, which chiefly occurs in the public cult, while on the other hand the individual engages in quiet meditation. The prayer must therefore not be wordy.

The third form of the adoration is the religious meditation or, as public, the address. Concerning this it is true that its purpose shall not be exclusively theoretical, practical, or aesthetic, but man's general elevation to God, from which it can be seen that a religious address must not be a scientific treatise as evidence or elucidation of knowledge concerning a certain object; it does indeed strive for the truth, but not necessarily clearness in detail, and proofs cannot and should not be presented, because what is said may be considered as evident, and the purpose is to elicit fantasy and reason to a spirited occupation with the subject. It should also be practical, but not exclusively, and it should close with this aspect, as it began with the more theoretical consideration. Finally, it should not be an aesthetic work of art, aimed only at

satisfying the aesthetic sense, but only to the extent that it does not offend it. In a word, its purpose is to awaken, admonish, and edify in general.

The second purpose of the cult, namely, piety, is gained through the acts which we call religious sacrifice,[8] or the voluntary offering to God, and has as its object giving to man the tendency of mind[9] whereby he subordinates his purpose under God. These activities can also act preponderantly on feeling, on fantasy, and on reason and the corresponding faculties. The acts are symbols, but they serve to strengthen the tendency just mentioned.

The first acts are those of homage to God (for example, bowing the knee), by which is understood that their purpose is simply to give physical expression to the necessity of subordinating ourselves under God. We have further, as higher moments, thanksgiving and praise (which correspond to prayer). Thanksgiving is a surrendering of egoism to the one from whom one has received a good. Such acts do not have in view[10] receiving further blessings. Finally, there is sacrifice, not necessarily in the old sense of something special, but acts which imply a restraint on the demands of

8. "Sakrifikation."
9. "Riktning."
10. "Åsyfta."

sensuousness, and an increase of the spiritual life. The festivities among the ancients had as their aim costly outlays,[11] which were dedicated to God. This, however, is not necessary, but they do imply the unity of submission and ovation, or the consciousness of the fact that the sacrifices signify an absolute gain.

What remains is to indicate how the cult should be organized appropriately as public, which can be done in numerous ways. The general rules for it follow from what has already been said. Certain individuals must represent the congregation, since the cult is to be performed by several.[12] The reason for this is that it should have in view both purposes mentioned, in such a way, however, that the first precedes and is prepohderant in the former part, and the second in the second part. The spiritual address [sermon] constitutes the central part, after which there are prayers, which assume the character of ovation, with which symbolic offerings are united. This, however, more properly belongs to the doctrine of the Church. On the other hand, the individual cult cannot be determined according to certain rules.

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11. "Kostnader."
12. It seems evident that Boström is here speaking particularly of the Church of Sweden.

A remark ought to be made here. In Swedish cult is called divine worship,[13] for which divine service[14] is not quite proper.[15] This word is an expression of the standpoint of the religious consciousness, when man places God and himself in sharp contrast with each other, as Lord and servant, and devotes a part of his activity to Him, and the rest to himself. But God does not gain anything through his activity. In that case one should rather call all of life a divine service.

Hitherto we have spoken about religion as unity, and about the fact that the activity through which it appears as such is inner, and touches all human power, but only brings them to a head,[16] or gives them an impulse. For that reason, religion may appear as poor in content. But the richness of its content will become apparent as we proceed to the next chapter.[17]

COMMENTS ON THE HUMAN RELIGION AS THE WORSHIP OF GOD

1. The quaint and archaic style of Boström's Phi-

13. "Gudsdyrkan."
14. "Gudstjänst."
15. The Swedish word "kult" is given in English as "cult." The New Century Dictionary gives "worship" as one meaning of "cult," but says that it is obsolete. Since Boström gave his lectures in 1844-1849, it may be assumed that he means "worship." Supra, 79.
16. "Går blott till deras spets."
17. Boström ends this chapter with the words, "när man övergår till betraktande av," without a period, thus leading directly into the caption of the next chapter. But it seems better in this translation to conclude as above.

losophy of Religion is immediately apparent. But these lectures were given one hundred years ago, and the development of language and style, as well as the change in the manner of presentation of the subject, have perhaps made this inevitable.

There are some excellent passages in Boström's lectures, as when, for instance, he says that religion gives man power to determine himself for holiness and righteousness, for wisdom, goodness, and perfection; or when he says that God gives man the power to enjoy the beautiful, the true, and the good.[18]

Compare with the words of Hegel:

> ...Religion is for our consciousness that region in which all the enigmas of the world are solved, all the contradictions of deeper-reaching thought have their meaning unveiled, and where the voice of the heart's pain is silenced--the region of eternal truth, of eternal rest, of eternal peace.[19]

2. Boström's concept of the philosophy of religion[20] differs considerably from that expressed by E. S. Brightman:

> Philosophy of religion is an attempt to discover by rational interpretation of religion and its relations to other types of experience, the truth of religious beliefs and the value of religious attitudes and practices.[21]

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18. Supra, 81.
19. LPR, I, 1.
20. Supra, 71-73.
21. PR, 22.

Brightman says that he has written a philosophy of religion.[22] In a different sense it can be said of Boström that his was a philosophy of religion. He attempted to present a philosophical system of the science of religion based on rational Christian theology. All other systems were by him excluded as inferior.[23] There is consequently a dogmatism in Boström which is a bit strange in a person who claims to be a true philosopher.

3. In his autobiographical article Boström makes the claim that his philosophy of religion corresponds essentially with the Christian doctrines, but that it differs at certain points with current theology.[24]

This position may be inevitable from the point of view of Boström's rational philosophy, but it is making arbitrary use of the Scriptures for one who makes the claim that his philosophy is a vindication of Christianity. When Boström enters the field of making distinctions between Christian doctrines and theology he is in the realm of human reason and opinion. It is, therefore, at least conceivable that both Boström and the theologians may be wrong. It may be that "All philosophy is an effort to be God,"[25] and it may also be true that Boström made a very special effort in his philosophy. But even so it must be regarded as only an effort.

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22. Ibid., vii.
23. SB, III, IX-XIII, especially X.
24. SB, II, 494.
25. Said by P. A. Bertocci in class lecture, March 28, 1946.

There is also perhaps something of condescension, which is not entirely wanting in Boström, in the statement:

> Boström, moreover, believes that the philosophical science of religion can just as little make the positive religion superfluous as philosophical jurisprudence can make positive justice superfluous. He, therefore, urges that every unwarranted disturbance of the development of the present positive religion be rejected...But he makes a definite distinction between appearing as a teacher of positive religion for the unlearned and expressing one's self as a pure research man for the learned.[26]

4. Boström believed that he was the first one to present a true philosophical science of religion.[27] Brightman says that The Euthyphro, a dialogue defending piety, composed shortly after 399 B.C., was the first book ever written on philosophy of religion.[28] Edfeldt, in his survey of the relation of Boström's philosophy to the historic systems, says:

> Any philosophical science of religion, as comprising an independent principal part of practical philosophy had not yet arisen. Boström is the founder of the philosophical science of religion.[29]

Boström does not, of course, deny that there had been philosophy of religion.[30] His claim is that he had brought it to a position that it had not attained

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26. SB, II, 496-497.
27. Supra, 66. For Boström's definition, see supra, 74-76
28. In Ferm (ed.) ENC REL, 593-595.
29. SB, I, 92.
30. Supra, 48-51.

before. The validity of his claim will be accepted or rejected in connection with the acceptance or rejection of his central system of philosophy.

While he does not directly say it, it is apparent that when Boström discusses worship[31] he is doing it from the point of view of worship in the Church of Sweden. This is also implicit in his statement, "A philosopher cannot readily get away from the religion into which he was born."[32] It may further be said that Boström was a patriotic Swede.[33]

5. The first impression that Boström's philosophy of religion is merely a religious essay is in part dissipated when we remember his division of philosophy into the theoretical and the practical, and that his philosophy of religion is a part of the practical, dealing with man as a child of God. Thus conceived, his procedure is understandable in developing the various phases of the Christian life from a philosophical point of view.

Boström's philosophy of religion, perhaps, should be accepted as having a position in the history of religious philosophy. His idealistic position will, furthermore, be of interest, and possibly of value, to

31. Supra, 86.
32. Supra, 76.
33. Landstrom, OTB, 18.

others who accept the same position. At this point his work impresses one, not so much as philosophy of religion in the presently accepted idea, but rather as a philosophically rational defense of Christianity.

CHAPTER VIII

THE HUMAN RELIGION OR THE RELIGIOUS MAN IN HIS STATES

1. The Religious Man's Relation to Deity

We know that man is an idea in God, in which case[1] He is and is considered center and subject; but [we also know] that man can be considered as subject for himself, as a rational being, and as such relatively identical with, and relatively opposed to[2] God, and that as such a being he can approach relative unity with his idea.[3] His relation as religious is here that between a guiding principle and himself as guided by it; not, however, without independence, but as a condition withal of being guided by himself, or himself guiding,[4] by means of[5] the guiding being; these two sides, however, of the religious man's relation to God appear somewhat different at different levels of religious culture. At the beginning of this [culture] the former side is preponderant, so that a person is more in the position of being guided; or, religion has him; but in due time he has religion, and by means of it he guides himself. This is the correct [situation],

1. "Varvid."
2. "Relativt motsatt."
3. This is a recurring emphasis in Boström.
4. Supra, 81-82.
5. "Genom."

a condition of being guided and self-guiding, and is conceivable when man's essence is the divine idea, and when he becomes more independent, the more he realizes himself,[6] so that the religious situation becomes one of cooperation (not merely interaction) in the sense that, without God, the religious life would not be possible.

If we consider this condition more closely with regard to man as self-consciousness and activity, then religion, with regard to the former, is a revelation of God to man, but also man's revelation of God for himself--not revelation to him through certain organs for its communication, but the relationship between God and man by which all more special revelations become possible; God permits him to behold His essence, but he beholds it, and in that case as his own essence. From a practical point of view it becomes the relationship of guiding and being guided, or of absolute dependence and freedom, which do not contradict each other, since man's true essence in fact is the divine. He cannot change his principle, if he wishes to be religious, but neither does he have any desire to do so, inasmuch as it is by free determination. The religious man is ethical by free choice, and vice versa.

6. "Ty mer hon blir till för sig själv."

COMMENTS ON THE RELIGIOUS MAN'S RELATION TO DEITY

One of Boström's fundamental doctrines is that reality consists of God and His ideas.[7] Man as idea is said to be perfect as perceived by God but, nevertheless, to have a certain imperfection. For God the idea is perfect. It is only in itself that the idea is imperfect.[8] This is a distinction that Boström insists should be clearly made.[9]

Yet the goal of the finite spirit is perfection--the realization of himself in the absolute spirit. Even though this goal can never be fully attained, because of failures and imperfections (which Boström characterizes as a remnant of sensuousness), this does not prevent an approximation to the goal by passing

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7. Supra, 39-40. Berkeley says: Ideas are things inactive, and perceived. And Spirits are a sort of beings altogether different from them. I do not therefore say my soul is an idea, or like an idea. However, taking the word idea in a large sense, my soul may be said to furnish extremely inadequate...I myself am not my ideas, but somewhat else, a thinking, active principle that perceives, knows, wills, and operates about ideas." Essay, Principles, Dialogues (Mary Whiton Calkins), (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929), 301-304.
Boström speaks of man as God's idea. But he also holds that man is spirit. SB, III, 263. Boström also speaks of man as a person and an immortal being. With him the ideas are finite-rational beings, or persons, with feeling, consciousness, and self-consciousness. Supra, 39-40, and passim.

8. Wedberg, LSBF, 166. See also SB, II, 487-488, 271-272.

9. SB, III, 225, note 100.

through an endless variety of forms.[10]

> As to its true being, the finite [person] has never begun and never ends, but goes through endless forms, in which each one is <u>in itself</u> finite. Even if the transition from one life to another occurs through dimness, it is, nevertheless, development...[11]

> Everywhere the sensuous reality is a unity of opposites in a relation of polarity, as the gray of the morning for the dim-sighted, and everywhere there is such a unity of daylight and darkness.[12]

It should here be mentioned that Boström held a theory of transmigration. In his own presentation of his system, he says:

> But he [Boström] does not regard the end of the present life as an immediate entering into the eternal, but he shows the necessity for man of still other forms of life before he can attain his highest completion in his development. Concerning these forms of life he teaches that they are from eternity potential in man, just as the present one before it became reality, and that the individual phenomenal worlds, which man has for himself under each one are not found in the space beyond, or in the time after the present, since this is in both instances empirically infinite, so that it cannot have any other outside or beside itself.[13]

Aside from the lack of support of this doctrine by any of the Christian doctrines, which Boström claims to vindicate, one may ask, What becomes of the doctrine practically? He does not refer to memory of previous

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10. SB, I, 255. See also 305, 345.
11. Ribbing, (ed.), FR, 79-80.
12. SB, II, 279.
13. SB, II, 496. See also ibid., III, 290-291, Åberg, BV, 57, 61, 121.

existences, and without memory, where would the abiding self-consciousness be? On Boström's own system, with its emphasis on consciousness as reality, where would consciousness or reality be without memory? There does not in this doctrine appear to be any suggestion of the "trailing clouds of glory."

But to return to the original subject, man's existence is a continuous struggle toward rationality and religion, properly designated as love to God and God's love to us.[14] For man's religion is not only his love to God, in whom he beholds the purpose and goal of his activity, but also God's love to man who through Him becomes a partaker in His true perfection and blessedness, which consists in likeness to God and unity with Him.[15]

Yet according to Boström this goal seems never to be fully attained, for he says:

> [The Kingdom of God] is indeed the final goal for the development and striving of all finite beings, and it is also the world in which they all possess their highest possible completion and blessedness; but since...they are finite, they cannot be completely without some shadow of sensuousness, and consequently

14. Boström here appears to make perfect love and perfect knowledge synonymous. This harmonizes with his statement that the human philosophy is the wisdom of God. Supra, 53.

15. SB, I, 345-347. See also SB, II, 486.

> not without distinction or difference from their ideas. The sensuous in them may, it is true, be far less at the end of their development than during its progress, but its complete extinction cannot be possible in any of their forms of life, and its continuation is also a condition of their independent existence for themselves, since its disappearance would be the same as their disappearance in God.[16]

Thus Egon Zöller, writing on the subject, "Werden wir einmal für uns das sein, was wir für Gott sind?", presents the question and the answer:

> Is not filiation with God[17] the goal that we continually approach, without ever attaining it?...In salvation we have attained the highest goal, namely, filiation with God. We are independent, self-conscious members in the absolute personality of God. Since we in ourselves are independent in the eternal salvation, therefore we cannot be as God apprehends us, namely, perfect moments in the system in which God perceives Himself and all that is His in an absolutely true manner. Then we would merge with God, and our individuality would be destroyed. Since we are independent, as moments in God, we must also in our eternal salvation remain distinct from God and from one another.[18]

Thus Wedberg is led to remark that it is impossible from what Boström himself says to ascertain whether he believes that man finally in a future life reaches his goal--identity with his idea--or not. Both thoughts are to be discerned.[19]

The one view has just been presented. On the other

16. SB, II, 294-295.
17. "Gottes-Kindschaft."
18. Art.(1897), 112, 115.
19. LSBF, 259.

hand, Boström writes to Nyblaeus:

> You must explain how and with what meaning time can have an end, namely, thereby that there is in man a potential form of life which is destined to become actual in him, and which has the character of eternity and immutability, because the human spirit, when that form has been attained, has developed to reality, clarity, and distinctness, everything that can be thus developed as a consequence of his eternal being. This form of life is what we properly call eternal life even in other religions, but especially in Christianity...[20]

On the basis of the former view, Waldemar Dons, in an ironic manner, writes:

> So, then, Boström's God sits there and perceives perfectly in the eternity of the eternities, while all the other beings perceive, the one more imperfectly than the other, the farther he gets down the Jacob's ladder. See there Boström's Kingdom of God.[21]

A comparison of the God of Boström with the First (or One) of Plotinus reveals the fact that, while Boström's God perceives, the First of Plotinus is related to nothing else. Motion is an aspiration, and the First aspires to nothing. He does not think Himself, but only possesses Himself.[22] Plotinus speaks of Divinities.[23] Nyblaeus charges Edfeldt with poly-

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20. SB, III, 490.

21. OB, 54-55. A translation fails to convey the pungency of the Norwegian: Saa sidder da Bostrøms Gud og fornemmer sandt i Evighedernes Evighed, mens alle de andre Vaesener fremdeles fornemme den Ene mere usandt end den Anden, jo laengere man kommer nedad Himmelstigen: Se der Bostrøms Guds-Rige!

22. See Plotinos, Complete Works, 4 vols. (ed. Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie), (Alpine: Platonist Press, 1918), III, 9, 9.

23. Ibid., V, 8, 9.

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23. Ibid., V, 8, 9.

theism in his interpretation of Boström's doctrine of ideas, because Edfeldt holds that there are many absolute beings in God. Edfeldt defends himself on the ground that what is finite for man is infinite for God.[24]

There is apparently a difficulty here in the system of Boström. It is one of the contradictions that his critics claim to find in his thought, and the difficulty here is a recurring one. Boström claimed rather boldly that he had removed all dualism from his system, but it seems that here we are still finding traces of it. He has before himself, on the one hand, the problem of the individual reaching his goal, which is identity with his idea; and, on the other hand, he is trying to avoid pantheism, with which he was charged. It appears that he succeeded only partially in this effort, and so far as the problem now under consideration is concerned, he leaves us in some uncertainty as to his real position.[25]

When his mother had died Boström wrote to his sister:

> Our beloved Mother has left the earthly [habitation] since I last wrote to you; she has moved to a better world, where she will reap the reward of all the good that she has perfected according to God's will.[26]

Here he appears to be entertaining the thought of

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24. Edfeldt, OBI, 17.
25. For Boström's defense against the charge of pantheism, see supra, 36-37.
26. Larsson, MÖB, 44.

perfection. But is he in this instance writing as the son, rather than as the philosopher?

2. The Religious Man's Relation to Himself

Since we know that religion includes knowing God, man and the relation of both to each other, the first thing that man as religious discovers is that God is the ground of his powers. From this fact comes the conviction that these are given to him for the purpose that He has determined, whereby the powers receive a higher meaning than merely that they are his own or nature's--a point of view above which he should arise. The conception of his powers hereby indicated, which is true of them all, including the sensuous, even though the Divine appears more in the higher than in the lower, is a moment in the religious manner of thinking. Thereby they are all hallowed in the consciousness, and thus become moments in the service of religion.

But man's knowledge of God must also occasion an activity in him [man], and stand out as determining this [activity], so that it shows that his powers have been given for the highest purpose, and becomes laws for them, so that a person may not use them as he pleases, and that the laws according to which he uses them are divine and holy. His religion thus becomes an effort to give

his powers a direction toward God as the highest center, so that both the science (in all its moments), and morality, receive the character of something holy, or of godly life in man; or such a character that through his knowledge and his activity he partakes in the divine life.[1] This may indeed be done from a certain position in the whole, but, nevertheless, in such a way that even when a person devotes himself to a certain science or activity, these become moments in the whole. Only he who cultivates his science as a link in the whole, pursues it properly and religiously. Likewise, if a person correctly understands his life's calling, no matter what it may be, he will regard it as a moment of the religious activity. In this manner religion will theoretically achieve the result that it will strengthen a person's certainty about, and faith in, the truth, and will produce the insight that, even though doubt may be a starting-point as to knowledge, it can, just as little as criticism, be its highest end, because God is that which is certain in itself.

In the moral activity religion appears as faith in the possibility of the good, and gives man power to labor for it. The religious person can, of course, see that a certain end is not always attained, and may even admit that a whole period with regard to religion can be des-

1. For Boström's position with regard to freedom, see below, 280-282.

perate enough; but never does he lose the conviction that man in general and God will attain their purpose. Finally, as to the aesthetic intuition and production, religion has the effect of giving it a religious distinctness, so that it eliminates[2] the coarse in art, and this is placed in a proper relationship to religion.

After having considered the relation of religion to the human powers in general, we must, further, make a survey of its influence on the special human capacities and their manifestations. Its general effect on the sensuous [capacities] is that they become means for the religious [capacities], not in such a way that they are used arbitrarily, or are destroyed, but so that they themselves go in as moments in man's purpose. [This is true] even if alone [the capacities] cannot fill his life, because the religious person develops them in the service of religion.

So far as man's rational powers are concerned, they are in themselves radically[3] religious. They are theoretical, practical, and aesthetic. The lowest expression, as to its form, of the theoretically rational capacity is feeling, and of the practical, love. So far as the aesthetic [capacities] are concerned, we concern ourselves

2. "Avstryker."
3. "Till sin rot."

less with them, because they are only a certain activity of the theoretical and the practical. From the rational standpoint, feeling is never unconscious, be it as pleasure or discomfort, but, moreover, very soon[4] it appears as consciousness of something objective, because the rational feeling appears later than the sensuous, since man, as sensuous, already has an object before himself. Religion then arouses a feeling of respect for a being on whom man knows himself in some way to depend--though in what way is not clear--and of humility with regard to himself.

This is its [i.e., religion's] highest form; at the first it appears as a feeling of fear and powerlessness, in a servile turn of mind, because God is thereby not grasped as personal being, but as ultimate reality[5] and ultimate substance,[6] which man places outside of himself, either as a part of the whole, or as the earth, heaven, etc.[7] This form is a consequence of the fact that man's inner being[8] is slightly developed; and since he himself is sensuous, he feels himself to be dependent on the sensuous, and inferior to it in power. It is only when man has apprehended himself as a person that God

4. "Redan tidigt."
5. "Urrealitet."
6. "Ursubstans."
7. Compare Rudolf Otto's mysterium tremendum in The Idea of Holy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924), 20-31.
8. "Det inre för människan."

also becomes a person for him, at first grasped under finite anthropomorphisms, both in a lower and a higher signification.

The feeling also follows to the second standpoint of religious consciousness, at which fear is modified into respect and reverence in the human sense, and then appears in the highest degree of development of this consciousness as pure and disinterested reverence and love, as well as humility: the same, whether referred to God, or man.

From a practical point of view, these forms just mentioned correspond to, first, involuntary obedience--due to the fact that man does not seek to approach God, and yet cannot escape Him. From this comes the religious activity, which seeks to appease God, and to gain favor with Him.[9] This has little influence on his practical activity in general, except to the extent that he abstains from certain deeds which are displeasing to God, and gives gifts to Him. On the other hand, from the highest standpoint of the religious consciousness, the practical becomes a voluntary love to God, because from this standpoint man does not consider himself and God to be in a hostile or external relation to each other, and [considers] himself in his unity with God. In this form the religious activity appears in connection with

9. "Ställa sig in hos honom."

the voluntary morality.

On the power of imagination, and the practical activity that results from it, religion works in such a manner that it sets the power of imagination in motion in order to form a certain way of representation concerning God and man's relation to Him, as, for instance, mythical figures. In a practical way, this impels to certain acts, which are determined by these representations. From this standpoint natural religion stands lowest, in which God is thought of as merely reality, in many forms, as, certain earthy objects, fetishism, the heavenly bodies, or heaven itself. Finally, through a kind of reflexion on God as the unity, by abstraction from all special determinations, He is thought of simply as primary substance, who transforms himself into the finite beings as a kind of apparition[10] of Him (so in specie[11] in Buddhism), which is pantheistic religion in the real sense.

All of these forms appear since man has not yet comprehended himself, and the feeling of the infinite is preponderant in him. They belong chiefly to Asia. They indicate a progression in religious consciousness in which religion gives them their meaning. In all

10. "Fantasmata."

11. Boström uses the expression, in specie, several times. It appears that he uses it in a figurative sense, "as to the idea," or "as to the notion."

mythological religion we must, namely, distinguish two moments: that which is itself religious, which forms the unity and can continually remain identical; and the manner of its execution, which can vary, although it also reacts on the comprehension of the principle.[12] In the Orient, where the religious consciousness is stronger, the images reveal a tendency toward infinity, or pantheism, and become arbitrary and more allegorical, since God cannot be seen in nature, but this rather becomes a make-believe.[13]

Then religion exists under the form of belief and feeling, which uncritically supplies material for the manner of representation, and the certainty that the religious feeling possesses is transferred to the myth. Usage[14] is thereby directed more upon the religious in general, rather than having influence on life; a certain complex of actions is determined by religion, and thus becomes religious, but the rest continue without regard to religion; wherefore it does not determine all actions, but only a few, for example, those touching family, cult, etc.

But when man develops himself into a consciousness of himself as a person, then the mystical religion also develops into its second form, as anthropomorphic, and

12. "Verkar tillbaka på principens uppfattning."
13. "Sken."
14. "Praxis."

thereby actually into a more divine [religion.] The transition itself to this form constitutes the anthropomorphizing of pantheism: God is one being who, as it were, represents the whole world, but as a human being (or man), who is present in his world; thus it was in Persia (the personification of light), just as our ancestors [did] from the beginning.

The second form of anthropomorphic religion is the Jewish, in which God is at the first regarded as a national God, later more universally, but always monotheistically, whereby a new religion could develop from the Jewish, after Greek views had influenced it sufficiently, so that it could rid itself of Jewish limitations.[15]

The third form from this standpoint is the Greek polytheism. The Greek religion was at the beginning naturalism (Orpheus); later it became more human (Hesiod) and purely anthropomorphic (Homer), in the idea of a plurality of personal deities, in which the divine unity remained only in fate. Since, however, this division[16] of God did not, on the one hand, sufficiently curb the human liberty, and, on the other hand, was unsatisfactory to the human consciousness, it was in Greece that philosophy arose.

15. A very expressive word: "Inskränktheter."
16. Also a vigorous word: "Splittring."

That which is unsatisfactory in all mythology is theoretical, namely, that according to it the divine Being is not qualified to be the principle of everything; that the principle, therefore, does not have its certainty in itself, but in the religious consciousness, which gives certainty to the myth; that the myth lacks inner necessity for the manner of its execution; and that a complete explanation of the world is not found in it, but only answers to particular questions.

From a practical point of view the mythological, just as the anthropomorphic [religion] in general, as to its principle, does not become purely practical, but more or less has the character of something individual, i.e., the authority of a certain person. Furthermore, it follows that, even though such a religion endeavors to give sanctity to life in and through certain acts, these, or the religious usage, are restricted to a few such, but do not include all of life. These acts can indeed include more than those which belong to the cult proper,[17] but in part it draws it [the usage] into the cult, and [regards] as moral such acts as do not in themselves include the character just mentioned; but

17. From here we have an extremely difficult passage: "Men dels indrager den i kulten och såsom sedliga sådana handlingar, som icke i sig äga sistnämnda karaktär, dels bestämmes ej hela livet med samma helgd (t. ex. det offentliga sasom mera helgat eller sedligt, än det enskilda)."

VIII. Translation of Goethe's Philosophy of Religion IIA

in part the entire life is not determined by the same sanctity (for example, the public [life] as more sacred or moral than the private). Finally, and in the same measure that reflexion develops, in theory and in life, the myths lose their sanctity, and thereby also the practical religiosity, so that human life is separated from the religious, and is determined independently of religion (thus, for example, among the Greeks in the Peloponnesian War, when profane usage took predominance over the religious).

These weaknesses are remedied through philosophy and voluntary morality. Before this happens a change takes place with regard to the myth, in that an attempt is made to develop this itself into something of scientific quality, so that a person, without having relinquished the sensuous, in which the idea is contained potentially, seeks to bring his religious representations into unity under general conceptions, just as general practical commandments develop as divine and externally given. By this appearance of reflexion in relation to religion mythology comes forth as a science, or dogmatics, which forms the transition to philosophy. In dogmatics the content, or the object, is regarded as given in advance through a divine revelation, and as such it has an authority on which dogmatics bases its doctrines. By this, however, this content, and dogmatics itself, does

not receive any inner necessity, but only one that is external, or given from without, by which it differs from philosophy. Dogmatics may indeed wish to prove the myth, and to resolve the contradictions in it. But since it does not in this proceed from the idea or an essential principle, but from the given, which is regarded as fixed, and to which one only seeks to give a formal principle, nothing becomes satisfactory. Therefore dogmatics leads to[18] skepticism, and this occasions philosophy. At the beginning the latter does not influence the myth, but it can later appear critically in relation to it, and then it may have a disintegrating effect on practical life, in so far as it is based on authority.

Then a reaction against philosophy usually comes, because it seems to threaten to destroy the given, without offering anything in its place. Even persecution against philosophy is thereby a consequence of the fact that religion has the form of myth among the masses, because of which content and form fuse, so that person fears that he will lose the one with the other. Practically, this standpoint permeates all of life, but never succeeds completely, but always leaves withal a profane area, and is restricted to certain acts. The reason for this may be in part the lower standpoint of the given religion, the degree of development of the form, in

18. "Upkallar."

placing something finite instead of the infinite, since the finite cannot be principle for the whole of life. It may depend on the dogma itself, if it is restricted, since both dogma and the religious practice succumb before science as also before the general morality, as it develops.

At this concrete development of the understanding,[19] which as to its content is identical with the power of the imagination, the myth thus becomes theology, and religious practice becomes theological morality. Then, it can easily happen that religion divorces itself from the dogma, and becomes mystic, inasmuch as the first mentioned, since it bases its certainty on religion, makes pretensions at being religion, without in reality being religion, since it is only a formal systematic.[20]

There religion, already toward the end of ancient times extricated itself from dogmatism[21] and cared little about it, but rather appeared as a striving by the subject to lose himself in God, as a pantheism, but only that of feeling and intuition; but this in such a way that the subject would not relinquish his existence by it, but would enjoy himself in God without, however, being at any time entirely free from infection by dog-

19. "Förståndsutveckling."
20. "Systematik."
21. "Dogmen."

matism. The other extreme, again, is to leave religion, and simply give attention to the dogma (as, for example, in scholasticism), which does not give importance to the religious mind, but in its place substitutes faith in certain dogmas, and the observance of certain practices.

Such a dogmatic point of view will properly collapse before philosophy which, freeing itself from dogmatism by means of skepticism, is an expression of the pure understanding, and attempts to develop a consistent view[22] from the conception itself. For dogmatism is not religion, but a way of representation in relation to it, and not the highest one. And the situation is similar from a practical point of view. Even a religious custom, which is the result of external authority, is an imperfect morality. Therefore it falls in the presence of philosophy, and in practical life, because neither one is satisfied with it.

To begin with, philosophy is low, and it goes through the same stages, or forms, as mythology, but not in the same manner. It supports itself by thought, and seeks knowledge, and for that reason it is not limited[23] to a certain portion of the universe, but makes all objects its own, only that it looks upon them in a way different from that of the other sciences. Likewise it seeks a

22. "En i sig nödvandig åsikt."
23. "Limited" seems here to be what Boström had in mind. The Swedish word is "bornerad."

higher practical principle, which must include all deeds, and for that reason disintegrates, not religion, but its dogmatic morality[24] which is based on external authority.

Here a number of questions arise with regard to the foregoing which need to be answered. What is the relation of philosophy to religion and to mythological dogma, and of morality to the religious cult and the religious usage? and, Does religion in a theoretic sense merge with philosophy, so that this is the perfected religion viewed from a theoretic point of view? No, because religion is the consciousness of man's connection with God and dependence on Him in all the various forms of consciousness.

Philosophy is a special expression of a certain capacity, namely, of reason, whereas religion reaches the whole of man and determines all his activity. By way of analogy, we have the state and the men of science. The purpose of the former stands above that of the latter, and its function is to give unity to all individuals and to the activities in the state. Religion may indeed interpret[25] itself in philosophy, but is not exhausted thereby, but gives direction and determination to science. The same is true with regard to morality. The cult does not simply have as its purpose the harmony of the sensuous in man with the ra-

24. "Dogmmoralen."
25. "Explicerar."

tional, but its mission is to support the consciousness of his relationship to God and subordination under Him; wherefore it indeed determines morality, but is not identical with it.

Morality has a special field for itself, because man does not simply have an idea about God and his relationship to Him, but also about his own idea and its realization; but this alone would be incomplete and too limited, in the same way, as, for instance, if a member of the state, or an order, might indeed devote himself to his work,[26] but did not subordinate his activity under the state, or take up its idea into himself. As simply scientific, moral, and artistic,[27] man would not yet be perfected; he rather needs a unity for these types of activity.

An example of such narrow-mindedness in a political sense was patria as one only principle among the Romans, for which they might be willing to sacrifice themselves, while at the same time they treated other states immorally. Likewise in the middle ages the Church and the heathen. Thus, in general, morality always becomes imperfect, if it does not receive its higher awakening from religion, and separates from the merely human what is narrow-minded in it.

Further, how are philosophy, morality, and art,

26. "Leva i sitt yrke."
27. "Vetenskaplig, sedlig och konstnär."

related to the corresponding lower standpoints in each instance? In the first place, so far as philosophy and the myth are concerned, it is to be observed that the latter includes two moments. The one, as principle and purpose, is the religious faith; the other, the mystical form in which this faith has translated itself, is myth in the narrower sense. That the science[28] does not have as its purpose to negate, or destroy, the first moment is clear, because it is exactly the same principle that is active in philosophy, only that this appears in a lower form in the myth, namely, as faith. Philosophy only gives to it greater clarity, whereby it still does not lose the character of faith, but by it faith as well moves from something externally communicated to an inner manner of thinking by man himself.

The moment of religion just mentioned--faith--can at a certain stage of development become exclusive; it can become mystical, which is only a certain turning on the stage of faith, consisting in the fact that faith desires to separate itself both from its change of garment which it had as myth[29] and from knowledge, and only desires to be immediately composed[30] in God, and thereby absorb everything external, without however comprising

28. Boström evidently refers to philosophy.
29. "Från sin omklädning såsom myt."
30. "Omedelbart fatta sig i."

VIII. Translation of Boström's Philosophy of Religion 121

a scientific pantheism.

If science cannot compel mysticism to interpret itself in knowledge,[31] then it will either descend more or less to dogma, or it will turn into theosophy, i.e., be filled with the content of fantasy. But every genuine thinker is, however, also a mystic, in order that he may gain and give deeper meaning to his research.

On the second of the two moments mentioned in the myth, or the mystical form itself, the science works destructively; and this process is easier, the less the myth has suppressed the person himself and his own individuality. Thus, for example, with the Greek myth, in which man had a place and a certain power together with God, but where it also thereby was easier to come to the understanding that the myth did not have correspondence to the idea of God.

As already mentioned,[32] dogmatics constitutes the form of transition from myth to philosophy, as a generalization of the myth. But about this also it is true that philosophy only destroys the imperfect form in which the religious consciousness appears in it.

Such a formal process of development of the religious consciousness as just mentioned occurred among the Greeks; and it likewise affected the Jewish supranaturalism, or

31. "Explicera sig till vetande."
32. Supra, 115-116.

the myth, which was increasingly purified, whereby also a higher religion developed from it. In its relation to the Orient the Greek philosophy appears, not only as annulling the myth, by raising the west Asiatic religions to a peculiar form of speculation, Neo-Platonism; it also became a condition for the appearance of the highest form of religion, even though it also immediately appeared in a mystical form.

This higher religion has the peculiarity, that it stands not simply under science, but is on an equality with[33] it; or stands above the one so far given, and could, therefore, be developed into speculative knowledge. All ancient philosophy was more realistic than Christianity. Even Plato's idealism did not grasp self-consciousness as fully as has been possible, through Christianity, even in philosophy. This was given in Christianity, since it apprehended God without limitation, and presented the conception of God as human, by which the development of the idea of the personality became more possible.

But if the myth in its lower form had not preceded, Christianity could with difficulty have arisen. What relation does dogma, or dogmatics, have to science, since such a religion, or Christianity, has arisen? It

33. "Equivalerar."

has no independence with relation to philosophy, because it permeates all sciences, so that a theological science by the side of, or independent of, philosophy could not stand. Philosophy, nevertheless, recognizes theology as an historical-religious science of the given and present forms of religion. It also recognizes that they are few in the community or the race, who are qualified to acquire philosophy, or find satisfaction in it.[34]

For the others there is always in theology a more popular form of knowledge, which is accepted in good faith and in the conviction that it has proceeded from God. What was last said is correct, when it has a religious content, with the provision that it always must likewise be determined by philosophy, which eliminates the non-essential in theology, or corrects and purifies theology and gives it a scientific content, even if not also a purely scientific form. Theology ought not to be able to exist[35] under any other condition.

As far as philosophy is concerned, it is in any case a development in the form of knowledge of the highest religion. Far from destroying religion as to its essence,[36]

34. The fact that only a limited few had the capacity for the study of philosophy was a familiar note in Boström. For illustration of a caustic use of this idea see SB, III, 181.

35. "Bör teologien ej kunna äga bestånd."

36. "Till dennas inre."

philosophy itself has the same religion as its living principle; and far from refusing a dogmatic manner of presentation, it rather requires it, namely, for the less educated, but without itself becoming dependent on it, and always purifying the dogma, as well as the cult. Philosophy cannot have the tendency to destroy the cult, but it rather gladly overlooks the less perfect in it, only so that the essential and the substantial appears in it.

The same relation that philosophy has to the myth, morality also has to the religious usage, which rests upon an externally represented authority. Its purpose is not to destroy it, because morality itself has the same principle, but to transfer this principle from the significance of an external restraint to an inner and free willing. Like the science, namely, morality supports itself on the willing itself, or the spirit's own inner law, but in such a way that it has taken up into itself the highest law, without which it would be a lower practice; for it would be either empirical or a subjective and negative philosophical morality, which can arise, either because a person apprehends God as a principle of everything incomplete (pantheism), or also, if one insists that man's knowledge is limited to the sensuous, in which case morality assumes a limited character.

A correct philosophy does not deprive morality of

its religious character, but destroys the manner of presentation according to which the law lies outside man, and shows that morality does not have an external purpose. It, furthermore, removes the froth in the practical manner of presentation, which consists in the fact that, either the cult extends beyond its limits, and enters into the practical life, or else in this that morality is confined to a certain sphere of the practical life. Philosophy does away with the view that certain moral deeds are more moral than others. It likewise opposes another frequently appearing onesidedness depending upon the contrast between the mystical and the dogmatic side in the religious manner of representation, and consisting in this that morality either is used to draw one's self from the world--monastic life--or also in this that a person considers himself religious without really having any true religion, but only by the doing of certain external deeds. But a morality without religion is not a true morality. A common narrowness is this that certain religious people consider certain deeds par préférence moral (mercy, for instance), which truly belong to morality, but not as the only thing in it.

The highest form of morality does not only in the first place require, and is not exhausted by the fact,

that a person wishes to alleviate the misery or overcome the evil, but that he realizes the good, by which the former follows of itself, even though philosophic systems have existed with this shallowness. Therefore, to accept a holy activity outside of the general morality is a manner of representation which ought to disappear; and a theological ethics beside the philosophical, or free and inner, is just as impossible as theology beside philosophy, and has its source simply in a lower degree of human development,[37] whereas on the highest it is evident that nothing transcendent exists, but that the supranaturalistic is the rationalistic.

As far as art is concerned, with regard to it also philosophy leads to the same kind of result. Its elevation, namely, consists in the fact that it is freed, and labors for its own sake, or for the sake of the beautiful, without being bound by a dogmatic manner of representation; but it receives this freedom from religion, which also gives it its absolute end, as a revelation of God in a certain direction. Thus religion directs the powers of all men to their freedom, or to the liberation of man from the finite and to the highest blessedness or a reconciliation within man with God and other people.

37. "Utvecklingsgrad."

1. In this chapter we have an historical and psychological study of religion and philosophy. Boström says that religion includes the knowledge of God and man, and the relation of each to the other. He further says that God is the ground of man's power, and the knowledge of God occasions activity in man.[38]

This is a familiar emphasis with Boström. It is intimately bound up with his central emphasis that reality consists of God and His eternal ideas.[39] He often refers[40] to Paul's statement that it is in God we live, and move, and have our being.[41] With Boström spiritual reality is fundamental.

2. It is also to be observed that in this study Boström moves toward Christianity, which, he is convinced, is the highest and the final religion. He says that there was need of a new and higher deposit in experience and life before an essentially higher step could be taken in the philosophical development, and that this deposit was Christianity.[42] This thought is implicit in his system, but Christianity is, however, interpreted from the point of view of his rational theology with the result that man's reason is unduly emphasized. He says

38. Supra, 106.
39. SB, II, 270. See also supra, 31.
40. Ibid., II, 124, 341, 400, and passim.
41. Acts 17:28.
42. SB, I, 26.

that his system conforms to Christianity, when Christianity is purified of the forms of fantasy which are found in it.[43] Dons charges that Boström's system is more religion than it is philosophy.[44]

3. Boström identifies reason and religion, when they are taken in their purity. He regards the science of religion as the normative science,[45] and religion as God Himself functioning as Regent of the rational beings.[46] Man is not reason itself, but a rational being, who shares in God's rationality.[47] Knowledge is rational, or philosophical, though in an abstract form, in the measure that it is identical with God's knowledge, and science is essentially a participation in God's omniscience.[48]

Rational activity can have no other purpose than the realization of reason, i.e., making the absolute, rational, and divine life actual in human life, and the realization and development of the human life in the rational (divine). The reality of reason in man is his religion, and this is his absolute bliss, his blessedness,

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43. Ribbing, (ed.), FR, 67-68. Since Boström rejects the doctrine of the Trinity, and since Jesus for him is only one of God's many sons (SB, II, 494), it is evident that he does not mean Christianity in the Scriptural sense, but from the liberal viewpoint of his philosophy.
44. OB, 27.
45. Ribbing, (ed.), FR, 46.
46. SB, II, 483.
47. Ibid., I, 307.
48. Ibid., I, 33.

which simultaneously is his own life in God, and God's life in Him.[49]

Thus the correct concept of religion is identical with reason itself, i.e., with the divine life, or the divine spirit. Reason does not exist without religion, and no being is rational, unless it is also religious.[50]

It is hereby clear that Boström's system is rationalistic. In fact, he expressly states that it is severely idealistic and rationalistic.[51] He calls his approach to Christianity from a rational and philosophical point of view scientific, and says that religion and philosophy both appear with the development of consciousness, especially as it reaches self-consciousness.[52]

It is because Boström applies his rationalistic system with rigor that he calls some of the elements of the Christian religion "fantasies." The real question here would, then, rest with the validity of his rationality. He has set up certain rational standards into which life must fit. But it would seem presumptuous for a human being to insist as radically as did Boström that his standards are correct, and that his reasoning must be accepted as valid.

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49. Ibid., II, 187.
50. Ibid., I, 307.
51. Ibid., II, 481.
52. Supra, 123-125.

4. While Boström has a high regard for philosophy,[53] he does not place it above religion, but criticizes Hegel for having done so.[54] He finds that religion is not exhausted in philosophy, because it reaches the whole of man and determines all his activity.[55] Philosophy is a servant of religion, and religion gives content to philosophy.[56] Yet it may be observed that there are times when he seems to equate them.[57] Philosophy is a development in the form of knowledge of the highest religion.[58] Philosophy, says Boström, has a purifying effect on religion. The conclusion of it is that philosophy and religion should go hand in hand.[59]

In statements like these we can discern a fundamental effort in the labors of Boström. As Kant sought to bring about a synthesis of continental rationalism and British empiricism, so Boström sought to bring harmony between religion and philosophy under the form of religion as a philosophical science. Perhaps he wished to restore theology to its place as queen of the sciences. But it must be as strictly rational theology, and his success is

53. Supra, 119.
54. Ribbing, (ed.), FR, 2.
55. Supra, 119.
56. Supra, 121.
57. Supra, 123.
58. Supra, 124.
59. Supra, 125-126.

of an equivocal character, because of the limited acceptation of his system, and its conflict with some of the fundamental tenets of the Church, such as the doctrine of special revelation, and of the Trinity.

5. That there is a note of arrogance in Boström as a philosopher has already been observed.[60] It can also be noticed in a condescending attitude toward the less educated.[61] Yet the situation in his very nation today is that the thinking that is best known is in the field of theology through such men as Nygren.

In this condescending attitude, he speaks of the masses as less developed in understanding.[62] Dons says that a consequence of the dogmatism of his system is a tendency toward intolerance with the adherents of other systems.[63] The philosophical dogmatists are just like the theological. Since they themselves have developed the absolute truth, it follows of itself that the rest of us have to be satisfied with falsehood, and on top of it all be scolded.[64, 65]

Statements of this kind occur rather frequently in Boström, and did not help to advance his philosophy. From Germany came a most sobering reaction to his

60. Supra, 78, note 46.
61. Supra, 124, also note 34.
62. SB, I, 275, 307, II, 314.
63. Dons was a Hegelian.
64. "Udskjaeldes."
65. OB, 12.

criticism of Borelius;[66] and in the other Scandinavian countries there were unfavorable reactions.[67]

The explanation appears to lie in the fact that Boström, due to his high regard for philosophy in general, and his conviction that he had evolved the perfect system, in particular, felt that any criticism of his system was an affront to philosophy, and not to him. But this attitude must be regarded as a weakness in him.

6. Between Boström and Hegel we find both similarities and dissimilarities in the philosophy of religion. Hegel says:

> Philosophy, therefore, only unfolds itself when it unfolds religion, and in unfolding itself it unfolds religion...Thus religion and philosophy come to be one. Philosophy is itself, in fact, worship; it is religion, for in the same way it renounces subjective notions and opinions in order to occupy itself with God.[68]

Boström has this definition:

> Philosophy of religion...is concerned

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66. Dons quotes Ed. Mätzner in Philosophi Monatsh., III, 207: "Diese Kritik verläugnet leider in erbitterter Schmähung des Gegners den Adel des Wortes so sehr, dass sie den Leser tief in seinen sittlichen Gefühle verletzt, wenn er erwägt dass ein Vertreter der Wissenschaft, die dem Höchsten und Tiefsten zugewendet ist, gerade am meisten von unedler Leidenschaft gereinigt sein sollte. Wenn Boström selber in der That diese Schrift verfasst hat, [of which there is no doubt], so ist sie ein Beweis dass der Vorwurf der Anmassung und Unduldsamkeit, welche der Boströmschen Schule gemacht worden ist, den Urheber des Systems am Schwersten trifft." OB, 12-13.

67. Dons for Norway, OB, 12; Höffding for Denmark, FS, 5.

68. LPR, I, 19-20.

> with religion for man, or man's religion...As such, it must first present the human religion, or the religious state of mind, in its purity, with conviction, and with beauty; it must also present the immediate products of it, as well as man's hopes united with it; and this is the true philosophy of religion.[69]

There is agreement on the practical side, with Hegel speaking of worship, and Boström of the religious state of mind. There is also agreement as to the relationship between philosophy and religion, Hegel saying that philosophy unfolds itself when it unfolds religion, and Boström stating that philosophy is a development in the form of knowledge of the highest religion.[70]

Hegel speaks of the religious feeling of dependence,[71] and Boström says that religion is the consciousness of man's connection with God and his dependence on Him in all the various forms of consciousness.[72] Here we find another pronounced similarity. Hegel says that if knowledge is to be valid, this validity can only build itself up upon the foundation of all truth.[73] In the same spirit Boström says that philosophy is a special expression of a certain capacity, namely, of reason, whereas religion reaches the <u>whole</u> of man and determines <u>all</u> his activity.[74] Hegel speaks of opposition to philosophy,[75] and Boström

69. Supra, 71-72.
70. Supra, 124.
71. LPR, I, 11.
72. Supra, 119.
73. LPR, I, 43.
74. Supra, 119.
75. LPR, I, 34.

likewise speaks of persecution against philosophy,[76] in both instances by the unthinking masses. Hegel says that the consciousness of God is immediate in our consciousness,[77] and this idea is central in the system of Boström.[78] Hegel says that rational knowledge is not limited to the sciences, but is an essential element in the Christian religion itself.[79] Boström holds that it is evident that nothing transcendent exists, but that the supranaturalistic is the rationalistic.[80]

In Hegel we find the statement:

> And thus advance is made to the further determination that the Spirit's consciousness of self is an eternal, absolute moment in that eternal life in which it is lifted up far above time, above this distraction of change, and above the reality of change, above dualism, when it is taken up into the unity and reconciliation which is presupposed as originally present in the object of consciousness.[81]

In Boström there is something of a corresponding sentence:

> ...Religion directs the powers of all men to their freedom, or to the liberation of man from the finite and to the highest blessedness or a reconciliation within man with God and other people.[82]

Hegel says of man that,

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76. Supra, 116.
77. LPR, I, 42-43.
78. Supra, 119 and passim.
79. LPR, I, 17.
80. Supra, 127.
81. LPR, I, 73.
82. Supra, 127.

> Knowing himself in God, he at the same time knows his imperishable life in God; he knows of the truth of his Being, and, therefore, the idea of the immortality of the soul here enters as an essential moment into the history of religion.[83]

This is in harmony with Boström's recurrent emphasis on man as realizing his eternal idea in God.

While Hegel deplores the fact that the dogmas of the Church are neglected, and have been emptied of their meaning,[84] Boström in his system rejects doctrines of the Church, as the Trinity, revelation, and vicarious atonement.[85] While Hegel says that philosophy unfolds religion, he seems to place philosophy prior to religion, whereas Boström says that philosophy is a development in the form of knowledge of the highest religion.[86] There appears to be a difference of emphasis here.

In general, it would thus seem that there is more agreement than disagreement between them. It is also evident that Hegel's philosophy of religion is stated in a clearer style, and with more of the human touch.

3. The Relationship to Other Persons and the Race

From an empirical standpoint, man's relation to others does not appear to his advantage. Considered empirically and in his sensuous existence, man is a

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83. LPR, I, 79.
84. LPR, I, 38, 40.
85. SB, II, 494-495.
86. Supra, 124.

product of nature, just like other beings, and his tendency seems only egoistic, whereby [life] becomes a battle for power and the means of sensuous bliss. [Life] becomes different when he sees his situation rationally, in which case the aforementioned sensuous reveals itself as imperfect and irrational.[1]

Religion requires that all men should be regarded as having come from God, or as having their ground in Him or from[2] Him. By such a view of man religion already achieves respect for others and love for and attraction to them, and also to God, because God is then thought of as being present in every person. And clear it is that religion reaches, not only to a few, but to all, for "All people are our neighbors and children of the same Father."

The second insight from the religious standpoint is that the same end has been set by God for all people, as for the religious person himself. From this, since the highest end is always present, it follows that the religious person must accept his end and that of others as identical; or is in duty bound to further theirs as well as his own, because the individual end is not furthered for its own sake, but as a moment in the whole. In other words, religion brings with it respect for the

1. "Förvänt."
2. "Ur."

right of others, or leads to the idea of justice between people, and of a united direction of all, because no one lives isolated in God, and therefore no one can attain his end except in an organic union with others.

This, as one can all too easily see, does not prevent the fact that the end of one is less inclusive than that of another,--as is true in every relative system. The one is not for that reason lower than the other, but the difference simply consists in the nature of the activity; from a religious point of view all people are alike.

For this reason, the third effect of religion is that a person discovers that he should subordinate the lower end to the higher and limit it in such a way that in this subordination it performs its duty properly.[3] It is for this reason that the religious person does not experience any humiliation in subordinating himself under a higher; this is what a person actually does in private [life] and in the state. When people act according to instinct it is a common experience that a difference arises between the higher and the lower [order], with the one requirement that there is complete independence for each one within his sphere, especially if the nation

3. "Riktigt fyller sin plats."

is more noble in its inclinations.[4]

When again a person sees that there are not only moral individuals, but also moral personalities, then he also finds by religion that these also come from God and have a divine purpose.[5] He, therefore, has a high regard for them, and is willing to subordinate himself under their more inclusive forms of activity. It is, consequently, religion that also gives man the spirit of unity[6] and this for the reason that his own purpose is achieved to the highest degree only in the community. On the other hand, as soon as the community is disorganized,[7] it simply reveals the fact that man has sunk down to sensuousness, or that there is lack of religion.

Then a demand for empirical equality arises. The demand for equality is religious in so far as it implies that each one is to have a part in the absolute end, but it is irreligious if it implies that all shall only be

4. It seems clear that Boström is here referring to the social orders in Sweden, which he defended. They were: nobility, clergy, burghers, and peasants. These orders were abolished in favor of a bicameral parliament in 1865, the vote becoming effective in 1866, the year that Boström died. See Carl Grimberg, Sveriges historia, 3rd ed. (Stockholm: P. A. Norstedt and söners förlag, 1915), V, 526-536.

5. Boström holds that the state is rational being--a personality. See SB, I, 378.

6. "Samhällighet."

7. "Desorganiseras."

dots beside one another.[8]

Religion also demands work for all kinds of communities, and thus in the last analysis for the whole human race, but only through and from the standpoint as to where a person himself is placed, immediately in the family, etc. As soon as religion exists[9] in its moments--science, morality, and art--no part is excluded from participation in the purpose of the whole; it is only on a lower standpoint that a person in this respect can limit himself.[10] In this manner religion includes all people as a whole in one single unity, namely, God.

Is the end thereby attained? Is there for man no higher unity between himself and God? Not in our present form of life, because there the race is for him the highest manifold[11] in which he sees the divine unity expressed or revealed, even though he already here stands in relation to higher forms of life, though he is not yet conscious of these. What has just now been said reveals itself in the fact that the phenomenal world is a representation of the essence, and that our earth is merely a moment in a system, and not even the highest in it.[12] Therefore man's effort here for attaining his end is also a moment in his contribution to the development of still higher

8. "Punkter jamte varandra." Here we have an indication of Boström's high regard for human personality.
9. "Finnes med sina momenter."
10. "Bornera sig."
11. "Mångfald."
12. A reference to Boström's doctrine of "many worlds."

forms of life.[13]

We now proceed to cast a glance at the relation of religion to the history of the world, or the race as a whole, and its development, where the problem will be the consideration of evil.

In this we shall first briefly indicate the difference between empirical and religious viewpoints in the consideration of world history. If the one who is predominantly inclined to be empirical has attained any higher degree of the development of consciousness, the consideration of nature (which for him is all reality) will compel him to admit that there is order, law, and purpose, in it; and since this is a satisfaction of a requirement of reason, he will also pay the most attention to it, or to the observation of nature.

He will, on the other hand, find in the human race only confusion and lack of order, which leaves him dissatisfied, because he sees only the outside; and to such a view history reveals itself only as a Chronos, who devours his children, or as a stream without beginning or end. The past seems to have ceased to have meaning, and the future has not yet received any; and the present seems without being, and appears to be only as an apparition, which already is a nothing, or is in a steady

13. Supra, 100-101.

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forms of life.13

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13. Supra, 100-101.

transition toward it; if one stretches out time to infinity, the relation to it also becomes a larger quantum of it equal to zero; and if one gives attention to the parts, or to the individuals which exist in these moments of time, they also appear to be without purpose, either snatched away prematurely, or else existing for a little while[14] in strife and struggle.

At times a more calm and more orderly[15] condition may seem to exist, but only for a short while and, as it were, [as] a foreboding of bad weather. On the whole, all power appears as a fluctuation, a struggling, or a moment of eternal change. Even the struggle for knowledge seems to be vain, because the prospect of attaining a goal by it seems uncertain, and its object passes by so rapidly. It seems to be the same way so far as virtue and self-control are concerned. Indeed, if one goes from this reflection upon nature, even this loses the dignity which at the first it seemed to possess. It appears essentially as merely matter with certain laws, but without goal, and rather as something monotonous and wearisome.[16]

Over against such a world view there early appears a teleological reflection which lays claim to validity against, or at least along with, the former; and [this reflection] is always a consequence or an expression of

14. "Några ögonblick existerande."
15. "Mera lagbundet."
16. Boström seems here to vie with Schopenhauer, but his general view is optimistic. See Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea (tr. R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp), (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner and Co., Ltd., 1883-1886), III, 382-401.

man's reason, or its demands, but can be better or worse according to the stage of development of the religious consciousness. From the highest standpoint this reflection becomes the only essential and correct one, and the former [standpoint] receives only the significance of an incorrect form of apprehension. Not to wish to know anything about the lower view is not consistent with the truth; and religious reflection cannot deny the relative correctness [of the lower view], nor hide itself from the fact that there is much in nature that is without purpose and repulsive, just as in the world of men.[17] These imperfections do not make a pleasant impression on the religious person; in fact, it is more unpleasant than the one made on the empirically minded, who only looks to the present, or upon the egotist who is concerned with his own advantage, and is satisfied so long as it can be accomplished to some extent.

But all this can, nevertheless, not disturb the inner calm of the religious person, because he knows that he, the human being, belongs not only to nature and time, but has his nature and his eternal determination in God; and thus he finds a goal and a law for himself, which also belong to the race as a whole, and in regard to which there is no before and after in time

17. "Den mänskliga världen."

but [which are] above it, and are thus sought in all moments. This knowledge in the religious person cannot be disturbed by the purposelessness[18] in the given existence, but [this knowledge] elicits the [deepest] conviction of a reconciliation which the world in itself does not possess.

Thus there arise, first, the conviction and the insight that the human race is just as bounded by law as [is] nature, when we look at his inner being; because the race has its ground in God, in whom all is harmony. If this [harmony] does not completely appear in the sensuous world, it is, nevertheless, the essential [part] in it, which always to some extent is present, can be detected, and controls the whole. Thereby the entire race receives the significance of a unit,[19] in which the past and the future also are present, and all mutually influence each other, even the past. Not until then does the whole become harmonious, even in the activity; and more so in the degree to which reason appears in it.

By this [law] consciousness, too, receives an independent power[20] to exist, and not to become extinct. Furthermore, knowledge and morality do not become vain; because, no matter how little they may contain, they,

18. "Ändamålsvidrigheten."
19. "Ett."
20. "Självmakt att existera."

nevertheless, pass over from the merely sensuous to the absolute as end. The weakness in the empirical viewpoint is that it is concerned with time alone[21] and seeks its end in it, which, however, is not to be found in, but above, [time]. This makes an essential difference in thought.[22] If anyone should assume that the human race simply emerged out of the stream of time, and there also perished, [the race] would certainly be nothing. It is, however, not thus, but this life is only a phenomenon. By this [fact] the whole not only receives a different signification than it otherwise would; but [this is true] even with the imperfect and the evil, to a consideration of which we have now in our thinking come.

Evil is of two kinds: physical evil, and moral evil. The former consists of all such things as are unpleasant for man which do not have their ground in his free will, and of which he, as free, is not the cause. [Physical evil] reduces itself to a disturbance of his [man's] lower nature, without going to his inner being, a disturbance, however, which is sufficiently painful to arouse religious questions.[23] Moral evil again is a work of man himself, reaches to his inner

21. "Blott håller sig inom tiden."
22. "I bektraktelsen."
23. There may be something personal in this statement. Boström often, and with reason, complained about his ill health. See Nyblaeus (ed.), FFS, IV, 5 and passim.

being, or is essentially concerned with him, and is not something more or less foreign to him.

Physical evil is of two kinds: that which is entirely independent of man's will, and that which does not have its ground solely in man's will, but becomes evil only through man's will. The first mentioned is that which arouses pain and which without man's will restricts his sensuous existence, or his rational activity.[24] All such evil is a result of man's limitation in time, which has the consequence that he can only successively approach his goal. This can be general for the race, or again merely for the individual.[25] But both determine each other. The religious person approaches it with resignation,[26] as something which cannot be overcome, either by God, or by man. This is a consequence of the fact that man is man.

Such a viewpoint is possible, if one understands that the world is not a production by God in time, in which case one could always ask why God did not make it

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24. There is in this statement a suggestion as to Boström's own experiences. Though he felt that he should do more writing, and often chafed under his neglect of it, he was so exhausted by the drain of his duties as professor on his limited physical resources that during vacations he was compelled to rest.

25. "Individuellt."

26. So did Schopenhauer!

better. But God does not immediately produce the sensuous world; it is man that does this, and to demand that it should be better would be to demand that he should not be man, which would be a contradiction.[27] In accordance with this, the religious person is convinced that, with the higher development of man, the evil will also cease, as a disappearing moment, which will not eternally follow man, and is not an essentiality.[28] Why was I not placed in such a situation that I became more fortunate? This is an unreasonable question, because man's essence is eternal, otherwise it would never have occurred.[29] No one, who understands what it means, would wish to make any exchange with some one else, because that would be absolute annihilation. Since this is ture, a person cannot demand that his conditions should become other than they are. But the important thing is the insight that these do not belong to his essence.

The other kind of physical evil--that which relatively depends on man--consists in this, that the natural things and their development do not always harmonize with man's vain desires and plans for his bliss. This

27. Yet Boström has said that God is the ground of man's powers. Supra, 106. Thus on the basis of Boström's own system, God must have at least an indirect part in the production of the world.

28. For a discussion of this question, see supra, 100-106.

29. It is difficult to see the rationality in Boström's statement. E. S. Brightman's statement in a lecture that a thing can have a beginning without an end seems more rational. By way of illustration, Dr. Brightman said that a line could have its beginning from the table and extend infinitely.

may be an evil in a physical sense, but not for the whole man; it is a reproof of his foolishness which, if it prospered, would have a harmful effect on the success of the whole. It is already something irreligious to desire to have advantages which do not harmonize with the whole; and still more so not to be willing to subject one's self to difficulties which are common to the whole.[30]

It is the same with this form of evil as with legal punishment, which, as a matter of fact, is a benefit to the criminal in his struggle against the sensuousness of reason.[31] That, again, incidents occur which counteract noble plans belongs to the former class of evil, to which the religious person is resigned. [He] does not try to do anything but that which for the moment is possible; and he believes that it was not determined that he should do this; and he knows that, if he could see further, he should find that if that which he purposed, at that time[32] and in this manner, were realized, it would accomplish a lesser good.--The sensuous evil is consequently something which cannot be escaped; or it may be proper that it exists.

It is of still greater importance for us that we give an account of the moral evil. This evil could be

30. Though he did not entirely agree with him, Boström shared some of Hegel's ideas--here that of the true being the whole.
31. "Mot sinnligheten av förnuftet."
32. "Tidsmomentet."

called sin, but this simply expresses its relation to God, and refers more to the action than to its internal nature. Thus also with folly, although this is more theoretical, whereas evil expresses its relationship to the end of man.

What is moral evil? The following observations will serve to give an account of its meaning. 1) It can never be found in other than personal beings. Nature cannot be morally evil, because the difference between moral good and evil does not, as in the physical, consist of a greater or less degree of well-being, but is qualitative, and only exists in conscious beings--even though on a lower level of development physical and moral evil are confused. Evil is 2), as mentioned, not only separated from the good qualitatively, but also quantitatively, which is an important observation. All systems which do not recognize this develop a wrong idea about evil, like the doctrine of emanation and pantheism.[33] If, namely, such were not the case, the difference between good and evil would fall away, and one would say that each, by intensification or by diminution, would pass over into each other. 3) Evil is not as to its essence <u>one</u> with the good, and separated from it only as an appearance of the self-

33. For Bostrom's observations about Neo-Platonism see supra, 111-112; 123.

same thing,[34] or else it would be another kind of good (thus Spinoza). Neither is it 4) merely or purely negation of the good, as all realistic pantheistic[35] systems have taught, because they have designated everything as modes of God.[36] According to [these] it is only for the relative manner of presentation, which does not see the whole in its continuity, that there is any difference between good and evil. But [this is][37] wrong, because evil may in this sense be negative, namely, in that it is not the good; but it is likewise a position[38] of something else, i.e., itself.

That good and evil as to their principle are one can only mean that they have not become real for a person, but are considered as to their potentiality; and this unity, or that which is identical in both, is man himself, or his free will as mere capacity; or in abstracto, that which, more closely determined, can become the one or the other, but not both. Evil is positive for just this reason, that it is a self-conscious and free activity; but such a one, however, that it is separated from the good.

5) Innocence is this very condition that has been

34. "Detsamma självt."
35. "Realistiska panteiskiska."
36. "Satt allt såsom modi i Gudomligheten."
37. "Men orätt."
38. "Position."

named, or the will, in so far as it does not yet possess consciousness of the opposite; and one can say that it is a form of existence that man has through God: in himself neither good nor evil, but good provided he through Him is innocence. This word, however, already expresses the conceivability of guilt, which cannot be predicated in God. Man, on the other hand, is not good until he has made himself good,[39] and thus has come out of the state of innocence. Because, in order that innocence shall become good, man must make it such, namely by actually excluding the opposite from one's self; otherwise, there would be no action.[40]

Evil is, then, a free will, or such thinking and willing as has a content which is opposed to the good. Such a possibility postulates the fact that man is free before he is evil, and that through his freedom he has determined himself for something that is in conflict with his essence. Evil, therefore, cannot be understood without relation to the good, just as darkness cannot be understood without light, since for both there must be something in common, namely, sight.[41] Thus evil is

39. One is left to choose whether Boström saw clearer than Paul. See Romans 7.

40. "Annars intet handlande."

41. It may here seem as if Boström says that good requires evil; but in the next paragraph he says that it is only a condition for the possibility of freedom of choice.

possible only in and by the good, or thereby that the rational being determines himself to it. Otherwise it would not be imputable. In other words, for its possibility a rational being is required, but one that decides not to be rational;[42] and a free being, but one who decides not to be self-dependent. Evil is thus a contradiction in man, and its ground is the will as a free capacity to determine its being,[43] or not to do it, the consequence of which is that he is determined and determines himself for the sensuous. A being that cannot be good can, therefore, neither be evil; but a finite being, in developing himself, cannot be good without the possibility of being evil.[44]

The necessity of the good is clear in itself, because it is what it is in itself, and cannot be an absolute nothing, even if it does not actu appear in man. Evil again is necessary in the sense that evil is a negative moment for the possibility of the good in man--as a condition for the possibility of freedom of choice; and it is just by the use of this, revealing itself in the freedom of the will, that the good can be realized in man.

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42. Boström here says that to be good is to be reasonable, or rational. Since God is the absolute reason, to be good would be to be God-like. Since to be evil is to be irrational, it can have no relation to God, and must be the consequence of man's misuse of his power. See below, 153-154.

43. "Besluta sig för sitt väsen."

44. That this possibility is the result of man's freedom seems evident from Boström's position that freedom consists in the ability to choose between opposing grounds of determination. See SB, II, 494.

Evil is, therefore, necessary for man in thought, or as to its possibility in idea[45]--although not for God--in such a way that, without consciousness of evil there would not be consciousness of the good, without the good; or, to become genuinely good is not possible without overcoming the evil; in other words, evil has a theoretical necessity when we consider man's development in time. Indeed, without propensity[46] toward [evil] man could not gain the strength of will which is necessary to overcome it.

But from this theoretical necessity of evil as to its ideal possibility there does not follow any practical necessity of its real actuality. That man must know about evil, and have a solicitation[47] to it, does not imply the necessity of determining one's self for it, or of sensuousness. On the contrary, there arises the necessity of recognizing that it must be overcome. In regard to this, it can always be explained from sufficient grounds how it can arise, but not how it actually has arisen. In this regard, or as to the factual reality of evil, no other ground can be given than man's free will or its

45. "Till sin ideala möjlighet."
46. "Propension." Boström's use of the word here seems to signify disposition, or will.
47. "Sollicitation." Boström wrote in Swedish and Latin. His reason for using Latinized words occasionally in his Swedish lectures is that in such instances they are more expressive than any Swedish word would be. Among the meanings of this word are "inveigle," "seduce," "provoke," "tempt."

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factual decisions.

Thus evil is not without ground, but neither does it have any other ground beside, or any other ground than, the will. In any other case the ground would be transferred to God. Therefore, when we come back to the human will, we have reached the ultimate on this path. Anything else that is found in him as rational belongs to his eternal being.[48]

God is said to be related to evil in a permissive way. This is false, becauses it supposes that God could prevent it, and if He did not [prevent it], then He did not will to do it. But such an assumption is also not needed with regard to God, since we do not accept any creation, but man is just as eternal as God, and what proceeds from him is not caused by God. Evil proceeds only from man's essence, not, namely, in its totality, but from that which is identical in sensuousness and reason, which is the ego;[49] not just from the sensuous, which is not evil, nor from reason, which is absolutely good, but from [man] as a unity of both or as possibility to apprehend both in himself. If one should ask why he rather determines or decides himself to the one, or the other, the answer is: because he does it. We can per-

48. Since with Boström the good is the rational, this must refer to the good.

49. "Jaget." Boström defines the ego as that which is identical in sensuousness and reason. "Det identiska mellan sinnlighet och förnuft, nämligen jaget."

haps give a reason for the possibility of evil, man's two-fold nature, but not for its actuality.

With regard to the entrance of evil into the sensuous world, it has according to many views been accpeted that it had its ground only in sensuousness, in which case it would only be physical; or that it depended on a disproportion between sensuousness and reason, as a consequence of culture and nurture,--but then these would be explained as evil. Leibniz sought the explanation in man's necessary limitation--he could not be like God. But this is to place the will in subservience to reason; it destroys freedom, and simply makes evil a negation.

Kant said that evil is beyond understanding, as grounded in the noumenon, but thereby he merely pushes the problem aside without explanation. Fichte [said that it is] a native inertia in conflict with the non-ego, and therefore a tendency in the ego to permit this to determine it. But this is more of an explanation of what evil <u>is</u> than of its ground.

In the Orient they sought the explanation in a double absoluteness, an evil <u>beside</u> the good; or in this, that the former had fallen away from the latter; but this is no explanation, because <u>declarandum</u> is just the ground of the falling away; and if evil is absolute, it does <u>not</u> become evil. The same thing lies in Plato's explanation of it, whereby the evil would not in itself

be evil, without which it is not explained by Plato whence matter arises. Spinoza taught that evil exists only in imagination. Schelling [taught] that a fall of the ideas had taken place as differentiations in God, whereby evil is transferred to the absolute, and therefore is not evil.

Hegel finally [taught] that evil is necessary in the absolute self, and has its ground there, namely, in the necessity of the idea of the good to posit itself[50] or to exist as the result of a process of development, whereby it becomes a unity of contradictions and consequently posits evil, which thereby also itself becomes absolute, and thus practically necessary.

All of these views are therefore unsatisfactory. My explanation--to summarize it--is that man as finite develops himself in time from the lower to the higher, consequently from sensuous to rational. When he thereby has come to consciousness of his essence, he finds two principles or types of forces in himself, which both reveal themselves to him as possible grounds of determination, or are motives for him, although it depends on him which he is to follow.[51] Sensuousness may thereby have taken a certain form, from which it may take effort to free one's self, and one can neglect this; but one

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can also take up the rational into one's will. One could hereby think that there are two forces in man, which war for him, and that the result would depend on which one of them were the stronger. But man is not merely passive and lifeless; and, even though both of these forces work upon him, it is necessary in order that one shall conquer that the person himself shall decide for the one or the other.

All determinism comes from the fact that one has forgotten that a person is not only a force, but that, as soon as he becomes conscious of his freedom, [man is] the highest power within himself. But it is clear that, if he does not wish to retain his power, then it follows of itself that he is determined by the sensuous or the lower, as the first in time; but this happens simply because he does not use his freedom. We must seek the ground for good and evil only in man's will, but only under the condition of the relationship to reason and sensuousness which has just been mentioned.

We add a few observations. 1) Is man evil in himself? No, because his existence in itself is his idea, and so long as this is not his being for himself, this being is his innocence.[52] Is he evil by nature? No,

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because man becomes morally evil through himself.[53] He first loses his innocence--this lies in its nature--but to it is added a free decision.

2) The immorality of other people cannot strictly[54] contribute to make him evil. But this can [be said to be true] in the sense that, if through immoral behavior of others, it can become more difficult for the individual to attain a higher degree of perfection. In that way it is indeed correct. No wickedness can be without influence on others, so that so far as the consequences are concerned, all evil strengthens the power of sensuousness over a person, and hinders him from higher development. Inherited sin[55] is just this influence on each one of that which has preceded.

So far as the individual person is concerned, one immoral act will not completely estrange him from his

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53. Boström's rejection of the doctrine of "original sin" is at variance with the doctrine of the Church in which he was brought up. See below, note 55. His position is also at variance with the Barthianism of our own day. See Barth and Thurnheysen, Come Holy Spirit (tr. George Richards, Elmer G. Homrighansen, Karl J. Ernst), New York: Round Table Press, Ind., 1933), 6-12 and passim.

54. "I sträng bemärkelse."

55. "Original sin" is defined as follows in the Catechism of the Evangelical Lutheran Augustana Synod (Rock Island: Augustana Book Concern, 1922), 51-52: "Original sin is our inherited tendency to do that which is evil and our disinclination and inability to do that which is good." Among the Bible verses quoted are the following: "I know that in me, that is, in my flesh, dwelleth no good thing." (Romans 7:18) and, "We were by nature the children of wrath" (Ephesians 2:3). In this definition "original sin" and "inherited sin" are identified. Boström, however, denies original sin, and gives his own interpretation of the doctrine of inherited sin.

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3) How is the religious person related to moral evil? a) he cannot ascribe any part in it to God, whether it be under the one form or the other. In God as the absolute good there can be no evil, neither can it issue from Him, but only from the being through whom evil becomes possible. Therefore the religious person does not need any theodicée; such a one has appeared only in the systems which have accepted a creatio libera, at which the thought has always arisen that God could have made man better, and that with the acceptance of such a creatio it is possible to justify God because

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b. Ethical theory takes the position that there can be no moral guilt where there is no choice. William Henry Roberts says: "Where there is no choice, there is no problem." The Problem of Choice (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1941), 6.

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of the evil in a different way from what Leibniz did.[61]

The case is entirely different with us. Since, according to our view, God did not create man, He can also not have made man wicked. But since man is a self-existing being, he must also in time decide what he is to be,[62] the ground for which cannot be sought in anything else than in himself.

b) The religious individual thinks of evil not only as his own and that of the race (through the consequences), but as the absolute evil for man, or that which is the greatest evil for him, and in that sense as his own. This does not mean that it would in itself be absolute, or that the sensuous life per se is evil, but that by choosing it as end man is deprived of that which for him is absolute good. In that sense evil is absolute, and this is true in each moment of time, and throughout all of life, when it is considered as a preparation for the higher life, which is his idea, and the only thing that has eternal worth for him.

Evil is, therefore, for man an eternal evil, because he cannot again enter into this present life and use it again as a means for his end, but has here played out his

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role, and not used this life for that which he should have attained in it; and also, because he knows that this missing of the mark cannot be remedied by himself, but only by God.

Another question, and a still more important one, is whether evil is eternal in the sense that it must have for man an eternal substantiality or reality. How does the religious person regard evil 4) in relation to other possible forms of life, and in specie with regard to his own absolute end? It cannot be thought that the moral evil be transferred to succeeding forms of life. Then man would have ceased to be free, and consequently also ceased to be independent, and a man. But he enters into a succeeding life, as into this one, with power of self-determination. But this does not prevent the fact that, even though he does not need to be actu evil, in the event that he has been so here, the consequences of a preceding immoral life will, nevertheless, in part have the effect that in the succeeding one he does not have those moments fully developed which he would need in order to reach a higher degree of life there; and in part that there will be obstructive moments in the determination of the will for the good; that is, he will there have a harder struggle to become good than would be the case if the reverse had been true. This fact, in connection with the consciousness that these

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deficiencies in correspondence[63] are the consequence of man's own will, is designated as punishment in the popular religions, and, in the contrary situation, rewards.

In some religions there is connected with [this consciousness] the false manner of representation, that outward punishments and rewards should follow. This is a vulgarity that disappears with higher development, so that the punishments and rewards fuse with the consciousness of a self-caused possibility of greater or less morality. Both the punishments and the rewards can be represented by fantasy in various ways, but always with this similarity in all religions, that therein a connection between this and the following life is assumed. In this manner the important influence and significance of the moral evil is usually depicted by means of the most severe pictures of punishment, dim and dark, sensuousness being that which is dim for man. They also picture it as a life of bondage and chains, because the spirit is bound by sensuousness; and this continues in the succeeding life, in so far as it is dependent on the present one.

The connection between the preceding and the succeeding life, and the influence of the former on the latter, finally elicits the question 5) whether the religious person can

63. "Oemotsvarigheter." There is similarity here to the use of the term "correspondence" by Emanuel Swedenborg. See his Heaven and Hell (Rotch ed.), (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1920), 347 and passim.

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regard the moral evil as continuing after it has once become actual, or if it will finally be destroyed. On the basis of the religious feeling this question has been variously answered. Certain persons have had a very vague notion about the life after this one, and with these people such a question can, therefore, not arise. Thus, for example, [it is with] Chinese and Egyptians, who accept the immortality of the soul, but sensuously considered. Among the Israelites immortality was also slightly apprehended in a conscious way, but to begin with all reward was limited to sensuous advantages. This manner of representation disappeared in the course of time, but with the effect that there was little questioning about eternal blessedness.

The problem was grasped in a deeper manner in Hindustan, where it was accepted that man passes through many stages of life, and that the present is, as it were, a middle boundary, from which he passes, either to unity with God, or else downward. Then he has a new life-series to pass through, with a sort of circular motion, in that he finally always returns to this life, and <u>from it</u> raises himself to something better, in the event that this is to happen. But whether or not this final [state] is to be better is not said. On the other hand, in Persia the express doctrine is found that everything ends by becoming the kingdom of Ormuzd. Among the Greeks there was a wretched view about the next life. The picture is taken from the fantasy that

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they had about the dead, because the memory of them is poorer than the present existence. They are all represented as shadows, but with a boundary between the better and the worse--and thus, no answer.

Which, now, of the opposing views is the more satisfactory? The thought which is prefigured in the Persian religion must, as the only correct one from a philosophical viewpoint, be accepted as the only one that is consistent with the standpoint of the religious life. If evil should continue forever, it would have to possess an eternal substance, which is impossible. The only thing that is positive[64] in evil is the sensuous will,[65] which rather belongs to the non-sensuous, but only the formal in the same, which also belongs to man's sensuous nature. Since we must believe that man more and more continues in the development of his being, that which does not correspond to his being must in this development be increasingly removed.[66] From one point of view, this has been found necessary, but, in order to reconcile it with other statements in the revelation, other hypotheses have been invented, as, for example, the one that the evil persons sink deeper and deeper into evil, or into a life of mere appearance,[67] and finally disappear. But

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65. Here obviously Boström is concerned with moral, not natural evil.
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A second reason for the impossibility of the eternal continuation of evil is the fact that many people do not here reach any higher development of their life, so that by far the greater portion of human ideas[69] do not attain any actual existence in our world; others may indeed attain such a one, but give it up again with haste. Yet these [who have not reached a higher development] cannot be excluded from communion with the others; a possibility must also be found for them for just as high a development, otherwise this [development] would depend on a certain duration.[70] It is of still greater importance that the religious consciousness would imply a contradiction, if man did not hope that there would be a higher development. The religious individual, therefore, calms himself in [hope of] the earlier participation in eternal life by the one or the other--which would be impossible if a portion of the race were excluded from the development. Indeed the re-

68. For a discussion of Boström's idea of immortality see below, 186-198.

69. "Människoidéer." Reference to Boström's system of God and his eternal ideas.

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ligious person may already in this life find himself living in God, but only as to the principle of his higher life, whereas the consciousness of sin is, nevertheless, always found in him. No one can be said to be so perfect that he can consider himself to be without guilt.

Therefore, if he also knows that he is raised above the immoral persons, he is, nevertheless, not absolutely, but only relatively, separated from the evil ones. But if upon reflection on good and evil one takes into consideration also the next life, this leads to the representation of a final complete difference between good and evil, and thereby also to a raising of the antithesis between good and evil to its greatest height. From this the imagination of the eternal damnation of the evil has arisen--which, however, if it existed, would destroy the blessedness of the religious person.[71]

We sum up what has been said in this manner that, on the one hand, since man cannot think of himself without relation to the others, therefore the consciousness of the absolute unblessedness of some would imply a decrease in his own blessedness. On the other hand, the thought of the eternal existence of evil does not harmonize with the thought of God as absolute end of all life. It is possible

71. A different spirit from the one that suggests the joy of the blessed will be increased by beholding the misery of the damned.

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that certain individuals for a certain period of time do not share in this life, but it cannot be absolutely unattainable for anyone.

Therefore the piously inclined has the conviction that evil may indeed in time work sorrowfully and cause a diminishing of his blessedness, but he also knows that only the true striving can have real success, wherefore he never has more than a relative sympathy with evil, and never any absolute sorrow over it. Neither does he consider evil so gross that it would be a complete lack of correspondence with the idea. To a certain extent this lack of correspondence may consist in a wrong tendency, without being actual sin. Therefore the religious person is careful and charitable in his judgments of others, because the exact state of perversion in a person can be known only by that person himself; and neither does he make too great demands on others.

It is easy to discover that the view of evil, which herewith has been presented is intimately bound up[72] with the certainty of the immortality of the soul. Therefore, we must also, in our consideration of religion, or the religious man, proceed to a consideration of other forms of life.[73]

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1. Boström holds that God did not directly create the sensuous world, but that this is done by man.[74] There is an idea in God, man, from which the world has its explanation, and it is through this that God is its cause.[75]

Boström says that for finite man there is, beside the absolute and supersensible world, also a relative and sensuous world, which belongs to him immediately, and to God (through him) mediately, which in itself is the faulty[76] one, but which, nevertheless, relatively for man, is the necessary and correct phenomenon of the former. Since this world is the relative antithesis of the absolutely true one, its parts must be more or less temporal and transitory, existing in space (extended, external, remote), not spiritual, but material, not absolutely alive, but (relatively) lifeless, unconscious, not free (passive), impenetrable,[77] etc.[78] As a matter of fact, this world is nothing else than a less perfect perception or consciousness of the content of God's spirit.[79]

In other words, this sensuous and temporal world is

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74. Supra, 147.

75. Ribbing (ed.), FR, 119. One may ask if Boström holds that man causes the laws of nature. He does indeed say that what we call nature does not, according to his view, have any existence of its own independent of man. SB, II, 491. See also SB, I, 85, Åberg, BV, 30-31.

76. "Oriktiga."

77. "Ogenomskådliga."

78. SB, III, 14-15.

79. See also Ribbing (ed.), FR, 75-76, 116; Åberg, BV, 47-49, 54; SB, I, 3, 118, IP3; II, 276-279, 284-286, 487, IP 24, 488-489, 491-492.

the result of man's imperfect perceptions.[80] It is for this reason that Boström can say that to demand that this should be a better world would be to demand that man should not be man, which would be a contradiction.[81] This is not the only world that has its ultimate cause in God.[82] He would often say that, if there were only one world, then Hegel would be right.[83]

2. In criticizing and evaluating Leibniz, Boström says that when Leibniz conceived of God as thinking of all possible worlds, then they were also in His consciousness, and could there possess harmony as an ideal reality; then He could also have created them all, provided His will were not weaker than His understanding, although this idea of creation is impossible, and not explained by Leibniz. An infinite number of worlds is not only possible, but is actual, in God, because each one of His ideas is the whole from a certain viewpoint, so that He has within Himself the perfect world, but each monad with a certain degree of imperfection. That God should choose the best possible world would not be reasonable,[84] because, if He could have them all in His consciousness, He could also have produced

80. SB, I, 245. Here is similarity to Leibniz and Hegel. See Leibniz, The Monadology (tr. Robert Latta), (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1898), 239-245, especially paragraphs 42, 49. See also McTaggart, SHD, 177.

81. Supra, 147-148.

82. Ribbing (ed.), FR, 119.

83. Wikner, STB, 17. Yet there is diversity in Hegel's "one world!"

84. "Har intet skäl för sig."

them, whereby both the world and God would have been more complete, just as He was more perfect in His thought by thinking them all. Boström holds that the correct part in Leibniz' view lies in the fact that the world which is God's is absolutely perfect, and that the imperfect worlds are already contained in it as to their possibility. Thus comprehended, the view of Leibniz becomes like Boström's.[85]

Boström criticizes Aristotle for accepting the idea of a substance other than God, which he says is an unproved supposition. He charges Hegel with something of the same procedure when he speaks of the passing over of the idea into the "Anderssein," which he says is also a supposition.[86]

3. Boström believes that he interprets the Christian viewpoint, as different from the Jewish, and freed from the empirical additions of theology, in this manner:

> God is eternal and unchangeable. He is not only God, but also man, as the Son, who is begotten of eternity. Consequently He exists, not as a production in time, which is only a symbolical expression, but as an eternal relationship. We think of the one who has the idea as prior[87] and the idea as latter, though both are the same in essence, and the idea, furthermore, has his own personal existence. This Son has in the fulness of time assumed human nature, or entered the sensuous world, which consequently is an immediate creation by Him. It is thereby said[88] that God indeed

85. Ribbing (ed.), FR, 95-96.
86. Ibid., 122. In short, he is more a monist than Hegel. Then why not "only one world?"
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4. There is a marked similarity between Boström and Royce in their conception of the material world.

Royce says:

> The result, so far, is that the world of endlessly consolidating matter can't be the ultimately real world, but must be only a seeming world whose anomalous character is

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92. Ribbing, (ed.), FR, 122-123.

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With Boström, as has been indicated in the foregoing paragraphs, this sensuous world belongs to the phenomenon. His development of the explanation of the physical world has also been criticized in the Scandinavian countries. Dons of Norway charges his system with hanging in the air.[94] Wedberg of Sweden speaks of his airy idea-fiction.[95] He questions whether Boström has been conscious of the problem of how the phenomenal worlds in their concretion are to be deduced from the composition of his doctrine of ideas.[96] He also charges that Boström does not make a clear distinction between the arguments that most immediately are directed against the acceptance of an external world, and those which are aimed at proving the spiritual nature of the true reality.[97]

Boström, however, insists that he accepts the existence of the phenomenal world as a material world. He says that we also have perceptions which are called sensations, which are the perceived[98] material things,[99] as in

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93. The Spirit of Modern Philosophy (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1893), 334-335.
94. OB, 21.
95. LSBF, 124. "Luftiga begreppsdiktning."
96. Ibid., 171.
97. Ibid., 82, note.
98. "Senterade."
99. SB, III, 234.

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Berkeley. He says further that the sensuous reality is certainly not false, provided it is not taken to be anything other than what it is, which is the case when it is taken to be the only true reality,[100] i.e., as anything other than man's world and manner of perceiving.[101] He takes an unnamed writer sternly to task for having said that he [Boström] does not believe that the world surrounding us in space and time exists.[102] He makes the statements that the individual works with the external, material things.[103]

5. Wedberg quotes Boström as having said, "I should perceive God Himself in a grain of sand, if I perceived it perfectly."[104] Boström makes the statement that in a somewhat modified form he accepts the phrase by Anaxagoras, ἐν παντὶ πάντα [105] i.e., in each individual [being] the whole universe is present in a certain way, just as was the case with the monads of Leibniz.[106]

It thus seems perfectly clear that Boström accepted the physical world, although the charge that he had more

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100. Boström was an unyielding foe of realism. See SB, II, 270-281, 481-482; Ribbing (ed.), FR, 20-30.
101. SB, III, 232, note 128.
102. Ibid., 244, note 142.
103. Ibid., 517.
104. LSBF, 154.
105. Fragment 11. See John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, 4th ed. (London: A. and C. Black, Ltd., 1930), 259.
106. SB, I, 241.

difficulty with it than with the spiritual world also is true. His system appeared to be very clear to himself, but it was not always clear even to his best students, as is evidenced by a controversy which reigned between two of them, Edfeldt and Nyblaeus, in which Edfeldt held that the ideas immediately for God, or as God's content, are absolute beings, just as absolute as God, and Nyblaeus held that this was out of keeping with Boström's theistic view.[107]

6. Boström's philosophy is that of a theist, and an idealist. Such a system will be attacked both by the non-theist and by the realist. There are statements in Wedberg which at least indirectly indicate that he is of the neo-realistic school.[108] Herein lies the basis of much of his criticism. Landström calls attention to the difficulty that is found in all philosophical systems in the relationship between the absolute and the relative,[109] a difficulty that is aggravated in Boström because of his rational idealism.

7. Of moral evil Boström says that it can never be found in other than personal beings.[110] There can be evil

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107. Leander, LGI, 8. This controversy is found in Edfeldt, BI and DBF, and Nyblaeus, TUBF.

108. LSBF, 37-38, 98. Wedberg makes special and sympathetic reference to the new-realistic school in America.

109. OTB, 46.

110. Supra, 149.

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110. Supra, 149.

only in morally responsible persons.[111] Moral evil has its roots in the will.[112] These statements are in harmony with the position of P. A. Bertocci, who holds that there can be moral evil only where there is a possibility of choice.[113]

It is significant that Boström does not escape the doctrine of inherited sin and natural depravity.[114] It is another indication of the truth of his own words that a philosopher does not get away from the influences of his training. This is also a doctrine of the Lutheran Church. Yet he cannot be classed as scripturally orthodox.

A contradictory element appears in his treatment of evil, between his statement that the consequences of evil will follow a person into the succeeding life,[115] and his doctrine that evil would be increasingly removed and annihilated. He appears to be coming back to the idea of atonement and the thought of cleansing, but it will not fit into his system, where man himself is to do the reforming, and he consequently slips back into

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111. Supra, 152.
112. Supra, 152-154.
113. Said in class in Ethics, 1945. This is the position of many modern ethicists, especially all influenced by Kant. See, for example, N. Hartmann, Ethics (tr. Stanton Coit) 3 vols. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932), II, 145; III, 114, 161-162, 257-259 and passim.
114. Supra, 157-159.
115. Supra, 162-163.

a position of uncertainty as to how completely evil will ever be removed. He does, however, believe in the eventual salvation of all.[116] God is in no case to be thought of as the source of evil.[117]

8. The eventual salvation of all must be the hope of every person in whom there is a spark of compassion. Thus far there can be no disagreement with Boström. But on what can one base the statement that the one who has refused to meet the conditions of salvation in this world is going to do so in any other? It may appear to be a good doctrine, but it cannot be called more than doctrine. In fact, it may be called pure dogmatism!

In his emotional article on the doctrine of hell, Boström in the concluding paragraph says:

> To hell, therefore, with the entire old barbaric devil- and hell-doctrine; and thither also--we were about to say--with all the crude and thoughtless beings that yet in our day proclaim it.[118]

To believe that Boström meant to encourage any kind of license by his doctrine would, of course, be to miss the central thought of his philosophical system, which is the unity of the idea (man) with God. On the other hand, the question may be raised whether Boström has not failed to see an element that is to be found in

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116. See below, 203-204.
117. SB, III, 261-265; Åberg, BV, 68-73, 119-122.
118. SB, III, 282.

righteousness. There is something terrible and consuming in righteousness--and in love, too![119]

Evil in nature does not receive the attention by Boström that he gives to moral evil. This is perhaps due to his view of nature as being dependent on man.[120]

It is as if one could detect in Boström an echo of the words, "Cursed is the ground for thy sake,"[121] and, "For the earnest expectation of the creation waiteth for the revealing of the sons of God."[122]

4. The Relationship to Other Forms of Life and to Their Totality

In the idea of the human soul there is also contained the thought of a reconciliation and harmony in man between the essence and the phenomenon through his successive development, both in the entire race, as well as in the individual. When this idea is apprehended by the individual consciousness, it leads to an imperative longing and hope, which is valid for the entire life, especially for the life to come; and the certainty of perfection, when it is referred to the life in time, becomes hope of immortality and of blessedness. Faith in immortality is, therefore, necessarily connected with the religious consciousness, just as is the consciousness of God and man

119. See Hebrews 6:4-8 and Matthew 23:37-39.
120. Supra, 169.
121. Genesis 3:17.
122. Romans 8:19.

in their relationship to one another. For this reason it has been accepted in all religions, just as it has been taught in all higher systems of philosophy.

It was already foreshadowed in the Pythagoreans, who had the first practical philosophical system in Greece. It is found again in Socrates, and is carried out in Plato. Even if all of his arguments do not seem to be completely satisfactory, this is due essentially only to their popular form. For his system as such, as a consequence of its entire point of view, special evidences would be superfluous. In the popular forms of religion among the Greeks the consciousness of the immortality of the soul was only imperfectly expressed; but it existed, on the other hand, in the mysteries, or the esoteric side of their religion.

This consciousness also has its expression in the Neo-Platonists, as a union of the human being, or the soul, with God, not as annihilation, but as a continuing enjoyment of himself in Him. With Leibniz immortality was an axiom, and according to him the soul could be annihilated only by a miracle. It also appears as indubitable in Kant; even though from his theoretical philosophical viewpoint immortality became indemonstrable, nevertheless, as a consequence of its connection with the practical [philosophy], he presents an ethical proof of it, which proof, however, can be reduced to a theoret-

VIII. Translation of Boethe's Philosophy of Religion 1/2

ical one.

There are only two kinds of systems that never can accept the doctrine of immortality: the materialistic or atomistic, in which no religious person remains, and, further, all pantheistic systems. This is true, in the very first instance, with the strictly pantheistic systems, with which immortality is incompatible, in which man simply has a passing existence in the motion of the absolute, or scarcely can be said to have any existence, since it simply belongs to the substance.

But the same thing is true with all such viewpoints as affirm[1] motion in God, even though He is not thereby apprehended in an essentially pantheistic manner. So it was with Heraclitus, Aristotle,[2] Schelling and Hegel, as also with Fichte. For even though, according to these [thinkers], there is something perduring in the motion, namely its forms, this [perduring] is, nevertheless, not anything personal or individual, but the whole could only be considered to be such, although even the personality of this can be questioned.

Our problem in connection with the question of the immortality of the soul does not touch only the eternity of the soul (which pantheism also could affirm); but in

1. "Jaka."
2. Boström does not here explain Aristotle's Unmoved Mover, whose highest employment is self-contemplation.

addition to this comes the demand that man shall perdure and further develop. The spirit, in relation to its development, is called soul, and as such has within itself an obscure moment. The problem of the immortality of the soul finally includes [the thought] that man is to perdure not only as spirit and soul, but also as person, that is, as an individual being, and thus not simply as to his general nature, but that he shall be the same being, identical with himself, and distinct from all others.

For the rest, it may in passing be remarked that certain adherents of Hegel's system have accepted immortality as consisting of descendents,--in which case many would not have a part in it;[3] or in deeds that perdure,--in which case it would also be small or nothing for many; or finally, in the consciousness of the universal human being as eternal, although not perduring in time. Here it is not a question of any one of these types of so called immortality.

At the consideration of this problem, the correct thing from a strictly systematic point of view[4] would be to pass over from the eternity of the spirit to his perduration and personality. But I shall use the opposite method, going from the lower to the higher; in other words, I begin with the question as to how the con-

3. Boström remained all his life unmarried.
4. "Strängt systematiskt rätta."

sciousness of immortality arose in man. It is immediately grounded in his consciousness of his personality, which also comprises the eternal ground of the expectation in question. At a certain stage of development man arrives at a consciousness of himself as a person. That he is a person means that he knows himself as an independent and conscious being, capable of all his activity, or that he differs from others in a manner that is conscious to himself; this is also his individuality.

In man's idea lies the consciousness about self-consciousness, just as all the other attributes of reason, and therefore also the consciousness of identity throughout all of life, so that he includes in this unity[5] not only the present, but also the future and the immaterial; no matter how much he may change, he still knows himself as the same being. This identity is expressed by "I", and in this he is a timeless and spaceless being. In man's ego is expressed not simply a thought or a condition, but a thought which, moreover, is activity, and the ground of all his other activity, and in that very fact is the most certain of all. It is, therefore, also in this that the consciousness of immortality most immediately is grounded. The consciousness of personality[6] is really[7]

5. "Enhet."
6. "Personlighetsmedvetande."
7. "I själva verket."

the ground of all evidences of the immortality of the soul; they would not have arisen without it. Not a single one of them proves anything in itself, just because they all posit the ego; but they are correct in this[8] that they express various ways for man in which he is able from certain facts to clarify his consciousness of personality, and, with this, the consciousness of his perduration. All other proofs base themselves on certain attributes of the personality, or have their source in such, and consequently lead to the concept of personality, but first through this to the one of immortality.

Such a one is found in the fact that man finds himself, as thinking, to be a subject that has determinations, but cannot be a determination, and also to be a being that perdures amid changes, i.e., to be a substance. Now, since accidentals[9] arise and perish, but not the substance, therefore the soul cannot, as substance, perish. All this may be correct; but if we recall how I determined the concept substance,[10] then, as a consequence thereof, the concept of personality constitutes ground; and since [the concept of substance] is only an imperfect apprehension of it, consequently the proof suffers from the imperfection that it moves from something secondary, or from result to

8. "Men hava det riktiga."
9. "Accidentier."
10. Consciousness.

ground. It is, therefore, valid as throwing light on something that is certain in itself.

The same is true about the argument of immateriality,[11] namely, that a dissolution is impossible without division, which again cannot be found in a simple [substance].[12] This conclusion also posits the fact that consciousness is one and simple, and it is only in this way that it can prove anything. The simpleness is also a determination in the personality, but only a secondary one; it can, furthermore, be charged that simplicity is only a negative determination, and that such a one is too feeble to establish the immortality of the soul.

Thus also with the other proofs, for example, Plato's, namely, that opposites must pass into each other; if, therefore, death were the last, it would finally be alone in the universe, which is unreasonable. This proves something only if one can establish from man's idea that succession and stages of development simply are product, and that the soul in his essence is eternal; otherwise one would be able to take the same view as Hegel, that life may not cease, but that it is not the same life.

Again, take Plato's proof from man's inner consciousness of the eternal ideas, which he had before and consequently also has after this life--that therefore his being is of the same quality as the idea. But this does

11. "Immaterialitetsargumentet."
12. "Ett enkelt."

not prove that the spirit must pass over into new forms, but he could be thought as returning to potentia, just as he has developed himself from it. Plato's most speculative proof is the one which is taken from the spontaneity of the soul or, as he says, self-motion,[13] which as such cannot cease; thus neither can the soul cease to be, because then all life in the universe would cease, which is unreasonable. This is correct, except the concept of motion itself, which posits a higher principle, namely, that motion is not the first in life. But this positive in motion is just life and self-consciousness, i.e., personality.

But even though personality is ground and postulate of the immortality of the soul, these two concepts are, nevertheless, not identical. The concept of immortality is, namely, the thought of a life perfecting itself in time, and of one in time which is eternal, which does not yet lie in the concept of a spirit, which is timeless. Man must consequently take up time in his eternity. He is as to his essence an idea in God, but, as subject for himself, finite, and thus inconstant, and as such not perfected; and the spirit, as also in itself temporal, and not only eternal, is being and phenomenon, or soul, whose essence and ground the spirit is. As finite, man strives for the actualization of himself, and

13. "Självrörelse." See Phaedrus 245.

thereby he receives a nature for himself. The spirit, or personality, must not be thought of as separated from man, but it is his being; or the soul is the spirit himself as active and real in time. Both are the same, in the one case as essence and ground, and in the other as activity and consequence;[14] and it is just with respect to both of these viewpoints together that we speak about "man."

In the consciousness of the soul itself, we now say, is also comprehended the consciousness of immortality, and thus the concept of it; because it is the consciousness of a being that in and by himself lives and works, and who consequently in his essence is eternal. It is for this reason that man's substance cannot share the fate of the merely phenomenal to change; but he is the substance of this change, for which reason his life and development cannot cease. This is the expression of the general thought and feeling, and the problem now is to verify it.

This verification we now gain in this that man receives consciousness of the perfection of his life in the very fact that he struggles upward to the production of life and self-consciousness in time; but, since this does not fully succeed in any moment of time, he must repeat the same act, and thus time is thereby procreated.

14. "Följd."

Since this struggle is intent upon a goal that has not yet been attained, the necessity arises of a continuation of life in order to reach it. This is the necessity of becoming in time that which he is as to his essence, or the struggle of the soul to become spirit. But what he can become through his essence, for that he must have essential inclination, that is, such a one as cannot be separated from him, but belongs to, or is, his essence. As such, it cannot be merely empty possibility, but a force of action,[15] which tends to realize itself, or the necessity of realizing all his inclinations.

But in no moment of time does man reach his goal in his present form of life; and this is something that he also feels in this that he constantly struggles for something greater than he reaches. Or, the fact that he has an essential necessity means that he finds in his being something more than that which is developed in time, and that he, therefore, cannot be completely satisfied in this, or in any certain life, but only as a whole in all the forms of life, which are possible for him. But which time or form of life is for man only partial, and which is complete, is a question which cannot be decided from without, or from the viewpoint of time, but only from the viewpoint of his eternal being; because each time is only a part of his time, and every form of life

15. "Verkningskraft."

is only a partial one, since time becomes a whole for him just through this, that he actually realizes his essence. Only when this has happened is the being satisfied, and then his time and struggle ceases.

Thus man moves through the struggle to rest and eternity, and this is just the idea of his immortality, or of immortality in the highest sense, as one with his goal. For, in order to be perfected, man must have taken up in himself all his tenses; and with the consciousness that no other [tense] is possible, his life would be eternal, with the consciousness of the fact that these tenses are successive, even though they are not so for him, since he has taken them up in his consciousness. As long as we are in time we must, moreover, change, but at the goal man should have all the tenses present in his consciousness as exhausting all the states in which the spirit can move.

Then motion would be at an end, and the content of his consciousness would be just about like God's. From this it does not follow that he cannot have the thought of change, which in itself is not change, but is the thought of it and as such unchangeable; only as representation does he have change. This would accordingly be the goal, and would be his immortality from this viewpoint; but in his life,[16] or when he conceives

16. "I hennes tid."

of himself[17] in time, immortality consists in moving toward perfection in all his moments of time, so that it is possible to distinguish between immortality as a goal and as a continuous development of his content. Both mutually imply each other, although the former is in reality called immortality.

The necessity or tendency just mentioned is not only a wish which is a guarantee of its satisfaction. Mere wish is a sensuous desire, which does not lead to execution, because it is too weak, or the thing seems impossible. But neither one is true of this desire, which is elemental,[18] i.e., appears from the certainty of that toward which man in his temporal development is directed; this is, namely, to realize his eternal essence, and this goal toward which he strives is not posited arbitrarily by him, but is of his essence. In other words, the consciousness of immortality and the tendency toward perfection are already given in the original notion of man, namely, in God's eternal idea of man.

If we now put together what we have said, it is clear that man's self-consciousness is the eternal ground of his immortality. It is timeless, and were there no question about anything else, no further proofs of the immortality of the soul would be needed. But

17. "Tänker sig."
18. "Ursprungligt."

time enters in, or man is in time, and the question is whether he also as [existing in time] is infinite, or if his existence is just as long as time itself. Yes, because his eternal nature is to attain his essence. This is also expressed in this way that man returns to God from Whom he has issued; which is quite correct, because the more man is composed[19] in God, the more perfectly is he composed, and when he has gained this [composure] he has gained what he needs. Then also time does not exist for him, except in the idea.

Before man can arrive at the thought he must have lower perceptions, but in reality the goal is that these shall become thoughts, even if they do not become such time-development, which still is finite. But as soon as he has apprehended his idea he has attained his goal; and this he must be able to do, because it is his essence. And this is not something in the future; for God all the stages of development of man are present; but in order to come to the point where he can thus apprehend them, the human spirit must extend itself and its determinations in time. God shall finally become all in all. This is the correct expression for immortality as goal, of which, as perduration, it is the condition.

But it is still not an expression of a truly

19. "Fattar sig."

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scientific deduction; for it would be possible in this to think of the whole man as only a moment in a higher spirit, whose striving in him it would be. This depends on the manner in which God is comprehended. But before we speak of it, a remark must be made about Kant's proof of the immortality of the soul, which in many ways corresponds with ours. Man, says Kant, feels in himself the unconditional necessity of continuation in moral and blessed perfection. But this requirement postulates that his noumenon is higher than the phenomenon; and, since this perfection is not attained in any certain moment of time, therefore infinite time is required for the advance toward it. It is the same reasoning as we have presented, except that it is taken from man's disposition in general, and not only from a certain one--that toward morality; it is, namely, to permeate all one's sensuousness with intelligence, i.e., to pass over into pure spirituality.

There is also in what we have presented only one other change,[20] namely, that if man's essence should cease, the demand of reason that sensuousness should in certain instances be negated because of what reason dictates would be sheer absurdity, because this demand would then imply that man should sacrifice his whole existence. This again would not be necessary, even with

20. "En annan vändning."

VIII. Translation of Boström's Philosophy of Religion 191

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There is also in what we have presented only one other change,[20] namely, that if man's actions should cease, the demand of reason that consciousness should in certain instances be negated because of what reason dictates would be sheer absurdity. Because this demand would then imply that man should sacrifice his whole existence. This again would not be necessary, even with

20. "Ein anderes Abändern."

the giving up of sensuousness, when we understand that this life is only a form of transition; then one casts away the lower in order to gain the higher, which essentially is man's whole end. This argument is also completely satisfactory, but posits that man's entire life shall not cease with death.

What has here been advanced are reasonings from experience or from man's point of view, which lead him to belief in immortality. What now remains is to see whether they also find verification from the idea of God. This is possible only if God is pure reason, and man's essence is conditioned, but only by Him. If now God is thought of as [the] highest reason, not only as unity in multiple, but also as possessing the rest of the ontological and noological[21] attributes of reason, or as to his personal ideas; then man must also consider himself as having the same general nature; that he is conditioned by, or lives in, God, does not prevent this, but on the contrary implies an affirmation of it.

The chief point is simply that God is without all matter and without change; with insight into this there arises in man the consciousness that he can never be without life, or cease, which only belongs to his phenomenal existence.--The religious person, furthermore,

21. See Appendix, par. 62, 64.

does not need to understand clearly what we have here said about God, and his relation to Him; but he feels it, wherefore also it is essentially only the religious person that is convinced of the immortality of the soul, and has need of it.[22]

We now proceed from the idea to which we have come, in order to demonstrate the necessity of several forms of development for man. At this we include the reminder that God must be considered as an infinite reason with the determinations we have indicated about it; and also [the reminder] about man's relationship to God, in which he is the subject, so that consequently the idea He has of man is Himself, as He apprehends His determination in a certain form of His consciousness, but integrates it in His total consciousness. In this idea God can think change, provided the idea is something else than Himself; thus His thought of change is not inconsistent with the eternity of the idea in Him; change can take place in it without being change in Him; and at the same time it is true that, in the case that God thinks several forms of development as belonging to the idea, this is not a development in Him. Thought is, namely, that which is fully developed and as such also unchangeable.

22. Here Boström seems to substitute feeling for reason.

We further call attention to the fact that it is said about the idea of man[23] that it is of eternity begotten of God, or subordinate in conception, but not in time, and that the subordinate is, nevertheless, self-existent, as the begetting--in analogy with father and son. Thus the idea of man is itself also alive in itself, and has its own independent existence, because in God there is only life and self-consciousness. But, since the idea apprehends itself as living and self-conscious, it must find itself changeable, not only in the idea, but must actually experience this change, because he is finite, and by this differs from God; he apprehends his determinations relatively.

It is now asked if in man himself, or from his viewpoint, there can be any ground on which the present form of life can be said not to be the only one. We know God's ideas as such only by knowing ourselves; therefore also it is only through this knowledge about ourselves that we understand that the necessity of change is included in the idea. Such a necessity is given in the essence of man, and already follows from the argumentation to which we have recently called attention. Because, if man were not by God determined to go further, neither would he feel any need of it, but would completely correspond to his end. Just be-

23. "Människoidéen."

cause he does not feel completely satisfied in any moment of his existence, it follows that a higher life than the present belongs to his essence; and, therefore, he must conclude from this necessity that other forms of life are included in God's idea of him than the present, or that this idea is the thought of these in the whole, or of a system of forms of development.[24]

It could be objected that God may have had a higher idea of man than the one of which his present form of life is the expression, but that He has determined him in such a way that he should not ever attain this higher [goal], or his idea. But this is a pure contradiction, because in that case, as soon as he had consciousness of himself, he would also feel that he ought to strive further, but also that he could not attain more than he does, which is opposed to his consciousness of being able to be and become better. Thus we properly conclude from this that man is conscious of his tendency to go forward, and that more is deposited in his idea than he can attain in this life; that in God's idea of him there are many forms of life, not ahead of the present one, but all just as present, although for man they have that appearance.

Immortality is not only something in the future,

24. This is a form of reasoning that would hardly convince anyone not already inclined to believe.

as belonging to man's essence, eternally present, but by man as sensuous it must be grasped as in the future, so long as he has not attained his highest standpoint. His own determination is successively to become in himself what he is in God, at which the final point would be to have passed through them all, so that all the forms would for him appear present and clear, as they are for God, although indeed, as has been said, this development must continue for him, and thus appear as a before and after. Since the individual cannot attain his goal except in union with the race, immortality and the various forms of life are, nevertheless, valid, as for the former, so also for the entire race, even though we do not know these forms more closely.

The question of man's blessedness is the same one as that of his immortality, only viewed from another side, because both of these needs are essentially one and the same. Man has no need of immortality without blessedness.[25] The most common form of the hope of blessedness is the consciousness that it shall go well with man in consequence of his morality, and vice versa.

But this word can have a meaning of two kinds:

25. If Boström means this only logically, the force of his logic may be admitted. But practically--and there may also be logic in this--his argument fails. Man has no need of a prison, but when he breaks the law, the state decides that he needs one.

either the act of the one requiting, which equates the consequence with the activity; or the consequence that befalls the doer. It is this latter that people expect, and even require or have need of, namely, as the requirement of justice; this is needed, not only as an external necessity, or as something accidental in relation to the deed itself, but as something absolutely necessary, because the moral person is worthy of blessedness, and vice versa. If a person would think of the relationship as being something else, he would come into indissoluble disharmony with himself, and it is for just this reason that he requires it.

This is so certainly given in consciousness, that from this consciousness, or this requirement, Kant sought a proof both of immortality and the existence of God. Although one ought not to do the good except for its own sake, reason recognizes the virtuous person to be worthy of [immortality]. Now, since this blessedness is not the virtue itself--it was a mistake in Kant's reasoning, that virtue is rationality, and blessedness again is something empirical--therefore the soul must continue to go on in virtue; God exists in order that He may mete out to the virtuous a blessedness proportionate to his virtue.

This reasoning of Kant's is, however, hardly correct. For it may be asked: Is it true that morality and blessed-

ness are so heterogeneous? And, Is the hope of their harmony, even though grounded in itself, here, however, rightly understood? Finally, Is it true that the meaning of both is the same for the present life and for the future forms? None of these questions is answered satisfactorily by Kant. This much, however, is certain and right in it, that the moral person is not good, and does not strive to be good, in order that he may be rewarded, but because it is the demand of his life to be such; and only such a life as is an expression of this, therefore, has any value for man. But the sensuous advantages, which he would not exchange for morality, do not [have value]. But from this it follows, or is inherent in it, that morality is independent of retribution; and this is even more apparent, if the latter had a sensuous content.

Blessedness is rather only an inevitable consequence of morality and a form of the consciousness that the most moral life is also for man the most blessed. From this it also follows that the concept of blessedness must be changed before it can be endorsed by the religious person, because he cannot wish a blessedness for himself that does not have its ground in religion. Man can indeed in this life feel himself far separated from blessedness, but he also knows that this depends on the fact that he is far separated from moral per-

fection, and that in so far as he has this [perfection], he is blessed and has a foretaste of the highest in it.

By this it is not denied that the religious person may also find himself in such circumstances of life, that he must wish that they were different, such as sickness, etc., and that, therefore, he also can and must wish deliverance from it, and long for a better life. But there is in this, or it implies, a longing for a condition where man is delivered from everything that disturbs his moral life, and can feel his blessedness extended to his whole existence.[26]

The concept of blessedness, consequently, includes two moments. The one is positive--an advance in morality; the other is negative--the absence of pain. This is the concept of blessedness of the thinking person, and that he becomes a participant of it in the measure of his perfection the religious person never doubts, because this blessedness is already present here for man in the measure of his advance in morality, by which he comes closer and closer to God, and is more and more independent of the external. This is his law here and also in succeeding forms of life.

This certainty also gains additional strength by

26. In spite of his claim of absolute rationality, Boström was also something of a mystic. Supra, 121-122.

observing the relation of man, in the first place, to nature, as to his own body; for the person who organizes his inner being well, receives greater power over his body and deeper harmony in it, so that the disturbing influences that man receives from his body disappear in the degree that he raises himself to higher perfection; and also [by observing his relation] to the external things, which also are placed in his power, and are made subject to law in the measure that man raises himself. The great revolutions in the earth, which took place before man existed, and the wild forces in the wild life, subside, in part by the deeds of man, but also without this directly, through the arrangement of God.[27]

Furthermore, we think of his relationship to other people. In doing so, we discover wild scenes taking place among savages, but not in the same way among the cultured.[28]

Finally, we have the relationship to God. In the measure that he understands that his goal is unity with Him, the subsequent forms of life also become more harmonious, both inwardly and outwardly, because God is

27. Like a commentary on Genesis I-III and Romans 8:18-25. See Brightman, PR, 216-218; 318-319. Bowne, MET, 102-103.

28. Boström did not live (on earth) during 1914-1918, and during 1939-1945.

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not only creator, but also ruler working with holiness and justice as the guiding principle of man's activity.[29]

This is the ultimate ground of the certainty of blessedness as a consequence of morality, so that in the same measure that man is ennobled, the concept of blessedness is also ennobled, and his certainty of attaining it, but not as compensation for previous sufferings, but as something far higher. "There is a moral hope for immortality, but also an immoral one," says Schelling. The idea of retribution is thus changed by the idea of blessedness into this, that the discord which forces itself into life through immorality is not to continue. It ought not to continue, can, therefore not continue, since it does not belong to the essence; consequently, retribution consists in this, that the moral person by his morality enters into a higher form of life.

Hereby the question of evil returns: Shall it also continue? A retribution is also found immediately for it in the very disharmony that results from being evil. But its final punishment is its annihilation. It may indeed continue in its effects even in another life, as in the consciousness that, without it,[30] it could have been better; but forever it cannot exist. With the entrance of the good into the world, the evil

29. See Appendix, par. 64.
30. "Annars."

is expelled, and the evil person is annihilated, that is, as evil, and he can only remain by a return to God.

This is the idea with regard to the final judgment: the evil will be annihilated. This is apparent also with the individual person; at the beginning of his conversion he may feel himself wretched through the consequences of the former life, and the memory of it; but in the measure that he comes to a full harmony with himself, the evil disappears. Furthermore, it is to be observed that even the person, who has been converted later, may develop to greater clarity than the one who for a longer period, but less constantly, has worked for his improvement. For that reason we can never imagine a form of life where conversion would be impossible. Such a thought would alone be enough to destroy the whole man, if he took account of all the consequences of it. Therefore a final repentance is also accepted in certain religions, and for the reasons already given, this is philosophically more correct than the acceptance of the opposite, although such a view can be explained simply by an abstract antithesis of blessedness and misery in genere and by a representation of the spiritual life without stages, as, for instance, to come to the bosom of Abraham directly from this life.[31]

But for such an imagination, as we have seen, there

31. Luke 16:19-31.

is neither any philosophical ground, nor any religious [ground]. The latter of these reveals itself factually in this, that, as mentioned, there are religions which have denied it. There are many statements even in the Jewish religion also, which are meaningless without the representation of an advancement even beyond this life.

It could be asked if indeed it would be satisfactory for the religiously inclined person that the lot of the good and the evil finally becomes the same. It does not become the same. Already in the course of this life the religious individual is blessed, and the evil one is miserable--which already is a difference. But the character of the present form of life influences the succeeding one, and this can, therefore, reveal itself there as punishment and reward; and one certainly suffers punishment, even if it is not endless, even as within the state a limited punishment is satisfactory to the sense of justice.

The antithesis, or endless punishment for the wicked, would even lessen the blessedness of the good; it is, furthermore, at variance with the very idea of absolute good. Finally, the race, although extended in time and space, is still only one single being, or a whole, and just as little as the various members of an organic body can be without feeling of the suffering of the others, just as little also the one person in

relation to the other.

One could ask if such a doctrine as this one ought to be presented to the public, and if this would not lead to false hopes, even with regard to continuing in evil.[32] The answer depends upon the purpose of the presentation. If it were a matter of gaining security against the evil, but nothing higher, then it would be proper to use the doctrine of eternal punishment as an instrument of fear. But on the other hand it must be said that it is not necessary to hide the truth even from the uneducated, because in itself it never brings any evil with it.

It is thus possible that the doctrine of the final dissolution of evil could lull some to security, because one can overlook the forms of life that lie between; but the opposite doctrine could also lead to despair.[33] Furthermore, it is not necessary to present everything to the less educated that we do to the educated, for it would be enough to call his attention to the fact that evil, from a moral point of view, is absolutely evil, and brings its own punishment.

Here also we must add some observations. 1) Must we regard fortune or misfortune in this world as reward and punishment, or not? Yes, in general, as a

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32. Boström's position here is clear and reveals moral courage.

33. By way of illustration, Boström refers to an incident in Dalarna, Sweden, where a mother by flogging had martyred and tortured a nine-year-old daughter to death, in order to save her sinful soul from the devil and hell. SB, III, 280.

consequence of the fact that the laws of providence put nature in harmony with freedom, and thus also man, and by digression from the right he also brings down upon himself an evil, even if this does not always immediately or in the same measure appear as something external. On the other hand, such fortune and misfortune can seldom in detail be used as a measuring rod for the judgment[34] of goodness and evil, since in part man as a consequence of his finiteness is subject to many necessary limitations, and in part, further, because the evil and the good live together and both must participate in the consequences of the evil deeds.[35]

The religious individual is in this respect not superstitious either with regard to himself or, even less, with regard to others, because in their case, less than in himself, can he know the relationship between will and external consequences, because much can be evil, which in relationship to the moral character

34. "För slutande till."

35. That Boström disavows retribution by God is evident from his statement which is condensed and paraphrased in the following: From God there comes to man, just as to any other finite being, nothing but the good, even though this cannot be realized by him in any other way than gradually, since the finiteness of his being does not permit it to happen at once; wherefore he also must, in each lower stage of development be only relatively good, i.e., also be afflicted with something morally as well as physically evil. This is the only Theodicée that is valid and satisfying; because it does not place God in any causal-relationship to our human evil, which exists only in and for us and in our sensuous world of phenomena. SB, III, 263-264.

is merely temporary.

In the Orient this view was in force; but the Book of Job has already in a beautiful poem revealed the correctness of the opposite [viewpoint]. The difference between natural and positive rewards and punishments, which are found in man, is, furthermore, not valid with God, because human punishment is also a means of security[36] which God does not need, and therefore punishment has another meaning with God. His will is that every being should follow his elemental laws; then there is bliss, and in the opposite situation misery; both the rewards and the punishments are a consequence of the life itself and thus also of eternal, divine laws.

It could be remarked, in connection with what has now been said, that slips and folly are usually punished more severely in this life than immorality; and the question could arise as to why. It is because immorality lies more inside[37] and does not need to disturb the surface, or the end of others; and therefore [does] not [need to] be so severely punished as external deeds which, even though performed in indiscretion, in a higher measure cause disadvantage to others. Furthermore, it is not to be forgotten that consideration in the relationship to others is a human virtue that is required of man.

36. "Säkerhetsåtgärd."
37. "Mera ligger i det inre."

2) Is death necessary for man? The positive doctrine of religion says that it has come into the world through sin, and thus, as it seems, indicates it as something necessary for man so long as he can sin. Death is not unconditionally necessary for man, because it does not follow from his being; from this we also have the conviction in the religious person that he does not really die; but it is only a phenomenal form. But it is relatively necessary as the dissolution of a special form of life; it is an expression of man's finiteness, and by this [also an expression of the fact] that each form for him, as well as for the race, has a center and a periphery. To that extent it is a consequence of man's temporariness, and, in relation to a succeeding life, it is a transition. Therefore the religious person does not long for death, but neither is he afraid of it, because the eternal is continually present with him.[38]

How long must the individual remain dead, since the race and the development of the world is so long? Time exists only for the one who has life and memory, and if we cannot say how long man is dead, it is because for

38. What does such a change as death imply according to Boström? It implies that the natural life in man ceases, and nothing else. The human spirit then sinks to potentiality in one of its forms of life, but this can be a condition for the appearance of another and higher life in him. No matter how strange it may seem, one can say that it is nature that ceases to be for the dying, while he himself lives on. Åberg, BV, 60.

him there is no time, since he is not alive;[39] when he no longer continues here in time, then the succeeding life lies on another time-line,[40]--just as there is no time during sleep.[41] It is, therefore, correct that between this life and the following there is no difference in time, but that only in each form of life man has infinite time a parte ante et post.

Must man die several times? According to the foregoing there are without doubt several forms of life, and so long as none of these integrates the full content of man's consciousness, they must have beginning and end. The transmigration of souls has been a symbolizing of it, and one can see in what sense the acceptance of it is correct. It is certain that a past never returns, and that the transitions can become different, although we do not know this difference. But more and more death is conquered by life, and the subject becomes increasingly conscious of the fact that they may indeed follow each other, but that they simply are forms of the same life.

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39. Boström here becomes involved because he denies the ontological reality of time.

40. "Tidslinie."

41. Perhaps no time for the sleeper, but Rip Van Winkle learned there had been time while he slept! It may also be observed that all dreams are in temporal form.

Man dreads death as a consequence of his inner being, which has an eternal force, and, therefore, must find death in genere struggling against his nature, although under certain conditions it can reveal itself differently, and merely be united with a sensuous dread. But in general what has been said is true, because each force struggles to continue in its development. There is also a moral and an immoral love of life. The latter is the one that is determined by the consciousness of losing by death everything that has value for the person who lives in the sensuous. From this it is also explained why such a person also easily turns away from life, in case it becomes apparent for him that it is impossible for him to attain his sensuous purpose in it, or if the sensuous itself has turned against him.

3) Should man be regarded as having lived before this life? Man has no consciousness of it, in so far as is the meaning of the expression, if he has lived here in this world; if again it is meant whether the soul existed in, or with regard to, his present existence, which is a consequence of the soul, but that it indeed has existed as to its essence, which is eternal. The representation of pre-existence is an expression of the feeling of eternity;[42] but we do not know this life as

42. "Evighetskänslan."

having been preceded by any other.[43] If, on the other hand, one wishes to assume that man has lived before in lower forms, it is easy to show why he does not have any consciousness of it. It is because he cannot previously have been conscious of himself, and of time, just for the reason that he stood at a lower point.

Why has not man come earlier into the world? This question can be taken in two meanings. Why not earlier in the race? Because the race forms a system in which each one assumes a certain place. Consequently no answer can be given to the question in this signification, except that his place in time is determined by his eternal place in the system. The other question, Why not earlier in the whole? has no meaning, because time does not exist before man.[44]

Why does man discover himself for the first time in this form of life, and why does he not know any preceding ones? So long as one has the present form, one cannot have the succeeding ones, but one can ask why man does not know a preceding one. For one must reveal itself as the first, and the human is the first, where there is self-consciousness--just as man receives consciousness of childhood only at a higher age, ex analogia with what he sees happening to others without in himself

43. Here Boström is empirical in his reasoning.
44. This seems more like an evasion than an answer. Compare McTaggart, SHD, 162-163.

having any consciousness of it.

4) How long is the later form of life united with the former? That there is a connection is a necessary consequence of the unity of the human ego and of the continuity of everything, or the coherence, in man. But one must not imagine the latter as simply a consequence of the preceding, in which case all higher development would be impossible. But a new form is a form in itself, a unity, even though it can recognize a former as preceding; because it is a form in which a new moment of man's eternal idea wishes to develop itself, and it is the more determined by this idea in the measure that it is a higher. Therefore it is vital that man in no life ought to live only for the future, just as "vita" is a "continua meditatio vitae," not "mortis" (Spinoza), because the eternal is present in every form of life.

5) Furthermore, certain questions appear, which are designed to determine more closely the form and the nature of man's immortality, and it behooves us to see whether they can be answered. a) Is man in a later form of life to have a body? This is necessary so long as he has not completely filled his measure of time and has all his content under the form of his thought. Thus, so long as he withal is temporal, or so long as man is finite, he has an impenetrable moment, i.e., the body, which always must be an expression of the soul as its principle. But

it is also true that he must have "a glorified body," because the more he develops, the more a higher vitality also appears in the body. In order to express or explain this, it has been assumed that there is in man's present body a sidereal principle that is supposed to be indestructible. This is unnecessary, because as man develops to greater consciousness of the rest to which he stands in relation, he must create for himself a body through which he stands in this relation.

b) Since man in his very idea is sensuous-rational, can he ever cease to be temporal or in the process of development? In other words, is the progression infinite, or does it finally cease? Man must indeed always consider himself changeable, but it must be carefully observed that the thought about this is not the real change, which exists for the senses. Should man have developed all his content, so that further development were neither possible nor necessary, he should indeed think himself as changeable--just as God in His idea of him--but without the fact that this thought were a real transition, in fact, just as little as in God's idea. Since man's content is God, it could here be remarked that this content nevertheless for him must be exhaustless, and thus always a limit exists for him.[45] Yes, he must have such a limit, namely, that something of God's world becomes impenetrable for him; but

45. The sentence seems vague, but is clarified in what follows.

from this it does not follow that, when man clearly understands what is his true being, he should then need to go further. But, if man has attained this goal, would not the eternal, as eternally one and the same, become monotonous? So truly as this is valid, so long as man needs further development, so little does it have any significance when the need has ceased--just as in God; on the other hand, if man for the present should remain in a lower form of life, this would be unsatisfactory for him, and would bring distaste for it, as all sameness in the sensuous, because this itself constitutes a warfare between the forces which tend toward development.

c) Will personality continue, so that man will find himself bounded by others as fully individual, or as the same identical subject? Aristotle and Hegel have denied this, and the latter even considered the desire for this immoral.[46] But we deny such a point of view; according to ours, every person is absolutely individual in part through his positive content, and in part through his place in the system, where nothing not individual exists. The antithesis for us people between general and individual is purely relative, or exists for us through the activity of abstraction.[47] But if one turns away from this rela-

46. The reader is directed to the article on immortality by L. Harold DeWolf in Ferm (ed.) ENC REL, 360-365.

47. "Abstraktionsverksamhet."

tionship, every concept is purely individual, since in rerum natura there is no more than one such. The entire difference that has been mentioned has essential bearing on the sensuous or relative world; within the rational world everything is individual or personal, reflecting the entire universe in itself.[48]

Which powers will man possess in the future life? The same as now, even though in his highest form of life those moments disappear which only have regard to time, such as activity, so that only the idea of it always must follow him.

d) Will man remember the present life? At this it may be remarked that man's memory is conditioned by the body, and that therefore with its disappearance, or if it becomes another, memory will also cease, or become another. But memory is also an essential attribute of the spirit, a retention of the former as a possession of the spirit, and the reminder is the ability in the present under the form of thought to retain the past. Consequently he can all too well comprehend this life as a lower form of development, as even empirical examples show, namely, that nothing of the past is entirely gone from conscious-

48. There was considerable philosophical kinship between Boström and Leibniz.

ness.[49]

I place great emphasis on this, because by this very thing man possibly has his eternal punishment for his transgressions in a previous life, even though he may in a later [life] develop into that for this the highest, namely, in the consciousness of the fact that the condition would have been better, if he had used the previous life better. If a large surface were illuminated by a light, only a small part of it would be illuminated, if the light were weak; but if it were directed along the surface, all the parts would be successively illuminated, although those lighted up at the first would become dark again as the later ones are lighted up. Thus a part of the surface would, as it were, arise, and a part disappear. Or, if the light should increase as it moves, the former would not to the same degree disappear, as if the light were less, even though it would to some extent grow dim, namely, in the fact that the extent of the illuminated would become increasingly larger. Or, if the light became so complete that the entire surface would be illuminated, then

49. Boström's treatmentof memory is confusing. Previously he said that man has no consciousness of having lived before this life. Supra, 209. Here he contradicts this statement. There is a clearer concept in Bowne's statement:"...The agent does it only by memory and consciousness, whereby a fixed point of personality is secured, and the past and present are bound together in the unity of one consciousness." MET, 64.

the center would be the brightest, but it would then also be possible to see the periphery.

The analogy:[50] As sensuous, man does not have the power to illuminate a larger expanse, and if he did not have more than the sense, he would know little more than the present; but as memory he has also the ability to know the past, and by means of fantasy to picture the future (without which, for example, all plans would be impossible, which as a consequence we constantly do). Or, if man thinks, he thereby apprehends that which as to its nature is eternal, and which permeates everything that is in time; and the intellect can use fantasy even more completely than the reproductive capacity to grasp the past and picture the future. If man should advance in perfection, he would more and more have the eternal before himself, and the boundary of it would then be that he would move all of his world into himself, so that he would have it, not only as fantasy, but as thought. So long, however, as he exists in a finite way, he has fantasy and sense, and these are not only thought as changeable in their determinations, but the latter actually pass over,[51] wherefore genesis and dissolution are necessary for him. In the final form of life all the others will also be present, although this presence would

50. "Analogice."
51. "Övergå."

not necessarily be the presence of everything in them since not everything in the former developed into consciousness.

e) Is there a meeting again? For this there is a valid ground in the fact that humanity comprises a system, in which all the links posit each other. Where? In consciousness. Commonly "in heaven," as that which is not present on earth for the sensuous human being, although heaven is in the consciousness of each one. It is, however, in this not necessary that the same world shall appear to us then as now. It may be the same in essence as the present, but not necessarily the same form, so that we should be able to say how in advance.

In general it is true about these questions that the religiously inclined person does not dismiss them, but rather seeks to find an answer to them, of which he has need. The value in answering them is this, that thus one escapes both dreaming and skepticism. Many have considered it right to omit[52] the questions advanced, since they cannot be answered in a completely definite way. But the religious person at least seeks to gain a general consciousness with regard to them; and he has such in the higher life which already is present for him, wherefore also the means for finding the answers that are sought is simply to investigate

52. "Lämna därhän."

carefully what he strives for now as his true and essential good. But these answers always become more indefinite than one could wish. The reason for this is that man can indeed have a sure consciousness as to what has its ground in himself, but that he cannot have a definite consciousness of what for him is not yet temporally present. A general consciousness of the future is possessed by each one, gathered from the present, but anything definite is not possible except by analogy with what has happened to others; thus it is also with the future life.

To this must be added the fact that man in the present life is so occupied with it that he only with difficulty is able to comprehend the purely spiritual in the unity of his consciousness. How incomplete our knowledge of the absolute and the higher really is is revealed by the large portion of the world that is impenetrable for us. Therefore man is occupied altogether too little with the spiritual; the greater portion of the race is far more sensuous than rational, and the first steps in the comprehension of the latter are very weak and childish in connection with the march of development of the whole speculation.

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That which is important to emphasize in the present regard is, nevertheless, the fact that the doctrine of immortality has appeared in all religions. This shows that, even though the thought of it has appeared in a

sensualized form, it nevertheless is found in the nature of the human spirit, for which reason it, as everything such, has revealed itself as something essential for philosophy. Only in imperfect systems has immortality been denied, that is, in the systems that have attributed relative determinations to God. Another difficulty in the present instance has been due to the imperfect way in which the concept of time has been apprehended, in the fact that one has imagined time as very long, and finally as eternal. Time is, nevertheless, only something relative, which, therefore, in itself does not have any dimension, but receives one only through the quantity of what enters consciousness and is successively apprehended there. This is true about all quantity which only depends on the relationship to the measure; if this is decreased, what is measured is still the same.

Time itself does not have any dimension, but this depends on the quantum of the content of consciousness and the succession of it; but if a person were able to apprehend all at once, then he could measure the one with the other within the whole, but this last would not have any dimension.

We must think of our world as infinite, because the quantity of reality in the world is greater than our capacity, and, therefore, we place ourselves in a certain

space of time.[53]

We add a general remark to the previous [ones], namely, this that the world in time and the temporary perception of it does not absolutely perish, just as it does not during sleep; but it remains in and with man, and can, therefore, be brought to consciousness again, which also is necessary, since it belongs to man's nature and development. Further something [more] is included in this, namely, that in the highest form of life all the preceding ones must be present. The world exists in and by man, not vice versa.

Caution must be practiced in two respects in connection with the questions that have just been considered: the one is not to become a visionary dreamer,, and the other not to fall into skepticism.[54] The one who is truly religious does neither one, but stays by what he knows, i.e., the general, and is undisturbed by the other--just as the moral person with regard to the future; one is not for that reason indifferent, but occupies one's self with the present. In general the entire temporal

53. "Tidsspatium."

54. The warning about mysticism was, no doubt, also addressed to himself. He has said: "Every genuine thinker is also a mystic in order that he may gain and give deeper meaning to his research." Supra, 122. On the other hand, he was fearful of every influence where reason might yield to feeling. See Åberg, BV, 48. Also, below, 226.

life is an activity from within, wherefore the eternal life in man is already present, and the difference with respect to it consists only in the degree of its vividness for consciousness.

With this we have concluded the presentation of man's religion as it is in its verity. It remains for us to consider religion as it appears in time.[55]

COMMENTS ON THE RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER FORMS OF LIFE AND TO THEIR TOTALITY

1. Boström says that at a certain stage of development man arrives at a consciousness of himself as a person,[56] and that man's effort is to clarify his consciousness of personality.[57] He further states that we know God's ideas as such only by knowing ourselves.[58] Here he follows the well known procedure of Descartes. It is also in keeping with Brightman's emphasis on situation experiences as our present consciousness.[59]

This places Boström among the personalists. Edfeldt says of him that he started from the principle of personality.[60] Another one of his students, Nyblaeus, says

55. The caption of the following chapter.
56. Supra, 182.
57. Supra, 183.
58. Supra, 194.
59. PR, 164, and as expressed in class lectures.
60. In Boström, SB, I, 49.

that his view could properly be called the philosophy of personality in a more correct and comprehensive sense than that of any view previously presented. For Boström personality is the only essential reality, and everything impersonal is only a form, a manner in which the personal appears to the finite consciousness.[61]

Leander says of him that his view establishes itself as a rational idealistic philosophy, whose principle is found in the idea of self-consciousness, and which seeks the only true and fundamental reality in the eternal and personal.[62] Ljunghoff makes the claim that Boström's idealistic personalism helped to save Sweden from atheism and pessimism.[63] Karl Pira, a more recent sympathetic and able interpreter of Boström, says that he felt that the truth that life and consciousness are identical was an original discovery with him, a conviction Boström also had about his version of the statement that to be is to be perceived.[64]

2. Thus Boström finds in personality the ground of immortality.[65] He holds that in the consciousness of the soul itself is comprehended the consciousness of immortality.[66] In other words, self-consciousness is the eternal ground of immortality.[67] Boström differs radically from Kant with whom immortality was a postulate, because with

61. Art.(1897), 2.
62. LGI, 4.
63. BSP, 13.
64. SS, VII, 177. See also supra, 26.
65. Supra, 185.
66. Supra, 186.
67. Supra, 189.

Boström immortality was intimately united with his doctrine of man as an eternal idea in God, whose function is to move toward a perfect realization of that idea.[68]

At this point Boström is in harmony with the words of Paul, as he speaks of God as having "Chosen us in Christ before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and without blemish before him in love: having foreordained us unto adoption as sons."[69]

3. Boström says that in man's ego is expressed a thought or a condition which is activity, and the ground of all his other activity.[70] The soul is the spirit himself as active and real in time.[71] There seems here to be a relation with Lotze in his doctrine of being as activity, and with the similar doctrine of Bowne. This is true so far as Boström's system will permit it. It has been pointed out that in Boström's central idea--to perceive--there is the element of activity.[72]

This activity, however, must be understood in its relation to the finite being, for

> ...It is only the character of the finite life to be thus active self-consciousness, for beyond the finite being's imperfect way of perceiving there is no change. The Infinite Being is indeed active in and by the finite, but He

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68. See also Åberg, BV, 41-42, 57-58, and supra, 100-106.
69. Ephesians 1:4-5.
70. Supra, 182. Boström holds that life, or self-consciousness, is the primary and substantial element in everything. Supra, 33.
71. Supra, 186.
72. Supra, 56, note 18.

> neither can nor needs be changing in and for Himself.[73]

There is considerable kinship with the Eleatics in Boström. He says that they finally understood that motion in itself is impossible, for which reason it could only belong to the phenomenal world.[74] When they had to face the argument of experience, which neither questions the multiple nor origination, Zeno criticized experience, and proved that, as absolute, it is more unreasonable than the Eleatic doctrine of all as one. He was able to do it because of the validity of the Eleatic concept.[75]

Boström says that that which is to come into existence must be; that ideas originate or are formed by the spirit only means that they are thought by him...[76] He further says that God is not in Himself active, but rather active in relation to man, which Boström considers consistent with His immutability.[77]

Boström's faithful disciple, Nyblaeus, says:

> The Being which in all respects is alive or absolute cannot need any development or change. It is also generally admitted that it is not the motion itself, but the independence in the motion, that reveals life.[78]

It is thus apparent that Boström is aligned with the

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73. Beck, RLB, 50.
74. See below, 225, note 81.
75. Ribbing,(ed.), FR, 83.
76. SB, I, 156.
77. See below, 248. See also Ribbing,(ed.) FR, 61-62, 64-66, 78.
78. Art.(1897), 9. See also Åberg, BV, 56.

eternalists. There is no motion, no change, and no development in God. Because of His omniscience, He knows about development and change, but only as it appears in and through man.

Here he reveals his affinity to Plato, by whom he was greatly influenced.[79] Bowne's "agnostic sigh," in which he says that the "thought of a developing God is a scandal to reason,"[80] was called by Brightman, Bowne's "surrender to Parmenides."[81] Boström may be charged with having made the same surrender.

There is more conformity to what we see and experience in the words of Jesus, "My Father worketh even until now."[82] Bergson's words may serve as a corrective to an emphasis on the intellect alone:

> Let us try to see, no longer with the eyes of the intellect alone, which grasps only the already made and which looks from the outside, but with the spirit, I mean with the faculty of seeing which is immanent in the faculty of acting and which springs up, somehow, by the twisting of the will on itself, when action is turned into knowledge, like heat, so to say, into light. To movement, then, everything will be resolved. Where the understanding, working on the image supposed to be fixed of the progressing action, shows us parts infinitely manifold and an order infinitely well contrived, we catch a glimpse of a simple process, an action which is making itself across an action of the same kind which is unmaking itself, like the

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79. See Republic, II, 380.
80. MET, 119-120.
81. See Parmenides 138. Compare Fránquiz, Borden Parker Bowne's Treatment of the Problem of Change and Identity (Rio Piedras, P.R.: Univ. of Puerto Rico, 1942), 171-179.
82. John 5:17.

> fiery path torn by the last rocket of a fireworks display through the black cinders of the spent rockets that are falling dead...The impetus of life, of which we are speaking, consists in a need of creation. It cannot create absolutely, because it is confronted with matter, that is to say with the movement that is the inverse of its own. But it **siezes** upon this matter, which is necessity itself, and strives to introduce into it the largest possible amount of indetermination and liberty.[83]

We quote once more from Bergson:

> God...has nothing of the already made; He is unceasing life, action, freedom. Creation, so conceived, is not a mystery; we experience it in ourselves when we act freely.[84]

This emphasis, which we also find in Alexander, Perry, Dewey, Brightman, Whitehead, and others, may be regarded as a refreshing and wholesome antidote to the rigidity of eternalism.

Boström tries to save himself by desiring that it be understood that he does not mean that God is inactive for the reason that activity and inactivity can no more be ascribed to God than warmth or cold to a mathematical figure.[85] Because God knows everything, He is conscious of change and activity, although He is not directly responsible. But Boström has already involved himself by more direct statements to the effect that there is no change in God, and his reasoning here does not seem con-

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83. CE, 273-274.
84. Ibid., 271.
85. SB, I, 364.

vincing.

4. In his doctrine of time, Boström says that for God all stages of man's development are present.[86] He says that the Absolute Spirit is the only one that is infinite in the absolute sense. Infinity here means that in reality there is nothing that is, or that can be perceived, which is not already perceived and known by Him in an eternal (timeless) manner.[87] God is not determined by time or change.[88] Boström says further that man, in order to be perfected, must have taken up in himself all his tenses; and with the consciousness that no other tense is possible, his life would be eternal...since he has taken them up in his consciousness.[89]

This strongly reminds one of the time-span of Royce,[90] and of Bowne's "conception of that tideless fulness of time."[91]

Bergson, on the other hand, says that "a self-sufficient reality is not necessarily a reality foreign to duration."[92] Of God's relationship to time Bergson says:

> While the ancient conception of scientific knowledge ended in making time a degradation, and change the diminution of a form given from all eternity--on the contrary, by following the new conception to the end, we should come to see in

86. Supra, 190.
87. SB, I, 251.
88. Ibid., 283.
89. Supra, 188. See also supra, 184-185.
90. WI, II, 122-138.
91. MET, 119.
92. CE, 324.

> time a progressive growth of the absolute, and in the evolution of things a continual invention of things ever new.[93]

There is a certain relating of time and timelessness in Boström, through his subjectivity of time. It exists for man in the sensuous world, and God knows everything; therefore He is conscious of time, although only in an intellectual way.

When Jesus said that His Father worketh even until now, he was imputing time to God, for there cannot be work without a before and an after. Brightman says:

> God is commonly thought of as the Eternal and it is reasonable that he should be, for religion is concerned with the permanent and trustworthy aspect of the universe. Nevertheless, the religious idea of the Eternal is not that of an utterly timeless being.[94]

Of Royce he says:

> By all odds the most persuasive attempt to overcome temporalism is Royce's doctrine of the absolute time-span, which includes all activity and striving of the universe in its true temporal order. Yet such a view does insufficient justice to the reality of time experience, with its free acts and its genuine evolutions.[95]

There is no kind of human experience, including thought, which does not require time, and of which a tense must not be used within a second after its occurrence. Whether there can be something mysterious in God, about which we now have no knowledge, it is,

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93. CE, 374.
94. "A Temporalist View of God". Jour. Rel. 12(1932), 544.
95. Ibid., 554-555.

VIII. Comments on the Relationship to Other Forms [illegible]

of course, impossible to say. But from our present knowledge it seems apparent that any and all experience requires ontological time.

5. When Boström says that the most common form of the hope of blessedness is the consciousness that it shall go well with man as a consequence of his morality,[96] he is indeed within the pale of rationality,[97] so far as it goes. It is also the kind of reasoning that we find most current.

But it may reasonably be questioned that it is a coherent and inclusive rationality, and one of Boström's recurring emphases is his insistence on seeing life as a whole. In this insistence he was undoubtedly influenced by Hegel. Beck says that Boström was greatly influenced by Hegel, although he did not want to admit it.[98]

If, for instance, a person is sick, it is rational for him to do everything in his power to win his health back again. One can admire him for submitting to whatever discipline he believes will help him. But if it happens that there is a doctor who could effect a cure, then a larger, or more inclusive, coherence demands that

96. Supra, 196.
97. By rationality is meant a logically consistent thought-structure from which the empirical is excluded.
98. RLB, 8. One is tempted to wonder if the reason is that there is more similarity in their systems than Boström wanted to grant. Supra, 133-136.

he seek the doctor, and accept his help. We should, furthermore, say that this is perfectly rational, in fact, that it is the only rational thing to do.

From the moral standpoint, it is the duty of each one of us to try to improve himself. But, if it must be admitted, as it would seem that every rational being must admit, that we are imperfect; and if the confession of those who have made the most serious efforts is that of comparative failure, which it is, as is evidenced by the confessions of the saints; and if at the same time it is true that there is One who is willing and able to help, which has also been revealed in changed lives; then rationality demands that we should be willing to accept the help that is offered.[99] If life itself is a gift, then there can be no rational denial of the fact that there can also be the gift of a new life.

Boström places too great confidence in the unaided human power,[100] whose weakness is amply demonstrated in the contemporary scene. He does use the word Savior in relation to Jesus, but it is so involved in his doctrine of the eternal ideas that in the last analysis it is man saving himself, since he does not accept any satisfactis vicaria.[101]

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99. Romans 3:20, 28.
100. Supra, 176-177; 187-190.
101. SB, II, 495.

VIII. Comments on the Relationship to Other Forms [illegible]

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nal [illegible] from [illegible].[101]

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99. Romans 3:20, 24.

100. Bugre, 176-177; 187-190.

101. Ibid., 11, 195.

The person who has regained his health, even if it is with the aid of the physician, can be of greater value to himself, and to his fellow men. Likewise the person who has found the new life in God--Redemption in Christ, salvation, forgiveness, or whatever we wish to call it--is also a better individual, in himself, in his home, and in his community. A system like Boström's, which rather looks away from experience, runs the danger of becoming an arm-chair philosophy, and needs to be brought into the stream of life.

Boström's insistence on a person's working out his own salvation was considered a mark of manliness. But it appears that it fails in rationality, because it does not take in all the facts, such as sin and grace, and redemption in Christ. For this reason it fails in coherence.

It is perhaps for reasons of this character that he has not gained the place in the Lutheran Church that it might seem he should have won. One of the central doctrines in the Lutheran Church is justification by faith, and Boström rejects it.

CHAPTER IX

RELIGION AS IT APPEARS IN TIME

This study includes elements of two kinds.[1] In it we must observe[2] how religion, even though in its idea it is one, nevertheless, partly because of man's limitation, and partly because of his misuse of the free will, appears as several imperfect, or relatively false, religions or religious forms of life even to the point of relative negation of religion; and in the second place we must observe how man is sanctified by religion or continues in religious development, which is the religious life in its existence in time. We can, however, in this part of our presentation only give a brief synopsis of the main points.

1. False and Incomplete Forms of Religion

Religion is universal for man, and is not limited merely to some one specific expression of it.[3] For this reason there arise imperfect forms of religion or religious life as soon as any certain faculty thereby gains the upper hand, or the true relationship between the individual faculties does not exist or prevail. In this regard we

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1. "Innefattar tveggehanda."
2. "Tillse."
3. "Icke inskränkt till allenast någon viss hennes yttring."

need first of all to remind ourselves of the fact that man consists of reason and sensuousness, the former, according to the nature of both, as directing, but the latter, during man's existence in time, as first actual. By an incorrect relationship between these two, such religious forms arise as imply a partial negation of religion.

Atheism may not be very widely spread, but does exist often enough, in speculation and in life.[4] Atheism, if we think of it not merely in a negative, but in a positive sense, based on motive and principle, consists in a purposeful suppression of the demands of the religious consciousness, and expresses itself either in a certain way of thinking or of acting; [it is] theoretical or practical empiricism in religion.[5] It always depends finally on the will. Theoretical atheism always arises by accepting sensuousness as the only source of knowledge, and can be caused either by a demand of proofs (in the strict sense of the word) for the existence of God, or by a false study of nature. The one who requires the former does not have God present in his consciousness; and a one-sided occupation with the physical sciences can lead to a similar result; because the more one re-

4. Note that Boström is right here, against frequent popular denials.

5. "I religiöst hänseende."

flects predominantly on the external, the more life recedes, and matter alone seems to remain. Practically, atheism has its ground in the supremacy of the sensuous demands. It appears in part as impiety, a flippant and frivolous treatment of things divine; or as a disregard of them, when it expresses itself in actions that injure the religious consciousness of others; or as defiance and scoffing, when in hostility it turns against God. In part it is hypocrisy, when one uses religion as a means for temporal ends--the greatest practical bane.

Indifferentism is not, as atheism, a denial of God, but the recognition of Him remains without influence on the thinking and activity of the indifferentist. This standpoint often has its source in early training,[6] since the consciousness was not in time directed to religion; or in desire for pleasure, and in one-sided desire for external activity (for example, political); or if one is brought up in a form of religion which one later considers unsatisfactory, as, for instance, the dogmatic, orthodox, or pietistic.[7] Not infrequently it passes over into pride or vaunted higher enlightenment than the masses have, and is often more difficult to correct than atheism.

Formalism is not exactly a negation of, or indifference

6. "I uppfostran."
7. All of these trends have been found in the Church of Sweden.

to, religion, but arises when essential importance is placed on something which in itself is not religion, whether it be a certain dogma, or an external mode of action. The formalist desires to have religion, but because the restrictions and not the life in it, have come to his consciousness, he conceives of religion as something which is not religion. This form appears theoretically as dogmatism, or orthodoxy, which practically has its equivalence in pietism. Orthodoxy fixes [the essence of] the religious in a certain view about God. It often develops into pride about having the correct view, and often into the desire to force one's conviction on others, and into inhumanity because of fear that it does not stand securely, since it is not based on arguments.

On the other hand, he is a pietist who has religion in his heart, and who protests against locking religion within certain definite dogmas, and rather places it in pious living; in this he has an advantage. It is often united with a truly religious life, but as a rule it sinks down to the one-sidedness that it places altogether too much emphasis on certain religious deeds, which in themselves have no weight, wherewith also vanity often appears and the desire to show one's preference over others. With this the doctrine of man's total depravity through the fall is not seldom united, and his reparation through God's absolute grace. It satisfies man's vanity

to be God's pet. Often the view is united with mysticism. One could think that thereby the right view would appear, but often the two simply increase each other's faults.

In mysticism, which is the theoretical side of pietism, the rational has the upper hand, but it appears in a one-sided manner, which is also true of two other forms, which we shall mention immediately. Mysticism essentially implies an abstraction from all definitely religious content, with the thought of thus apprehending God purely; but in this one has difficulty in separating one's self from the influence of fantasy, or enthusiasm, which is the same as accepting the creations of imagination as true.[8]

Mysticism is usually employed to designate a religious aberration--that of indifferentism. But even with its faults it is better than the emptiness of empiricism. In a speculative sense mysticism is a longing from the limited to the unlimited, and the drawing back of the subject upon itself; its mistake is that it stops at the beginning of the religious life, at the standpoint of feeling and the immediate intuition. It can be 1) mysticism of feeling[9] and 2) mysticism of fancy.[10] The

8. Supra, 215, note 49.
9. "Känslomystik."
10. "Fantasimystik."

former stops with inexpressible presentiments,[11] in which it finds the highest bliss and a sharing in the life of God. This is the correct [element], namely, that blessedness is life in God. The latter believes that he has advanced further with regard to a content, but it is an arbitrary [one]; he attempts to philosophize, and thereby vaguely apprehends God as simply a unity.

The reason for these forms is dissatisfaction with the external, and the need for a higher life; the error lies in the desire to come to it in a singular way, and not in the fact that God is in constant relationship with man; hereby the thought easily arises of a select few, or of an inbeaming [12] of God in the soul. [These are] signs of a faulty activity of the understanding and a tendency toward a life of contemplation turned away from the external cult, and of a disease, because it is contagious. If a person only wishes to follow his own heart he falls easy prey to the power of evil.

Quietism, practically, is the same manner of representation as mysticism, theoretically. It has its source in a vital love of God, but stops at this beginning, whereas man also ought to realize his religion; one believes that one's religious blessedness is disturbed by its being realized in life. But the practical is so es-

11. "Aningar."
12. "Instrålande."

IX. Translation of Boström's Philosophy of Religion 217

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11. "Anlegen."
12. "Inwohnen."

sential that without it there is no true religious life.

When people have sought improvement through solitude, it is to this extent negatively correct that in this way they have guarded against external provocations. Quietism has three dangers: that, at an advanced age, when the feeling is less excitable, it easily develops into mere external ceremonies; that sensuous elements easily unite with the religious feeling; that the feeling of humility easily changes over into the feeling of pride. Its general fault is that the duties of life are neglected, which can never be excused.

The peculiarities[13] which are the opposite of mysticism and quietism are to confuse religion with speculation, or else with a legalistic[14] morality. Both can be pursued for their own sake, for the sake of knowledge, and out of regard for duty, and from fear of the necessity of having contempt for one's self;[15] and they are useful for religion, but are not religion. They also suffer from the same defects as, from a lower standpoint, dogmatism and pietism.

Superstition is the activity of religion in man, but tainted with so much that is sensuous that religion is falsified. In the strict sense of the word, all Christian

13. "Ensidigheterna."
14. "Lagbunden."
15. "Att behöva missakta sig själv."

religions[16] are not superstitious, but here we are considering superstition only as it appears in Christianity. As such, it appears in the concept of God, which concept can be higher or lower according to higher and lower culture and religiosity.

Thus, God is thought of anthropomorphically when we ascribe to Him attributes which are found only in man, and when He is imagined as having feelings and desires, or being able to be led by the influence of man. Thus the usual way of representing prayer, superstitiously understood, essentially belongs to the lower forms of religion, but it can also appear in the higher. The true end of prayer is to lift man to God and to cause him to be subject to His laws.

It is also a superstition that God should be able to perform miracles or change the laws of nature--because in the laws man only sees the commonplace. This belief has its roots in a higher consciousness that is but poorly developed.[17] [A miracle or] a work of wonder[18] is an act about which one wonders, that is to say, for which one does not see the cause. From God's viewpoint, and in themselves, miracles are thus unthinkable, and for man

16. Here the word "religion" is apparently used to denote denomination, or church body.

17. "Ett föga utvecklat högre medvetande."

18. The literal rendering of the original, "underverk," is used in order to bring out Boström's play on words.

they have merely a subjective, and not an objective, significance. The thinker can indeed also marvel, but at the same time he knows that what happens, happens in a natural way.

This is not fatalism, because freedom is also a natural ground; miracles are thus impossible, partly because God is eternal and unchangeable, and partly because the laws comprise the common and constant nature in many phenomena; if it is to change, it must consequently change in the whole universe at the same time, because it is the same law in all things that obey it.

Another superstition with regard to man's relationship to God is the faith in a special inner enlightenment, or special revelation, either through the soul's rising to God, or through God's shining into the soul, whereby man should receive khowledge which does not otherwise belong to him. In this there is something that is correct, namely, that religion cannot arise by activity of the understanding, but is always found in the human soul, no matter how dimly. This more vague consciousness can at times break forth more vividly, either by a gathering in upon itself,[19] or by outward circumstances, and is then regarded as extraordinary or supernatural.[20]

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19. "Genom inre samlande på sig själv."

20. One is reminded of the words of Bergson: "You must take things by storm; you must thrust intelligence outside itself by an act of will." CE, 212.

IX. Translation of Boutroux's Philosophy of Religion 240

The incorrect [element] in this is that man should go outside of himself, depending on the fact that in feeling and fancy he places everything in space. And the incorrect [element] consists in the representation that God does not stand in an eternal and unchangeable relationship to man, and, furthermore, in the external conception of God in space. To the same kind of superstition belongs the acceptance of predestination; it comes from a wrong manner of representation of God as either arbitrarily free, or foreseeing, and implies vanity and love of self.[21]

The idea that God should be arbitrarily free is that He gratuitously determines man, not only for salvation, and contrariwise, but also to virtue and vice. Freedom in God is not arbitrium. The explanation of God's justice as foreseeing is just as incorrect. History shows, for example, that whole tribes are found on a lower standpoint, with scarcely any possibility of improvement, while others seem to be religious by nature. It is believed that God has foreseen this, and determined accordingly. But God does not foresee in the human sense of the word. If certain tribes are on a lower plane, this has its source partly in themselves

21. It seems apparent that Boström has two things in mind: 1) God is not arbitrary; 2) man has freedom of choice, a doctrine that Boström vigorously defends (SB, II, 494), but which is denied by the doctrine of predestination.

and in this, that they previously misused their freedom, and partly in the organic unity of the race. Such a representation of a special election is dangerous, because vanity and national pride easily unite with it in those who consider themselves chosen, the caste spirit in the higher, and dejection in the lower. Those who live in monasteries furnish examples.

A third form of superstition is the belief in good and evil spirits and their influence on man. The reason for it is vague consciousness of God and the relation of the spiritual to the sensuous. There is something correct in this manner of representation, namely, the consciousness that between God and man there must be intermediary beings,[22] but it is incorrect that higher beings, which are beyond man's power of comprehension, should appear and work in his world; no one gets outside of his consciousness.

The view is founded on faith in apparitions, which comes from a vivid fancy in connection with weak understanding,[23] and on faith in evil spirits; it has its cause partly in this that he is unable to explain evil from the physical reasons for it, and partly in the fact that he is led to bad deeds by his own desires, and later,

22. "Mellanvarelser."
23. This sounds like Bowne. See MET, 246 and passim.

IX. Translation of Boström's Philosophy of Religion 2.2

and in this, that they previously misused their freedom, and partly in the organic unity of the race. Such a representation of a special election is dangerous, because vanity and national pride easily unite with it in those who consider themselves chosen, the caste spirit in the higher, and dejection in the lower. Those who live in monasteries furnish examples.

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22. "Mellanvereiser."
23. This sounds like Bowne. See MET, 2A5 and passim.

when reflexion sets in, he finds that he did not wish to do so, and then tries to remove the blame from himself; finally [the view is founded] on this, that an evil spirit should have deceived man, who was by God created perfect, to become evil; but man is neither created by God, nor is he, except in his idea, perfect. Even though the belief just mentioned has been widespread, it only proves that the cause has been widespread.

Another superstitious view is the one about angels, a sensualizing of the omnipresence of God; the sensuous in this is to think either that God is not powerful enough or that He is too exalted to do everything. The imagination about guardian spirits is a sensualizing of man's own higher nature. The belief that the pious departed should effect with God through prayers what man himself cannot do is superstition; man as sensuous thinks himself as standing nearer to the lower beings than to God, and that it is, therefore, easier to turn to them than to God Himself.

A further form of superstition is this that man clothes the spiritual in a material form, usually that which he here regards as the highest good or evil. Thus, for example, the imagination about Hades, Purgatory, an interim between death and the judgment, etc.

Some think of the world as a vale of woe[24] and heaven

24. "Jämmerdal."

as a hall of bliss,[25] which shows that they do not here find their rational needs realized, but also that they have not grasped the significance of this life. According to Christianity, God's Kingdom comes to us, not we to it. There are, furthermore, many other forms of superstitious imagination, for example, that blessedness consists of something different from the religious life, or that man as a consequence of immorality can suffer something worse than the diminution of spiritual life; all of which has its ground in the preponderance of the sensuous over reason.

COMMENTS ON FALSE AND INCOMPLETE FORMS OF RELIGION

1. In this chapter Boström deals with some of the practical religious problems, namely, atheism, indifferentism, formalism, mysticism, superstition, miracles, special revelation, and freedom. He also touches some of the doctrines of the Church. He is grappling with questions of theology, and in doing so approaches them with a strict application of his rational philosophy. He does it fearlessly, following his reasoning wherever it leads.

In his analysis of the religious life he displays a keen insight into the psychology of such forms of religious life as mysticism, quietism, pietism, dogmatism,

25. "Fröjdesal."

atheism, and indifferentism. Here he is familiar with life, and to this extent the charge that he was not able to deal well with the things of earth cannot be made. However, he does not specify empirical facts or historical situations.

2. While Boström criticizes dogmatism, it is to be observed that he is at times extremely dogmatic, as appears throughout a large portion of this chapter. He can be charged with dogmatism in his insistence that his form of rationality is invincible and that his system, based on this rationality, is the full and final one. It is true that he is sincere in this conviction, but sincerity in itself never made anything right.

He speaks frequently about the whole as the true, and his system is synoptic, but it can hardly be said to be coherent for any human being to claim that he has included all the facts within the system of his thinking. There are times when the question can properly be asked of him, "How do you know?" as, for instance, when he says that it is a superstition that God should be able to perform miracles or change the laws of nature.[26] If he presumes to be speaking from God's point of view, it may be true. But Boström is not God, and for him to speak dogmatically for God is presumptuous. The law of nature is not changed by the act, but it is, nevertheless, true

26. Supra, 239.

that every time an arm is raised something happens that may be called a miracle. It is, furthermore, apparent that Boström is speaking from our human point of view, and that is something different. We do not know what powers can be introduced to cause what we call miracles. What we call laws are a statement of the way we usually see things happen, but laws do not in themselves work. There may be more than poetry in the words, "The miracles of earth are the laws of heaven."

3. When Boström speaks of faith in a special inner enlightenment and in special revelation[27] as a superstition, and explains it on the basis that man cannot go outside of himself,[28] he fails to take into account the mediacy of knowledge; in fact, he thinks he has refuted it.[29] Yet his own doctrines were mediated by his voice to his students, and they are mediated now by having been preserved in print. To say that there is no external relation is to accept the pantheistic view that Boström vigorously opposed, although he was in grave danger of surrender to it--at least as much as Hegel.[30]

4. It should perhaps be stated that Boström has a keen desire to vindicate God, but it is a desire to vindicate Him as Boström's God, that is, as the God who

27. Supra, 240.
28. Supra, 241.
29. Supra, 39 and 52, note 13.
30. Supra, 36-37.

can be moulded according to his rational pattern. He wishes to remove from God everything that is arbitrary and whimsical, and in that effort he is to be commended. But in doing so, Boström accepts the doctrine of a timeless and motionless God. There seems to be a hint at the idea that there may be temporality in God,[31] but the idea vanishes in the time and activity of man, of which there is consciousness in God, because He sees and knows everything. This subject has been discussed at greater length in the comments on the preceding chapter.[32]

5. Boström does not admit any fall of man,[33] and still he speaks of imperfection and of evil from which man endeavors to free himself. On the other hand, he does not seem to endorse any kind of material evolution, because it would be contrary to his central system of thought, since it would give too much recognition to the sensuous, which comes into existence only by man's imperfect perceptions. Here he presents an unsolved problem. Why should man misuse his freedom, if he is an eternal idea in God, and has not fallen, or if he is not making his way up along the slow trail of evolution?

6. The negative comments added to this chapter do not imply a negative attitude to Boström's system in general. His central concept of ideality and his emphasis

31. Supra, 238-240.
32. Supra, 221-231.
33. Supra, 242-243.

on God as the source of life come as a refreshing rationalized intuition. There is also merit in his constant emphasis on the supremacy of reason over the sensuous, and the spiritual over the material.

But the negative criticisms are placed here, because of their relationship to theology, and the effect of his rational idealism on it. Many of his doctrines are directly opposed to the teachings of the Church; and here we think especially of the Church of Sweden. Whether, for instance, the great mind of Paul or the rationality of Boström, keen as it was, is to be accepted as the more rational, is a question. There faith, which is also a part of human experience, will play a part, and perhaps its part will be determining.

2. The Effect of Religion on Man and the Means for It

Religion, in so far as it is real in man, is activity. God is not in Himself active,[1] but rather in relation to man, i.e., in man's relation to Him, which indeed is consistent with God's immutability. Religion is an activity to determine the lower according to the higher. Action is either by man or by God; here the two fall together. All activity moves from a principle to a goal; here reason, or God, is both. The activity of religion consists in realizing one's self in the sensuous, or to

1. It may be questioned if this is really possible.

change this in such a way that it becomes an organ or a form for the activity of reason; just as the activity of the individual in the community, by working in agreement with it, becomes public.

There are various names for this. One is redemption, which is based on the Oriental representation of war between the good and the evil, as well as the fact that man at some time should have been perfectly good. Another is deliverance, which implies that man is bound by the sensuous, and that only reason gives him independence; salvation--that the sensuous life is an evil; conversion--that man must change point of direction[2] in his activity; justification and sanctification (by partaking the holiness of God): with regard to the consequences.

The ultimate ground for the effect of religion on man is not man's temporal, but his eternal, nature in God, and can be considered as to its essence and its expressions in the individual and in the race. This ground is called in theology vocatio, which man does not have as sensuous, but through his essence in God, i.e., from God; from this vocatio secundaria must be differentiated, which is based on the former, and occurs in certain moments of time. This is vocatio generalis, extended to all through the Christian doctrine; however, beyond this doctrine, [the call] also advances to the heathen, although less

2. "Riktningspunkt."

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2. "Riktningspunkt."

clear and active (this against the Calvinists).

It [the vocatio] must finally reach its goal, even if not in this form of life. These works are in theology called God's works of grace, which is correct, even though the expression can lead to the misapprehension that it is an act of God which man without Him would not be able to achieve, which is grace in the theological sense; but all arbitrium on the part of God must be strictly separated from it [grace].

As a consequence of this general call every person must be certain of his salvation; God cannot fall short of His goal, i.e., evil is not fundamental. With such a doctrine the doctrine of the final judgment in a strict sense is at variance; but it is not certain that this doctrine comes from Christ Himself, but from the authors of the gospels; it is also only a parable about the relationship between the evil and the good.

Furthermore, it is observed here that with this doctrine there would be need of a special order of grace also in the next world--but the scriptures do not speak of such a one. For us, from the standpoint just given, there is no need of anything such [grace]. Such an order of grace would not be needed because even the best are not worthy and mighty to enter the highest blessedness. One could say that God could forgive them, but this is based on the false view that salvation is con-

ceivable without man's free cooperation, or consists in something else than actual religion.

It could be observed that this doctrine just proposed by me about the unconditional salvation of all is dangerous because it induces a sense of security; but this can only be true in the case of the one who already is evil, and thus would be led to continue in his evil. But it is never worth while to keep silent about the truth to save anyone; and through fear no moral, much less spiritual, improvement is ever made. Evil, without being eternal unblessedness, can, nevertheless, be as great as sin; it is, furthermore, well known that the better a person is, and the more insight he has into the spiritual life, the deeper repentance does he feel for that which has been neglected.

It could further be observed that the doctrine often mentioned[3] is at variance with the morally strict spirit of Christianity, which definitely separates between good and evil, since here, on the other hand, all would come out the same.[4] To this it is already replied: It is not the same if I am fully well, or only after sickness can gain my health. Each one has to suffer what he deserves, and only through repentance is salvation attained; thus the good and the evil are

3. "Meranämnda."
4. "Komma ut på ett."

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absolutely separated.

It can also be remarked that the doctrine would minimize the call of God. No, but the exclusion of one single person would minimize the blessedness of the blessed--as Schleiermacher properly remarks. God is never absent from any human being, which is an idea that only bases itself on the empirical thought that God, after He had created man, left him to himself; but without his idea man would be absolutely nothing. The human race is one single organic whole, where the one part cannot be separated from the other, but whatever anyone has done of good or evil, he has done it for the whole race, and the very misery of the evil is a benefaction, and drives them to repentance.

Repentance is the condition for redemption, and means the acceptance of a new principle for one's life, which is repentance in the narrow sense; in the wider [sense] it is the advance of the entire person to a higher [life]. The question has been raised as to whether a man can convert himself; this was the concern of the strife between Pelagius and Augustine. That he can is proven by the fact that he has consciousness of the command[5] to do so; as free he can also tear himself

5. It seems evident that Boström here means moral command.

loose from the sensuous and decide on the one thing,[6] and if he does not do this in the present life, being sunken in sensuousness, then in another form of life. Conscience[7] is both a summons to repentance and a witness to its possibility, wherefore also man always has the consciousness of good and evil; otherwise he would be absolutely annihilated, which is impossible, since he is of the essence of God.

The doctrine of man's incapacity with regard to repentance depends upon an abstract conception of God and His relationship to man, namely that of thinking of the sensuous as man's nature and of reason and God as outside of him. This view does not find any support in the doctrine of man's corruption; if he were absolutely corrupt, he would not feel the need of repentance,[8] but the expression of sorrow for the corruption shows that it has not gotten hold of the whole man. Many have zealously defended this doctrine, which is a repulsive expression of self-love, as if one would place more value on what has been received through grace than

6. "Ettdera." Note Boström's conviction of free will and his pantheistic tendencies. Supra, 36-37, and below, 280-281.

7. Regarding conscience Boström says that it does not decide between right and wrong, but is only pleasant or unpleasant. FE, 91.

8. Compare Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941), 255-264, especially 257.

by one's own labors.[9] Thus it happens in relation to despots. Analogous with this is the excess with which the converted speak of their wickedness before conversion.

But, irrespective of the fact that man has the power of conversion, a conversion without God is inconceivable. In this lay the common mistake of Pelagius and Augustine, namely, to place man outside of God, and then ask what he could do, which is an absurdity.[10] Pelagius consequently placed salvation in something else than the religious life, which is heathenish. If by man's own power a power were meant that is not also God's, then it would not be good, and man could not by it be converted.

The sensuous man does not reform himself, but is reformed by the higher nature that is in him; and it is not conceivable that two beings can work together toward one goal; this is shown by the community and the citizen. Without taking God into himself, man cannot become religious, but it is also God who is present

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9. People with ample means have been observed to find more happiness in gifts given in love than if they had been bought with their own money. Aside from its conflict with the Bible, this statement is at variance with experience.

10. Boström here reveals a valuable insight. Salvation cannot be divorced from the religious life. One is reminded of Paul's words: "...Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling; for it is God who worketh in you both to will and to work, for his good pleasure." Philippians 2:12-13.

in man and causes conversion; this is not something that has come from the outside, but develops from within and has of eternity potentia existed in man. The two statements are united in this that man is converted by God, who is in him, and that man acts quite humanly.

As far as conversion, as it appears in time, is concerned, it is given and complete in his [man's] inner being as soon as he has made God the principle of his life. But he can also be considered from the viewpoint of the multiple with regard to his life as a whole. According to the first viewpoint, each act has its own consequences, and conversion is one act; but, viewed from the viewpoint just mentioned, the conversion is grounded in a multiple of decisions and is carried out in a multiple of acts.

After man has determined to reform, he has peace, but this decision does not occur all at once, but gradually, and even thereafter he, therefore, has a struggle and battle, and a relapse is possible.[11] For that reason man also needs external means of help, which by the providence of God, or God's presence and successive development in the world, are not wanting; thus [we find it] in the church, the family, the state, the union of states, and world history. These are the summing up of God's ex-

11. Life, however, records countless sudden conversions.

ternal workings of grace, and the one who does not neglect[12] them receives unmistakable efficacy from them.

Many people are not essentially evil or indifferent to religion, but still sensuous egoists; in them a conversion is not really necessary, but only a continuous development of the higher life, by suppression of the sensuous, which, however, is always accompanied with some suffering. Others slave under sensuous passions, which must be uprooted through strife and struggle, in which one is not always the victor, nor achieves it without noticeable consequences.[13] For this reason it has been said that man must experience contrition[14] before he can repent.[15] Evil always brings its own punishment, if not here, then in another form of life, where the good appears more clearly.[16]

Reconciliation is repentance, because the consciousness of God brings disharmony to the sensuous person. Since salvation is a work of God,[17] one must from this side say that He reconciles man through His eternal love, as principle for his higher life. Reconciliation

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12. "Ej lämnar dem å sido."
13. "Kännbara följder."
14. Near to Christian theology. But all must pass before the bar of his rationality.
15. "Kan bättras."
16. Hell, or Purgatory, back?
17. One has to walk along rather circuitous paths to follow Boström in his theology. Here he is in danger of becoming very orthodox, although he did guard himself against it. Supra, 253-255.

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results in deliverance from sin, and thereby from its punishment, and not only [from] the latter [i.e., punishment]. The servants of the Church can consequently never grant the forgiveness of sins, or reconciliation, to the one who does not himself have the power of repentance.

The workings which have now been mentioned are the same for all people, and for the entire race, for which reason all people have had a consciousness of the need of repentance, and have regarded it as of the greatest importance. It is necessary for all; all must take part in the doing of penance, i.e., in suffering and disharmony because of sin. The best person will consequently suffer the most for the sin of all; but this is not a positive evil, for he will afterward enter into so much the greater glory; and it works so much the more for the improvement and sanctification of all.

The next question will concern the means which man employs for the attainment of the religious goal. False ones are, for example, reconciliation through discipline. The reason for prescribing them is the thought that man for repentance needs to keep his sensuous nature under discipline, to which is added [the fact] that he feels the need of reconciliation through chastisement as causing sorrow and pain. The false element in it is to consider the chastisement

necessary and good in itself; therefore contrition is also considered sufficient among the more cultured. The contrary view depends on the fact that God is regarded as a despot. In the more sensuous person, who imagines that the evil comes from without, this conviction leads to faith in the necessity of physical chastisement of himself, partly to place himself in opposition to the external world, and partly in order to set himself against his own sensuous nature.

But it is foolish to deprive one's self of the means of help, in order to set one's self in opposition to the sphere in which religion is to be realized, and injurious to true religion, because in this way man makes himself more and more incapable of it. It can, furthermore, easily happen that [man's] nature treated in such a hostile manner turns inimically against man, which can proceed even to madness,[18] just as in general it is natural that the sensuous powers, if they are not employed as means for the rational, will take another turn. The only helpful external measure is activity, wherefore also hermits, and such, have complained the most about temptations, whereas the active person does not have time to feel[19] them. To this further belongs the belief that matter is the principle of evil and the organ by which

18. Supra, 199, note 26.
19. "Känna efter dem."

evil spirits tempt man. Such a belief easily passes over into vanity and to faith in some merit, and a desire of admiration by the multitude. True ennoblement never has this result,[20] because it is never absolute and never occurs without the help of God.

Religion does not require of man any sorrowful moments[21] for their own sake; the one who has attained the religious life can move about in the external world with security and joy. The doing of penance is often a necessary consequence of conversion, but is not in itself a principle or a necessary condition. Another measure that is often urged is sacrifice--gifts brought to God in order to win a friendly relationship with Him; or love and gratitude in order to win His grace; or as reconciliation for transgressions.

The first mentioned may take place even in the higher religions, but only with a symbolic signification; the last named comes from the concept of Him as despot. It arises through the belief that we must make amends for sin, in which the false [idea] is this, that this could come through anything else than repentance. In gloomy forms of religion there are in this respect not only personal sacrifices, but also the acceptance of

20. "Leder aldrig dit."
21. "Sorgsna stunder."

substitution, which are supposed to be more effective and better, the more costly they are: from which we have human sacrifice.

This form of representation is united with a certain activity of the fantasy; sin rests heavily on man, and he, as it were, suffers with the one sacrificed, who by his lesser guilt would have the right to claim some kind of merit. In addition, [this form of representation] is united with the idea of the connection between the blood and the life, and that by draining the warm blood one should rather mean the life.[22]

Finally, there is also connected herewith the idea that God indeed is loving, but also just,[23] and that one arouses sympathy in Him by punishing one's self; and also that He is offended, and therefore less kindly disposed toward man. But God's justice is one with His love.

It is now asked if sacrifice has any side from which it ought to be retained. It may have the symbolical meaning that we have all from God, and that all ought to be subjected under Him. But the only real sacrifice is [the giving up of] sensuousness, provided it is in disharmony with reason, although this can only by mistake be con-

22. Perhaps if Boström had had a son give his life for the sake of his native land, which he dearly loved, he would have been more cautious about such a statement.

23. Doctrines of the Church of Sweden.

sidered as equivalent to repentance. By such a sacrifice man does not lose his sensuousness, but it is only this, that sensuousness should not be the end, or something essential, but that he rather gains by the sacrifice of the sensuous.[24] Occasionally religion may even require the sacrifice of the entire sensuous life, but this life is from a religious point of view of no essential significance, and thereby man attains just that for which the sensuous life exists, and it would be foolish to sacrifice the end for the means.--From what has been said the importance of the doctrine of immortality can be seen, [a doctrine] which is so important for man's morality that, if it did not exist, the whole man, as Plato says, would be a contradiction.

All the acts belonging to the religious cult, such as prayer and the Church, are, furthermore, means for the influence of religion upon man. The Church is a house where people gather for divine service.[25] Further, in a transferred[26] sense, [it is] a moral personality, the congregation extended into the signification of the

24. "Människan förlorar med ett sådant offer ej sin sinnlighet, utan endast det, att sinnligheten skulle vara ändamål, eller något väsentligt, vilket hon tvärtom just genom offrandet av det sinnliga vinner."

25. Here Boström seems to forget his nice distinction between divine worship and divine service. Supra, 92.

26. "Translat."

unity of the people, who confess the same religious teaching. [The Church], finally, receives a still wider significance, that of all people; as such, it has its unity from within, including all people in whom religion exists, and is active, consequently, in the last analysis, all humanity.

Here we think of the Church appearing in the sensuous world, a community of people, among whom the same religion prevails. The Church, in this sense, is thus 1) unity of rational beings, 2) a rational community, which has reason as ground, law, and end, and consequently the same attributes as reason. It is, therefore, not an association, but a community. There are two kinds of these: private and public. The Church is not any special one of these; it is the unity in all, i.e., all are communities only to the extent that they comprise more limited forms of the highest community, the Church. Each community is, therefore, a Church, provided it assumes the highest human end, religion, which does not exclude the possibility that it likewise is a special [religion]. If this is true, one may ask wherein the difference between Church and state exists. It has an historical ground. In ancient times people did not know any difference between them. But at the spread of Christianity the state was heathen at the beginning, and from this came the idea that the Church was something higher and more noble than the state,

which was only worldly. In the Middle Ages the battle was essentially not between Church and state, but between the private communities which wished to maintain their right against the state, and the state or the public; thus also with the order of the priesthood, whose members are the functionaries of the Church, but who has usurped the right of the Church, and who themselves wished to be regarded as having this right, or comprising it. Protestantism united Church with state, which is Church in an eminent sense, because it is an independent community, which does not need to be integrated by others. Every state is essentially a Church, and if one is spread over several states, this only means that it is common to all.

Every Church has a definite doctrine, or confession, i.e., a definite theoretical manner of representation of God. Every religion also necessarily has a cult, i.e., a unity of acts, which are directly designed to lift man to God, and with respect to his will to subject it to God's. Cult and doctrine cannot be separated, because they mutually determine each other, although the one, especially in the lower forms of religion, can be preponderant, as, for example, the cult among the Greeks. Neither one is anything accidental, even though certain moments in it may seem to depend on arbitrium. The Church should never forget that it is a living being, which is

to be developed in time. For that reason there must be no norms, which prevent such a development, because then they are deserted by people, and it causes divisions, since they no longer find themselves fully satisfied in it. Confession should, therefore, only touch the general, which is given for a certain time in the religious consciousness, as a symbol or norm of doctrine for the priests. Certain attributes of reason[27] should be required of the ministers to prevent error, but not in such detail that there is no freedom for feeling and imagination.--An order of clergy is necessary, since there is in religion a unity of the theoretical, practical, and aesthetic, which is represented by the ministers.

The question is now raised as to what means the Church has for the attainment of its goal. The Word and the Sacraments. Both ought to be purposeful for a definite time. Further, living organisms, the servants of the Church, [who are] "spiritual", since they work especially for the purpose of the Church. Their responsibility is to keep the doctrine and the cult in power, and to communicate it to the congregation.

The teachers must necessarily comprise a separate order. The regent is at the head of it, but not himself a teacher, because the general is only determining for the individual. The state does not in fact have ministers.

27. "Förståndsbestämningar."

except the highest, who have general guidance of all that belongs to the Church.[28] The rest have their place in the community, and even larger families may wish to choose organs for their religious activity, namely, home preachers.[29] The highest functionaries of the Church itself participate less in the execution of the divine service than in the guidance of the whole of it. Under these we have the entire spiritual order, thus also men of science, artists, and others.

A distinction must, however, be made between the last named and those who directly work for the arousing of the spiritual consciousness and for the care of souls. The religious activity is a unity of theory and practice, and therefore the servants of the Church should also have scientific training. Herein is revealed the difference between men of science as such and teachers of religion. There should be no secrets, but everything should be revealed to the people; the ministers are not definitely separated from the others, not holier, as if they were nearer to God; therefore they must not build a hierarchy.

The spiritual order is political, provided it carries out deeds enjoined by the government;[30] in other respects

28. "Det kyrkliga hela."
29. "Huspredikanter."
30. The minister in Sweden, for instance, issues certain certificates that are here issued by the state.

it is a private order. From this it comes that, as a rule, the ministers are appointed by a choice of the congregation, although, since it is not certain that thereby in all cases the right is done, there is reason why the government has reserved the right of appointment in some cases.[31]

The ministers should not fall into any kind of formalism, i.e., consider the teaching and the worship as something holy in itself, but rather the spirit as leading to blessedness. The opposite fosters a caste system.[32] They must be careful not to impart superstitious ideas, as, for instance, that the Sacraments have any miraculous power; they should not work exclusively on the feeling; nor should they teach philosophy,[33] although clarity in the teaching is most highly important to strive for. Extremes in this regard are formalism and mysticism.

Founders of religion or reformers are such men as especially express the religious consciousness of their age; there have been such in all ages, but those who have really been epochal have naturally had an influence on man's entire life, since religion is its principle.

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31. For instance, the archbishop is appointed by the King. Boström here seems to assume that the government is always right.
32. "Kastväsen."
33. Sic!

That the old forms should rise in opposition at the appearance of a reformer is natural, especially since reformers appear at times of great religious abuses, and when the time is far advanced without a like advance in the forms of culture. The reformers have their authority from within, from God, and do not need any external authority.

What right and power does the Church have in general, and what external means should it employ for the furtherance of its end? The same as the state itself, and it can thus also defend itself with force against attacks against its objective laws. These general laws bear upon jurisprudence, whereas, with the question of conviction as to the religiously and morally right, the right of force falls, since it is impossible, because the essential is free and independent. But an irreligious act can indeed be such that one can understand that, if it were permitted to continue, it would be inconsistent with the very continuance of the state, and then forceful means are necessary, not for the sake of improving the criminal, but in order to stay the consequences.[34]

The right of the state with regard to confession

34. From this point of view. Elsewhere Boström has said that purpose of punishment is the improvement of the offender. SB, III, 266-275, especially 272.

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is that the Church must have certain norms for its confession. Therefore it is properly punishable[35] if anyone falls away, or spreads contrary doctrines,[36] or sets a poor example. Deviations, however, can be tolerated so long as they do not touch anything essential. The punishment here is naturally exile. But this is not really punishment of the individual, whose faults are based on theoretical conviction, but is established for the security of the state.[37] If the one who has fallen away changes his convictions, the punishment is canceled.

In what has been said it is not a contradiction that other confessions are permitted within the state, which, in the measure that the state is sound, can be tolerated,[38] however, without the right of their members to manage the offices of the Church or the state, and with the provision that they do not strive to make pros-

35. "Belagt med straff."

36. This hardly seems consistent with Boström's general rationality, and the right that he claims for it.

37. Here it seems that he regards the state above the individual, which is inconsistent with his usual emphasis on the person. Boström holds: 1) that the individual is a person. Supra, 221, 222; 2) that every human community is to be a Church or an organ for religion and its end. SB, II, 496; supra, 262; 3) that the state is in itself a rational, personal being. SB, II, 501.

38. The non-Lutheran churches have had various experiences in Sweden. The late Archbishop, Nathan Söderblom, for instance, was friendly to other denominations in Sweden.

elytes, and with such a purpose turn to the non-thinking.[39] But when one who falls away thereby gives a poor example to those who are uncultured and indifferent, he places himself in the same relation to the state as a person who is not a citizen; wherefore the state must investigate whether he should be permitted to remain in it, which should not be permitted, if he can be proved to be eager to make proselytes. The right of the Church in this does not, however, extend beyond the right of the state, because [the right] of no one goes beyond it. No one can, therefore, be said to have fallen away who has not declared it. The Church has the right to maintain a certain discipline, and for that reason it can deny certain advantages to the one who has revealed himself as not possessing a religious attitude. The Church certainly has the same right as other communities to protect itself against others, but only the state can decide about the right to use force and the general conditions for it.

A holy catholic Church is to this extent a correct representation, if one means thereby that the various Churches simply are manifestations of only one; or as

39. In many ways, Boström antagonized leaders of the State Church. Here one can see how he also would antagonize the independent Churches.

it is the expression of faith in the possibility and actuality of religion in the race in general; or in the appearance of that which is eternal in a Church bringing salvation to man. Religion saves, and the Church is religion in its complexity, i.e., it appears in many persons who have the same conviction; and in this sense, consequently, the Church saves. But, on the other hand, [to say] one certain Church should be the only one that has salvation is a mockery against Providence, and this so much the more, as this Church can claim age,[40] whereas humanity constantly moves forward.

It remains to speak about the Divine revelation. Revelation reveals that which is not hidden, but which is, or can become, familiar, which is known, or can be known. All knowledge is thus revelation, and revelation is, consequently, either an activity in the one who reveals, or a quality in that which can become known, or both, and their cooperation.

Divine revelation, then, becomes the act through which God becomes known, or at least possible of being known; [it is] that quality in God through which it is possible to know [Him]; or [it is] God's being, provided it is possible for man to learn to know [Him], and the comprehension of man's knowledge of Him. Such a [knowledge] must exist in the world, provided there

40. "Har åldern för sig."

are rational beings; man does not know God because he is rational, but he is rational because God's essence is present in him (because nothing exists outside God); He must,, therefore, always be more or less clear to man; and by man's reason is meant just his complete perceptions.

God is revealed to man through Himself in this way, that He is in man, and man in Him; that is to say, man comprehends himself in relation to God, i.e., comprehends Him. This relationship is eternal. In time it reveals itself as man's development toward rationality, and is, therefore, successive. By that which is divine in man God consequently reveals Himself to him. At times it has not been possible to understand this, because man has been placed in one space, and God in another, and then a revelation extra ordinem has been required. Originally, revelation is from God's side, even though successive on man's. God has also originally revealed Himself in a perfect way, or, in His revelation eternally reached His goal, and a higher revelation than the one through God is impossible. From man's side again this revelation must be successively realized, through interaction with external nature; this must be done, however, with the provision that in this he also lives in interaction with other people; and this successive revelation is history, seen from the highest viewpoint.

A special Divine revelation must mean, either such

a one as would be separated from the original relationship between God and man, and given for some special purpose; or one that had its ground, not in this relationship, but in some immediate contact between God and man in a certain time, and which only had validity for it. As reason for such a one could possibly be alleged man's need of it, and this can appear to be a correct point of view. One has thereby said that God's original revelation was not sufficient. On the other hand, this shows itself at war with the fundamental principle of religion. Creation must then be regarded as imperfect, and the essence of man be such that it needed an improvement by means of a new revelation.

The essence of man is eternal and unchangeable. It could then seem more correct that the original revelation had become inactive as a consequence of man's misuse of his own freedom, and that God in love had given man His help. But at this it is asked how such a renewed revelation is possible, and how one can convince one's self that it is genuine.

The revelation is given either in an external way, through the senses, preferably sight. But if God thus has given man signs, these would only provide representations, and as soon as they would be developed into thought, they would be recognized as man's own; but the whole outer world is only a phenomenon of the spirit, and

consequently not outside of him.

Or else this revelation could have occurred in an inner way--by inspiration, or effect on man's spirit, and not a development of what exists in man's own consciousness. This again involves the difficulty that one cannot understand how a thought can be placed in man's being, since every such is consciousness itself in a certain form or determination.[41]

There are thus here three alternatives. Either man must have the capacity to apprehend what is deposited in him. This is, however, not exactly accepted by supranaturalism, since there would not be anything miraculous in it. Or man is said with the revelation to receive the mind and understanding to grasp it. But if he has not in his essence had the need of such, why then this change? Or finally, it is said that man's capacity is raised and developed in and at the revelation, so that this capacity becomes sufficient, though it did not exist before, or was insufficient.

This could be thought of as an external quickening, but by this revelation loses everything miraculous; and these external quickenings should be alike at all times, because one can see no reason why a certain time should have preference; and to think of the ability, once called

41. That is, according to Boström's system.

forth, as again lost or destroyed, is absurd, because then the essence would be destroyed.

Revelation is, consequently, conceivable only if man has the ability to apprehend God; but then this is the thing itself, only undeveloped; God is everywhere present: why, then, should He not always be so in man? But, even if the original revelation is sufficient, this does not prevent the fact that there may be need of mighty revivals, which, appearing in time, receive the appearance of a higher divine revelation,--but this is not extraordinary.

What next concerns the certainty about the nature of the divine revelation to comprise such a one, provided this certainty has been apprehended as an immediate experience, people have tried to explain and to retain it, either by something sensuous, and not divine, accompanying the revelation; or through something spiritual, an intuition, or a light shining in; or, by being transported, as it were, to a higher world.

This has, however, been attempted more by philosophers than by real theologians, who preponderantly have held themselves to the doctrine of inspiration.

Concerning these three methods it may be remarked that one can indeed convince one's self of a change within, but not about the fact that it comes from God, except by way of inference, as with the poets of ancient times; namely this that, because one is aware of things of which he is

not aware at other times, and performs acts which are not done at other times, and that since they both are true and satisfying, therefore they come from God. This is correct to this extent that higher consciousness of what is true and right really are revelations from God.[42]

But is this extraordinary? One may not be able to give the reason why it appeared just now; but this ground may possibly be the development of the race and of man's nature. But, on the other hand, it is difficult to know which revelation should be regarded as the true one, because all have their reasons. Therefore people have ascribed the reasons to immediate miracles. Those who have had revelations have discovered that they could perform deeds which at other times are not possible,--which, therefore, have come from God.

With regard to such deeds we have already expressed ourselves about miracles. Here the same is true as about creation, that of giving shape and form, but not of producing anything new. One wonders about that which one cannot understand; and thus there are miracles for man as a consequence of ignorance about the laws which exist for that which happens. The only miraculous thing is the whole, and the existence and power of the spirit itself.[43]

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42. The force of this criterion must be recognized. The problem lies in man's ability to apply the criterion.

43. Perhaps it should be rendered "Himself." Note the Hegelian force of this sentence.

This is inexplicable, for otherwise the existing would be explained out of the non-existing. God's presence and activity in the sensuous world is only miraculous for the sensuous man. Further, if we should agree that some one performs miracles, it would not follow from it that he is supplied with, or does this in the power of, divine might; one must first discover him to be good and beautiful in his activity, because man's divinity consists in this. Consequently one must investigate and find that which has been said and done to be true by this, that one finds it to be rational. The miracles of the Bible here signify so much the less, because, for example, the magicians of Pharaoh performed miracles. This was a common thing at that time.

No revelation needs anything else to be recognized as divine than that it is true. The divine cannot be anything militating against the truth, neither can it be above reason, because this is a system above which nothing can exist. The whole controversy with regard to the point in question is based on the conception of the relationship between God and man.

Both parties--those who have affirmed, and those who have denied, miracles and special revelations--have believed that man was outside God, and thus worked with powers that are not His. Man would then be able to get

along without much knowledge that God needs, and what further knowledge might be attained by him would come from without. The strife is consequently easy to conciliate, when one knows the right relationship between God and man.

No supranaturalism has, furthermore, been consistent with this lower conception, because exegesis has always been admitted to be necessary. But this is impossible, if we do not believe that God is the true and that the true is God. It is only imagination when anyone believes himself to be a supranaturalist. When a person does not feel that he himself has the strength to search out the truth, then he accepts that which is presented from without. This is also correct in this sense that the revelation is divine, but it is not extraordinary, which latter one accepts when one thinks that God would permit man to pronounce the true without first reflecting upon it.

COMMENTS ON THE EFFECT OF RELIGION ON MAN

1. Our attention is again called to the arbitrary use Boström makes of the Bible, as it is subjected to the test of his rationality. Every person must be certain of his salvation.[44] This statement may be taken in connection with his doctrine that there is no hell, which he vigorously

44. Supra, 250.

defended in a special article.[45] He tries to demonstrate the irrationality of the doctrine on the basis that man is an eternal idea in God, and that he cannot fail finally to attain his idea. What he seems to fail to see is that when the New Testament speaks of hell, it is with the admonition that man shall live so as to escape it. It can hardly be thought that he did not see enough of life on earth to realize that people make hell for themselves, and that there can be no escape except by meeting the conditions for the escape. This view would perhaps be consistent with his system--no hell, but many hells!

It can also in general be said that Boström quotes Scripture when it fits into his system, for which he cannot logically be blamed. He does not treat Scripture as authority. But the test will come in the consideration of his system; and there the thought that it is perfect is presumption.

2. Boström makes the statement that man can convert himself.[46] Here he runs counter to the teaching of the Bible and that of his Church, where he undoubtedly had learned as a child what the Lutheran youth was taught, and still is taught:

> I believe that I cannot by my own reason or strength believe in Jesus Christ my Lord or come to Him; but the Holy Spirit has called me through

45. SB, III, 255-291.
46. Supra, 252-253.

> the Gospel, enlightened me with His gifts, and sanctified and preserved me in the true faith...[47]

Not only does he have the testimony of Scripture, and the doctrine of his Church, in opposition to this view, but there is much in human experience that is evidence against it. Boström, however, does not seek the real in the objects of ordinary experience, but in the unchangeable eternal ideas of the world of absolute reality.[48]

Boström's system here seems to involve him in contradictions, or at least in circuitous reasoning. For he says that if by man's own power a power were meant that is not also God's then it would not be good, and man could not be converted by it.[49] Again he says that true ennoblement never occurs without the help of God.[50] Yet he has said that man can convert himself.[51] This seems to be an instance where it would be better if he descended from his lofty thinking and came down to earth, where it would be evident that we are helped, not only from within ourselves, but where we experience "a power not ourselves that makes for righteousness."

Boström seems to discount the significance of sacrifice, including the death of Christ.[52] Ljunghoff says, however, that, according to Boström,

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47. Part of Luther's explanation of the Third Article of the Creed. See Catechism (Rock Island: Augustana Book Concern, 1922), 13.
48. Beck, RLB, 34.
49. Supra, 254.
50. Supra, 259.
51. Supra, 278.
52. Supra, 260-261.

> The redemptive element in Christ is not His suffering, or death, or doctrine, or anything private or external, taken in itself, but His very personality, or what He in the very essence of His being is in what He thinks, does, and suffers. The reconciliation in its deepest sense is the same as the Redeemer, and, therefore, eternal; not something past, but something eternally present. Only the external can become past. Not so the inner! And the personality thus leads us from the world of history to that of eternity.[53]

Here we are reminded of the words of the Bible, "God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself."[54]

3. Boström holds the doctrine that the free will is the good will in its teleological aspect of man's realization of his idea in God. He speaks of man's development as being better or worse, depending on man's use of his freedom.[55] He says that the freedom consists in man's ability to abstract from the desires, so that they sink down to potentiality for the will, or he can determine them to acts of will.[56]

In his own summary of his philosophical system Boström has the statement:

> Boström vindicates man's freedom in the usual sense of an ability to choose between antithetical grounds of determination. He can do this with more success and thoroughness than all others, since according to his view the sensuous world is man's own possession, and since his present life is a continuing development

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53. BSP, 111.
54. II Corinthians 5:19.
55. SB, II, 495.
56. Ibid., 183.

> (actualizing) of it, and is potential in his essence, or at least a consequence of it. Therefore he ought to a certain degree himself to be able to direct and determine the course and nature of his development after he has developed to the degree of personal power[57] or self-consciousness or independence which we designate with the words intelligence and will.[58]

Wedberg, whose approach is analytical and critical, says of his doctrine of freedom:

> In the ethical as well as in the psychological proof of the freedom of the will Boström consequently ascribes to freedom the meaning that it is not determined in advance how the decision of the will is to be made. It may with a certain degree of correctness be said that this is the primary meaning in Boström's concept of freedom.[59]

Boström holds that freedom is a necessary condition for the possibility of morality.[60] The freedom of God is His independence, and the more free man becomes, the more like God does he thereby become.[61]

He is thus opposed to all deterministic, predestinarian, and fatalistic systems, and defends man's freedom in time. But his usual difficulty arises in the relationship between sensuous man and his idea. While he is developing toward the realization of his idea there is freedom of choice; but there is, nevertheless, a certain determination in the fact that he is destined to move toward that realization.

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57. "Självmakt."
58. SB, II, 494.
59. LSBF, 248.
60. Ibid., 246.
61. Ribbing, (ed.), FR, 160. But since man becomes like God <u>through</u> God, it may be asked, where, then, is real freedom?

Also, the world in time is not metaphysical.[62]

Thus there is something closed in his system in spite of his words about freedom, which is true of every eternalist. Something of the vigor of Bergson is needed as a supplement:

> All the living hold together, and all yield to the same tremendous push. The animal takes its stand on the plant, man bestrides animality, and the whole of humanity, in space and in time, is one immense army galloping beside and before and behind each of us in an overwhelming charge able to beat down every resistance and clear the most formidable obstacles, perhaps even death.[63]

4. Revelation is given extensive treatment by Boström. He says that all knowledge is revelation.[64] Divine revelation is the act through which God becomes known, or at least possible of being known. Man does not know God because he is rational, but he is rational because God's essence is present in him. God has originally revealed Himself in a perfect way. From man's side, this revelation must be realized successively, and this successive revelation is history, seen from the highest viewpoint.[65]

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62. Boström says that God is religion. Supra, 65. He says that the freedom of God is his independence. Supra, 281. Thus in morality man's freedom is his freedom of choice, and in religion, as he becomes like God, it is his independence.

63. CE, 295.

64. Supra, 270.

65. Supra, 271-272. This reminds one of Hegel's statement, "The history of the world is the world's court of judgment," in his Philosophy of Right (tr. S. W. Dyde), (London: George Bell and Sons, 1896), 341.

In his extended discussion[66] of revelation he says that revelation must be identical with the content of reason, provided the revelation is true and divine. The rational is identical with the true. That which is not true and good is consequently not rational.[67] The truly rational is the absolutely true, and the absolutely true is the really rational.[68]

In this emphasis on rationality we find the core of Boström's doctrine of revelation. He also emphasizes the fact that he is referring not only to the Christian religion, but to every claim of revelation.[69]

Boström's argument that a doctrine cannot be accepted simply for the reason that it lays claim to being revelation must be accepted as valid. Jesus advanced this principle in the words, "By their fruits ye shall know them."[70] He made it even more pointed im the challenge: "If any man willeth to do his will, he shall know of the teaching, whether it is of God, or whether I speak from myself."[71] That claims to revelation must be put to the test, must be recognized as necessary. Boström himself makes the concession that higher consciousness of what is true and right really are revelations from God.[72]

66. SB, III, 3-81.
67. SB, III, 7.
68. Ibid., 9. This is Hegelian doctrine!
69. Ibid., 7.
70. Matthew 7:16.
71. John 7:17.
72. Supra, 275.

That Boström comes close to accepting the Bible's general position that revelation is necessary because of man's sin is evident in his words, "It could then seem more correct that the original revelation had become inactive as a consequence of man's misuse of his own freedom, and that God in love had given man his help."[73] Again he says that man's reason is his consciousness of God, separated from Him because of its less inclusive clarity.[74]

He seems here to admit that some explanation must be made of human imperfection, whether it be through a fall, or because man has still far to go on the way to perfection. But Boström says that a person cannot get outside of his consciousness,[75] and that not a single truth can be above or outside him.[76] His difficulty here is with what, at least in this connection, must be considered an epistemological monism. But for the person who accepts the fact that knowledge is mediated--or epistemological dualism--this difficulty disappears. Boström himself seems to waver, and at times to accept the position just mentioned, as in the words in his own summary of his system:

> The Holy Spirit can in certain individuals work and realize Himself in part immediately from within, and in part mediately from without (through others in whom He already is realized).[77]

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73. Supra, 272.
74. SB, III, 9.
75. Supra, 242.
76. SB, III, 33.
77. SB, II, 495.

But the difficulty is that he immediately in the very next sentence abandons this thought by saying that it is always the one and same Spirit that is present and active in all, and Who is this (from his side) in all in the same way.[78]

Boström says that beside the sensuous and the non-sensuous, or rational, there is no third [being] of whom it could be said that it is neither the one nor the other; and consequently a third source of knowledge cannot be possible for man. What the theologians say that man has received through revelation he has, nevertheless, found only in and through his reason. He holds that Christianity, just as reason, is older than the Bible.[79] Christ's own Christianity was His deep and clear consciousness of God and of Himself in relation to Him. In our own reason the Christian truth is accessible to us, if we earnestly seek it there, and do not simply wish to gather it from other sources.[80]

Thus we find Boström back again at his unity of reason and revelation. Dons observes that, as a good dogmatician, Boström believes that only that is true in

78. Ibid., 495.

79. This statement, while often made, is unfair to the Old Testament, because it has specific doctrines and practices, which are annulled in the New Testament.

80. SB, III, 256-257. This emphasis is similar to Boström's statement that "Everything that exists has self-consciousness as its determination." Supra, 52, note 13. This emphasis is a natural consequence of his epistemological and metaphysical monism.

religion which corresponds with his own views. He says that the consequence of it is that the philosophical element disappears to the extent that there may be a question as to whether at this point Boström's system should be turned over for consideration to the history of theology, or perhaps, to the history of religion.[81]

5. Boström accuses those who disagree with him of not having the capacity for philosophy, but even in the face of such a criticism, one may be permitted to disagree with him. One can take a stand with Bowne, and say that man is created.[82] This created being, endowed with selfhood, stands in relation to God, and as such he can fall back on some word of revelation.[83] This position appears fully rational.

If we are able to hear one another's voice, and exchange ideas with one another; if nature can speak "a various language;" then it does not seem irrational that He Whom we recognize as the Creator can also speak to us.

Now and then individuals appear that we call geniuses, whether it be in science, in art, in poetry, in thought, or in religion. By their genius they can see further and go further than men of less incisive mental or spiritual powers. If they leave a record of what they have done or experienced, then that record becomes a deposit from which

81. OB, 51.
82. MET, 97.
83. Ibid., 379.

others gain knowledge. Life is greatly enriched because we have the written records of man's achievement in science, in literature, or any other field of human endeavor.

In the spiritual realm it has also been true that there have been individuals whose keen spiritual sensibility has brought them into closer contact with God. Thus Isaiah could say: "In the year that king Uzziah died I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne, high and lifted up."[84] Amos had no hesitancy in declaring, "Thus saith the Lord."[85] Paul was certain that he had seen the Lord.[86] What they have recorded becomes a revelation to us, most of whom without that revelation would never receive that spiritual knowledge.

It would be unrealistic to deny that here a problem arises due to the fact that there are unlimited and indiscriminate claims to revelation. So we are back at the fact that revelation must find some kind of validation. That Jesus was not fearful of the outcome of such a test is indicated by His invitation to put the teachings to the test.[87] Two thousand years have given opportunity to see that Jesus is the highest revelation of God, in word and

84. Isaiah 6:1.
85. Amos, passim.
86. I Corinthians 15:8.
87. John 7:17.

in life, and that, if the world would follow His teachings and His example, the problems and the hatreds that now threaten the destruction of the human race would not be possible.

CONCLUSION

The conclusion of this work is that Boström has in some respects established himself as an independent thinker. He has done this by bringing his rational idealistic philosophy to its logical position, namely, that ultimately nothing exists except God and His eternal ideas. He vindicates his claim to being a rational idealist by producing a logical thought-structure in which space, time, motion, and change are excluded from true and original existence.

Boström is a personalist in the sense that the principle of his philosophy is found in the idea of self-consciousness which seeks the true and fundamental reality in the eternal and personal. With him self-consciousness is life, and life is self-consciousness.

In this study it has been discovered that, even though Boström is especially critical of Hegel, his system, nevertheless, resembles Hegel's in many respects. There are similarities, for instance, in Boström's emphasis on the fact that to be is the same as to be for someone, or to be perceived; that nothing can be a determination without being something in consciousness; that God could not be omniscient, if He did not possess the form of system; that the rational is the true, and the true is the rational.[88]

88. Supra, 25, 133-136, 282 and passim.

But Boström differs radically from Hegel when he leaves no place for development.

In his denial of time in God, and in his doctrine that God, since He knows everything, is conscious of time in an intellectual way through man,[89] Boström strongly resembles J. M. E. McTaggart, who speaks of the "manifestation through time of the timeless."[90]

Boström's rational theology is in several respects unacceptable to biblical orthodoxy, because he rejects some of the fundamental doctrines of the Bible, such as the Trinity, vicarious atonement, and special revelation. His use of the Bible is in harmony with liberal theology, in which the Bible is not regarded as an infallible norm of faith and practice, but is accepted as it fits into the system of the liberal theologian.[91]

Boström's philosophical system is of interest as a chapter in the history of philosophic thought. But it is more than that. It has elements, such as his personalistic idealism, that will be of abiding interest to those who try to see beyond appearance to the reality that is its essence.

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89. Supra, 227-228.

90. Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1896), 159-202, especially 179, 195, 198.

91. See, for example, Harry Emerson Fosdick, The Modern Use of the Bible (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1924), 1-31 and passim. See also his A Guide to Understanding the Bible (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1938), and Frederick May Eliot's Pamphlet, Unitarians Believe, 13th printing (Boston: American Unitarian Association, 1946), especially 43-47.

APPENDIX

OUTLINE[1] OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION[2]

INTRODUCTION

A) Problems

1.

What is The Philosophy of Religion? In this question two others are included which must first be answered: 1) What is philosophy? 2) What is religion?

2.

Both of the latter questions may have a double meaning, or may be resolved into two others: 1) What are philosophy and religion as such? 2) What are they in relation to us, i.e., as man's philosophy and religion?[3] The relationship between these questions, the order of their being answered.[4]

3.

But even the second of these may be taken in a dual sense: 1) What have philosophy and religion up to the present been in relation to us? 2) What must they always remain in relation to us, as distinct from what they are

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1. This outline is found in SB, II, 215-236.
2. The literal wording of the title is: "The Philosophy of Religious Doctrine." It is, however, equivalent to "Philosophy of Religion."
3. Sometimes Boström begins the sentence following a colon with a capital, and sometimes not. I am trying to do it consistently.
4. Boström does not always use complete sentences in this Outline.

considered absolutely? It is only in the second sense that the question is here considered.

B) Philosophy Considered Absolutely

4.

From a formal point of view philosophy, considered absolutely, is: a) a science, consequently α) a knowledge, a definite form of self-consciousness or perceiving together with a definite degree of certainty or conviction, β) a systematic knowing, a system of thoughts; the highest science both α) qualitatively and β) quantitatively, when it is compared with the other sciences, for which it is the foundation.[5]

5.

From a material point of view philosophy, considered absolutely, is: a) The science of the self-existing, of the absolutely true being or essence, consequently not of the phenomenon without regard to the former; b) the science of the concepts or ideas, of the absolute reason and its substance,[6] which is exactly the absolutely true being.

6.

From this come the most general (formal) attributes in philosophy, when the word is taken in its absolute meaning. It is, namely, a life or self-consciousness with

5. Literally: "For which it [philosophy] lies as foundation."

6. The word used--"innehåll"--primarily means "content."

the attributes a) infinite, consequently α) absoluteness and β) organic pan-unity;[7] b) immateriality, consequently α) spirituality and β) eternity.

C) Human Philosophy[8]

7.

Philosophy for us, or human philosophy, is possible on condition of the postulate that man is: 1) rational, that is, a sharer in the absolute reason, a sharer in philosophy as such; 2) finitely-rational, that is, not completely but only more or less sharing in it. From this come the most general attributes in human philosophy in so far as it is considered in contrast with philosophy taken absolutely. Compare 6.

8.

The philosophy which is possible for man therefore as a consequence always remains only relatively identical with the absolute philosophy; indeed it is possible only in as far as, and in the measure that the absolute being, reason with its ideas, can appear and be grasped in the human self-consciousness and its world, in the relatively existing (the phenomenon), of which it is the substance and into which it enters as (a more or less potential or actual) element. Consequence of this for the character of

7. Boström's expression is "all-enhet," for which I believe "pan-unity" is adequate.

8. The literal translation would be "Man's Philosophy," but I think "Human Philosophy" is a better rendering.

human philosophy and for the method, by which the same can be achieved.

D) Religion in the Absolute and Relative Sense

9.

Religion in itself, or in the absolute sense, can be nothing else than the absolute being or reason, which, nevertheless, not merely as such is called religion, except in so far as it is regarded as binding and in a certain way determining or regulating the spiritual being's free activity; in other words, as this activity's purpose and law. From this come the most general attributes of religion. Compare 6.

10.

Again, as far as religion for us, or human religion, is concerned, it is possible under the same postulates and in the same degree as human philosophy, and its most general attributes are also analogous to those which belong to this one. Human religion, furthermore, is not only a knowing, but it is likewise and essentially a willing and doing; wherefore the philosophy of religion is at the same time a practical discipline.

E) Introduction to Philosophy

11.

Human philosophy is A) theoretical in so far as it conceives of the absolute being as the final ground for man and his world, and explains the latter through the

former; B) practical in so far as it conceives the same being as the highest end of man and his world, and determines his free activity in the way according to which this end can and should be attained.

12.

Theoretical philosophy has three divisions: a) Theology, b) Anthropology, and c) Ethnology. The object or substance of these is being, namely, man and the world in general for the first; the individual man for the second; and for the third man naturally united, the tribe, the nation.

13.

Practical philosophy also has three divisions: a) Philosophy of Religion, b) Ethics, and c) Political Science. The object or content of the first is for the purpose of man in general, of the second for the individual man, and of the third for man collectively, the state. In addition to this it is taught in each division how the free human enterprise should be determined by the purpose that is indicated.[9]

14.

Remark: Anthropology and Ethnology taken together may be called Cosmology or Anthropology in a wide sense. In like manner Moral Philosophy (Ethics) and Political

9. The last two sentences are one in Boström. The division in the translation seemed wise in the interest of clarity.

Science (Statescraft) together may be called Jurisprudence in a wide sense.

15.

The Philosophy of Religion must primarily determine the concept of religion or of the religious life with respect to form and content, as well as indicate the relative limitations which religion must meet in the finite man. This is the object of the true Philosophy of Religion.

16.

The same science must, furthermore, in general present the specific forms of religion in their relation to one another and to the concept of religion, as well as determine the laws of their historical development, which belongs to the History of the Philosophy of Religion.

17.

General remarks: Concerning the interest of the philosophy of religion in science and life; concerning its relation to the positive science of religion; concerning its assumptions in the investigator; concerning the relative necessity of permitting its presentation to be here preceded by that of theoretical philosophy, etc.

THEOLOGY

Introductory Remarks

18.

Is there a God?[10] And what is God? The relation of these questions to each other. What is God taken absolutely? And what is He for us? [The problem as] to what extent these questions can be distinguished. Compare 8.

19.

Remarks concerning the so called proofs of the existence of God. What has been intended by them. What should not have been intended by them. The meaning of a proof. The result of it for the question which is considered here, and the progress of the present investigation.

A) The Existing

20.

What is the existing in itself?[11] What must one imagine by this expression? The existing is the perceived; for to be is = to be perceived. Possible objections to this; their occasions and solution. The meaning of an essence or a being in a wide sense and of an essence in a limited or specific sense.

21.

The perceived, the existing as such, cannot be any-

10. Literally, Is God?
11. Literally, "What is the existing per se?"

thing else than self-consciousness and its attributes, i.e., perceptions. The substantial in everything is life or self-consciousness; everything is a definite modus or form of this, and beyond or independent of it there is absolutely nothing.

22.

Proofs of this proposition, taken 1) from the simplicity of self-consciousness and its relationship to everything that exists or is perceived; 2) from the very idea of perception. The reason why we human beings place the perception (the subjective) and its objects (the objective) against each other; 3) from the axiom that nothing can exist and be anything for another without existing first (as an idea) and existing as something by itself.

23.

Further evidence, taken 1) from the relativity and the subjectivity of the sensuous reality. Remark: Concerning the absurdities of materialism and in specie of atomism; 2) especially from the significance of space and its relation to us, i.e., to our spirit, and the impossibility that anything could exist beyond (extra) self-consciousness; 3) from the impossibility to express in words anything else than our own perceptions or to speak about anything else than these.

24.

Further evidence, taken 1) from the impossibility to gain any knowledge of the existing, in case it really

were something else than perceptions, or were not such; 2) from the course of human culture in general and from the course of philosophical culture in particular; 3) from the fact that at least the incompletely perceived as such cannot be anything else than perceptions, and that these, nevertheless, are more identical with self-existing in the measure that they are less incomplete.

25.

Consequently, the result of this, namely, that the most general attribute, the first and the substantial in everything, is life and self-consciousness, that everything is a definite modus or form of this, and that without or independently of this nothing can be found. Absolute idealism is the only absolutely true view of the world.

B) The Necessity of the Absolute Reason,
or the Existence of God

26.

Every form of life or self-consciousness is self-existing[12] or self-conscious in a definite way, i.e., perceives, or is a rationality in a wide sense (mens, percipiens). But this does not prevent it from also being a perception (perceptio & perceptum), namely, in another perceiving being, provided this one refers it to itself as

12. Boström's expression is "sjelf lefvande"--"self-living" but it seems that "self-existing" is a better form in English, and that it adequately represents the original.

its determination.[13] Further concerning the relationship between the perceiving being and its perceptions.

27.

Every form of self-consciousness, every perceiving or rational being, has all the others as its attributes, i.e., as its perceptions, so that in reality all is in all, ἐν παντὶ πάντα. Remarks concerning the monadology of Leibniz, and what is satisfactory in it or the contrary.

28.

Taken together, the rational beings also comprise an organic whole or a system in which each one has a definite degree of perfection in relation to the whole and stands in definite relationships to each one of the others; from which it follows that there is only one single world, when it is viewed in its truth and perfection.

29.

But not every being grasps all the others with the same completeness or just as really. In this respect there can and must be an infinity of gradations. For this reason each one, in addition, has actu its own and altogether distinct world, irrespective of the extent to which it may be identical with that of the others and with the

13. The Swedish word is "bestämning." An unabridged Swedish-English Lexicon gives the words "attribute," "quality," "property" as the English equivalents. But from a study of the various forms of the word it seems that there are cases where "determination" is a better rendering.

only absolutely true, of which it is a relatively perfect conception.[14]

30.

Since, therefore, relative and imperfect conceptions exist, and since these are not possible without the assumption of perfect ones, which again are impossible without some one who perceives perfectly, the reality and necessity of an absolutely perceiving being is thereby presented, i.e., presented by reason κατ' ἐξοχήν which, in conformity with its idea, cannot be more than just one; this is God.

31.

Observations concerning the chief of the so called proofs of the existence of God, concerning the ontological, the cosmological, the teleological, and the ethico-theological. The critiques by Kant and others of these proofs. In what measure they are valid or not, and why.

C) General Logical Determinations or Attributes of the Absolute Reason

32.

The importance of the words attributes or qualities. The importance and the difficulty of the doctrine concerning God's attributes. How and why a plurality of them may

14. This entire paragraph is one sentence in the original, divided in only one place by a semicolon. It seemed wise, in the interest of easier English, to break it up into several sentences.

be regarded as possible.[15]

33.

The division of the divine attributes into: A) logical, which are a) formal, b) real, which again are in part α) ontological, in part β) noological; B) metaphysical, which are a) aetiological, b) teleological. Observations concerning the relationship to each other of these kinds of attributes.

34.

The first class of the logical attributes comprise the formal, or the attributes of infiniteness of the divinity, which are a) absoluteness, i.e., α) independence,[16] absolute self-existence , β) perfection, positive infiniteness; b) organic pan-unity,[17] i.e., α) unity in the many, β) the many[18] in unity, consequently infinite harmony.

35.

The second class of the logical attributes consists of the ontological, or the attributes concerning the reality

15. Boström uses the word "such" where the word "them" is here used.

16. The word used here is identical with the German word "Unabhängigkeit." The two words used by Boström mean about the same thing, although the second may be a bit stronger, and thus the rendering, "absolute self-existence."

17. Here again the word "all-enhet"--"all-oneness"--is used. In Swedish combinations are very common, and it is often difficult to give them in idiomatic English.

18. The Swedish word is "allhet"--"all-ness" which is another coined word. The context would indicate that the rendering "many" correctly reflects what the author has in mind.

of God, which are a) absolute immateriality, or the quality of transcending sense,[19] i.e., α) spirituality, β) eternity; b) substantiality, having the quality of an organism,[20] i.e., α) quality of universal being,[21] omnipresence, β) omnipotence.

36.

The third class of logical attributes consists of the noological, or God's attributes of ideality, which are a) absolute knowing, i.e., α) self-consciousness, β) omniscience; b) absolute rationality, i.e., α) personality and β) complete personality.[22]

37.

These three classes are embraced respectively by the attributes: A) beauty in a wide sense (majesty), a) sublimity, b) beauty in a narrow sense; B) truth, a) substance, b) the quality of universal being,[23] systematic quality of universal being; C) goodness, a) life, b) blessedness. All of them must here be regarded in the absolute sense.[24]

38.

Further observations concerning the negative and

19. "Supersensuality," or the supersensuous, would be the word.
20. The word is "organiskhet," something like "organicism-hood."
21. The word--"allväsenhet"--would be "all-beinghood."
22. The combination--"allpersonlighet"--would mean a personality that fills the universe--"all-inclusive personality."
23. See note 21.
24. A phrase is here made into a complete sentence.

positive expressions of these attributes; concerning their consequences; concerning the critical evaluation of them by Strauss and others, and to what extent this may be regarded valid, etc.

D) The Comprehension or Ideas of the Absolute Being

39.

The inner determination or comprehension of the absolute reason consists of its perceptions, its ideas or conceptions, which here are regarded only as thought in and by their absolute subject.

40.

Every idea, thus thought, is the absolute reason itself, regarded in a certain determination, in a certain form of its infinite life or self-consciousness. This self, however, must not be regarded as being only the combination of its ideas, so that it would be completely identical with its contents.

41.

Every idea, as such, has the same general determination, the same attributes, as the absolute reason; but it also has another and special determination, through which it is distinguished from it, as well as from every other idea.

42.

Every idea requires all the others together with their subject in order to be what it is. It is the whole

considered from a certain point of view, and it is a certain unity for us of all the others, which comprise its content and refer themselves to it either as its positive or negative determinations.

43.

By itself, i.e., as thought in and by God, every idea is absolutely perfect (40); but this does not prevent the possibility of comparing the ideas with each other with regard to their special determination alone, and that then the one is more complete than the other in the sense that the one has more positive and fewer negative determinations than the other.

44.

Therefore also God,[25] when compared with the other beings, has only positive attributes, and not a single negative one. If we properly ascribe to Him negative attributes, these would only be negations of negative and consequently actually positive. The meaning of the scholastic expressions, ens perfectissimum, realissimum, the highest being, etc.

45.

An idea can be thought, not only as existing within oneself, as far as its own positive content is concerned, but also as existing in others, who are higher or more

25. The word here used is "divinity." But the context clearly indicates that Boström means God.

perfect, and into whom it must enter as a positive determination. Regarded in this latter way, it itself also receives a greater determination, and this applies in the same measure even more, the higher the idea is within which it is thought.

46.

From this it follows that all ideas have their complete determination and significance in the measure in which they are thought of in and by the absolute reason.[26] It also follows that their original tendency as well as their highest end and good must be to live and compose oneself in and through this, provided they themselves are living and perceiving beings. All other tendencies and ends properly stand in relation to this end as inferior moments and means.

E) The Relative Substantiality

48.

If the ideas are attributed to God, i.e., are thought of by Him, they are His ideas or perceptions, and it is only He who then is self-conscious with regard to them, only He that comprises their eternal essence and substance. They also concern Him alone, without any other beings than He being determined by them.

49.

But if they also can and must be attributed to them-

26. "I och af."

selves, and are subjected to self-scrutiny, each one of them is, however, also for himself living and self-conscious in a determinate way, in other words, a perceiving or rational being, a personality; for under no other condition either would or could they be perceptions of the absolute reason.

50.

If one should ask what they, as perceiving beings apprehend or perceive, it would be true with regard to them also that they cannot perceive anything else than themselves and their perceptions in their individual determination; and since in their essence they are organic moments in the system of divine ideas, consequently each one of them this system itself, regarded from a certain special point of view, they also have this as the original and eternal content of their self-consciousness, provided they are considered in their truth and perfection.

51.

But since they not only are perceiving, but also finite, beings, therefore they cannot grasp their essential substance with the same completeness as the infinite reason, indeed the one among them cannot grasp it with the same perfection as the other; consequently the same substance, the world of the beings or ideas, must reveal itself to each of them as something different

or the opposite of what it is for itself (for God) and for all the others, i.e., they must find and possess another reality as theirs than the one which exists immediately for God.

52.

Consequently, then, there exists for them, in addition to the absolute reality or world, a relative reality, which also consists of as many relatively distinct worlds as there are finitely perceiving beings, because these worlds are nothing but the finite beings as they are self-conscious in their complete relative determination, consequently always altogether dissimilar and individual, no matter to what extent they may be partially identical.

53.

The relative reality or, since only that of man is known to us, our relative world is thus a phenomenon, an incomplete perception of the absolute, which, as essence, is its foundation, and also in that respect is or is perceived, although not completely as it is in its verity, but more or less differently, according to the manner in which it is grasped, whether less or more completely.

54.

The relative world may indeed as a whole have determinations or attributes which are the very opposite of those which belong to the absolute (34-37); but since this antithesis is merely relative, it does not prevent

the former from being partially more or less identical with the latter. Further development of this relationship, and thereby explanation of the most general attributes of the phenomenon.

55.

The relative world is everywhere a unity of contradictions, namely, of the being, through all its attributes (34-37) and of its negation in the same manner as the former reveals itself in the phenomenon as its potential infinity, even though this is in all of its moments as actually finite. From this comes the unlimited development of the phenomenon, which constitutes one of its essential characteristics.

56.

Since the unity of contradictions within the phenomenal world permeates the whole, therefore all of its parts must stand in what has been called a state of polarity to each other, so that when two distinct phenomena are compared with each other, the essence will appear relatively more and the opposite or negation of the essence will appear less in the one than in the other. A reminder in this connection of Schelling's way of determining the absolute in his system of identity.

57.

Comparison of the view of the universe presented here with others, in particular those of more recent date. Evidence that the former cannot properly be called pan-

theistic,, or lead to the consequences which must be regarded as valid reasons for discarding pantheism.

THE METAPHYSICAL ATTRIBUTES OF GOD

58.

The relative world does not lie within the absolute world in the sense that it comprises a constituent part of it; but neither does it lie outside of it in the sense that it is independent of it. A relationship thus exists between them, when they are considered from the point of view of the former [view]; and a consideration of God under this circumstance belongs to metaphysics, the general foundation of which is given in what precedes (48-56).

59.

According to what already has been evidenced, the relative world is a secondary existence,[27] which for its possible existence[28] and reality postulates another as its ground; and since beside the relative existence there is no other than the absolute, i.e., God, therefore he must comprise the ground of the relative world in all the considerations and from all the viewpoints from which it can be regarded.

60.

But as finitely-infinite (55) the relative world is

27. The word here rendered "secondary" could also mean "subordinate."

28. Literally, "possibility."

one continually evolving reality, and therefore it can be considered with respect to A) its reality and from this point of view in regard to a) its material and formal existence as such and b) its existence or continuation in its existence; B) its development and from this point of view with respect to a) its form of development and b) the goal of its development and direction.

61.

If, therefore, God is considered in relation to the reality of the relative world, and, furthermore, only from the ontological point of view (35), he is this world's primordial being[29] and as such a) its cause[30] (original cause) and b) its original substance,[31] even though, as absolute, he is this only indirectly and mediately. It is to be observed that here we are not concerned with any empirical causality or substantiality, but only with a rational.

62.

And when he is further considered in the same relationship, but, in addition, from a noological point of view, a consideration that includes and enlarges upon the previous one, then he is the original intelligence[32]

29. "Urväsende." This is the same as the German "Urwesen."
30. "Orsak." In parenthesis Boström has "ursak," which would be the same as the German "Ursache."
31. The Swedish word is "ursubstans."
32. Swedish, "ur-intelligens." "Ur" means "original."

of the relative world, and as such a) its creator and b) sustainer in which case the same remark holds true as above (61). The impossibility of a creation in time. The possible meaning of a creation out of nothing. The question of the purpose of creation, etc.

63.

If again God is considered in relation to the development of the relative world, and, further, only from an ontological point of view, he is, nevertheless, by implication and mediately, the source of religion[33] of the same world and as such its a) highest law and b) highest end, which thus is realized infinitely, even though in each of its moments it is only in a finite way.

64.

And if he is regarded in the same relationship from the noological point of view, he is in the same manner the absolute regent of the relative world, and as such a) its highest providence and b) its most complete savior,[34] in which regard our world can be considered as one of his realms, in connection with which the preceding remark (63) should not be overlooked.

65.

Thought of in the latter relationship (63, 64) God

33. Swedish, "ur-religion."
34. The literal expression is "highest savior," but it seems that "most complete savior" is a more adequate translation.

has the attributes of holiness and righteousness, and further of omniscience and goodness,[35] for us. These attributes possess only metaphysical significance and express his logical being in special relationship to man, who as self-conscious, free, and rational, stands in a more immediately intimate relationship to him than everything else that exists in his world.[36]

ANTHROPOLOGY

A) Concerning Man in General

66.

Man, inwardly regarded,[37] is a relatively rational, a sensuously rational being, and as such distinguished not only from God Himself, but also from that idea in him which is the most immediate ground of man's being. Further analysis of what is implied by this.

67.

This formal explanation concerns not only the individual human being, but also humanity in all its states. The human organism, furthermore, should not be regarded as alone constituting the sensuous human being. The entire sensuous world, as seen from man's point of view,

35. The word Boström uses here is "allgodhet." Swedish has great facility for such combinations, which usually are difficult, and sometimes impossible, to convey into English in the richness of the original.

36. This paragraph is one sentence in the original.

37. Literally, "considered within himself."

should be regarded as belonging to his phenomenal existence and comprising his determinateness.

68.

The attributes which belong to man as a consequence of his general concept[38] (66) are already stated in what precedes and are to be found by combining 55 with 34-37. The relationship in man, furthermore, between the being and the phenomenon, between the reason and the sensuousness, is determined according to the analogy of God's relationship to the relative in general, concerning which see 61-64. Further particulars about this relationship when the being is considered within the phenomenon and vice versa.

69.

It is especially observed that man is temporal, or, more correctly, eternally-temporal,[39] consequently becoming, inconstant, a life in continuous development, a determination which must be explained through the relative finiteness of his ideas in connection with the organic nature of his determinations (those of the other ideas).

70.

As a consequence of this determination man is to be regarded as a living activity or an active life;[40] and,

38. Here the meaning appears to be the concept of man.
39. The hyphenated expression is "evigt-timlig," "eternal-temporal."
40. This emphasis on activity is interesting, since it is the definition that Bowne gives of the real.

furthermore, since man everywhere is a unity of contradictions (55, 56), therefore also his activity must reveal itself as such, i.e., in part as more active and in part as more passive, as the being expresses itself more or less.

71.

But all activity has a purpose for which it struggles, and this can be nothing else than the concept of the active being (66); consequently man as active cannot tend to anything else than that he, though sensuous, may become rational; that he may live and comprehend himself as a unity of the rational and the sensuous through the change of the latter, which would imply his own change; for the rational is inherently unchangeable.

72.

What, furthermore, man thus strives for he can attain actually to a greater or less degree, in part involuntarily, as a consequence of his original ability[41] and his finiteness, and in part voluntarily, as a consequence of his morality or his immorality. But this does not prevent the tendency, considered as a matter of principle, from being always the same; it is only its direction and use, only its closer determination in every moment of life, that determines to what degree and in

41. The word here is "Mått"--"measure." But the context makes it clear that the author means "measure of ability."

what manner the goal is reached.

73.

Even the general trend of man's development depends on the fact that its content is in part relatively more general, and in part relatively more particular, and that the former must be regarded by him as relatively more central, inner, present, and the latter as relatively more peripheral, exterior, absent, not only to the extent that it coexists in space, but also to the extent that it follows in time.

74.

This, added to the fact of man's finiteness, explains why man, considered in a definite period of his life, is originally more external and unconscious, and that he from this point in due time changes so that he becomes more introspective[42] and self-conscious until he reaches his culmination, as well as the fact that thereafter he gradually reverts to a more external and unconscious condition, etc.; all of this takes place provided that the development is normal and is not interrupted by contingent circumstances.

75.

Finally, it is observed that man's general work in time is a continued reflecting with which, as a conse-

42. The word "inre"--"inner"--is translated as "introspective," because it seems to convey the full meaning better.

quence of his finiteness, there is united a likewise continued abstracting in the negative significance of this word. The word has another meaning when it designates the opposite to the determination, in which case it expresses the progress of reflection from the more concrete to the more abstract.

B) Concerning Man's Functions and Capacities

76.

What man is when he is considered in a certain undivided moment of his activity or of his active life is called one of his functions or manifestations, which is consequently not to be regarded merely as one activity, but also as one effect, one product, of his being. Remarks concerning the ground and fitness of the determination.

77.

Such a function or manifestation is also always to be regarded as a unity in multiplicity, both with regard to its content and the period of time it occupies; it can, therefore, be regarded, according to preference, both as one single function and as a plurality of such, concerning each one of which the same would then apply, etc.

78.

Both the possibility and the reality of all the functions of man depend primarily on his eternal being,

which, regarded in this relation to them, i.e., as their ground and unity and subject, is called capacity or ability in general, but in the same relationship to a certain kind among them, a (certain) capacity or an ability of this kind of functions, which relate themselves to him in general as the higher to the lower. Compare 68.

79.

From this it is thus apparent that all power or ability is that of the being or of the spirit; but in specie such a power is, nevertheless, called a faculty of the mind, provided that man expresses himself in it as soul, i.e., as actu or perceptibly self-conscious and independent. Remarks: Concerning the difficulties which we have been wont to find in the assumption of individual faculties of the mind, and how they can be settled; further, concerning the ground of the classification of the human capacities and their significance, etc.

80.

With regard to I) the form of his functions and his activity man is A) an elemental being, i.e., imperceptibly self-conscious or perceiving and as such either abstract or qualified or organized matter; B) spiritual being, i.e., perceptibly self-conscious or perceiving; and it is to be observed in this connection that the lower form is always in connection with the higher, when it is developed. The difference, however, is relative, depending

on a more or a less. Consideration of the consequences of this.

81.

As a spiritual being, man is a) perceiving and spontaneous, noticeable to others, but not to himself; b) conscious and arbitrary, noticeable to himself, but not as spirit; c) self-conscious and free, noticeable also to himself as spirit. The same comment as above is valid here. The content itself is richer or more concrete in the same degree (potentially) as the form is lower or less spiritual, which is a consequence of man's finitude.

82.

With regard to II) the content of his functions and his activity man is a) sensuous or, considered as ability, sensuousness; b) rational, or, considered as ability, reason. The opposition between the two capabilities is the same as between the being and the phenomenon. Neither can exist in the actual man without or exterior to the other. At the beginning, however, the former appears as predominating.[43]

83.

With regard to III) the purpose or direction of his functions man is a) theoretical ability, provided that he predominantly intends higher self-consciousness through development[44] of the soul; b) practical ability, provided

43. One sentence in the original has here been divided into two.

44. The word used means "change," but the context indicates the kind of change that implies development.

that he predominantly intends higher freedom through development of the exterior; c) esthetic ability, provided that he predominantly intends merely pleasure or diversion through activity as such.

84.

Remarks concerning the relation of these divisions to each other, especially concerning the theoretical, practical, and esthetic capacities, their appelations in Swedish, their relationship to each other and to the general purpose, their bases and results, as well as what is gained by it, etc.

C) Concerning Man's Theoretical Ability

85.

The sensuous theoretical ability is a) sensuous power to feel, or sense in a lower signification (as that of the animal), which expresses itself as α) vital-sense[45] for measures[46] of pleasure or displeasure; β) the sense of the organs, the higher, with its familiar modifications: the five exterior senses. The very expressions of this ability are called feelings in a wider sense and objective feelings or organ-sensations, which together comprise the qualities of the reality existing in space.

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45. Boström: "vital-sinne." His use of "vital" is apparently Latin, and is best left thus.

46. The author uses only the word "modi." It is seemingly the plural of the Latin word "modus."

86.

The same ability, furthermore, develops into b) ability to foreshadow, which is α) sense in a higher degree (as human) provided it has the same content as the ability to feel, but considers it as an object opposite to itself; β) power of imagination, provided it has another content than merely the ability to feel, an inner, clearer, more idealistic and more arbitrary world, which partially corresponds to the external, more vital and necessary objective [world], and is not only in the presently represented space, but also in time. The functions of sense are called awarenesses,[47] intuitions; [the functions] of the power of imagination in the essential sense [are called] representations.

87.

As power of imagination the spirit can more or less arbitrarily use its represented content and 1) reproduce it in accordance with associations, 2) transform it according to the law of fashion[48] and schematize it according to the laws of generalization, after which the power of imagination also receives distinct appelations. Remarks: Concerning the meaning, conditions, and limitations of these activities. Further, concerning memory, and concerning the meaning of space and time and the or-

47. This is perhaps not a good word, but it is expressive of what the author says here.

48. The word here is "fictionens," apparently from "fingo," "to form," "to fashion."

ganic body.

88.

The sensuous theoretical power further develops into c) the power of thought or reason in a wide sense, which is α) concrete power of thought, provided at the same time that its content is that of the power of presentation, though clearer, evident, inner, spiritual, fundamental, necessary, and immutable, though at the same time not completed; β) abstract or pure power of thought, provided its content is purely spiritual, and only needs the language to be realized. The functions of the former are properly called abstract apprehensions, relatively distinguished from schemata; those of the latter, essential concepts.

ABSTRACT

The aim of this dissertation is to provide a critical introduction to the Philosophy of Religion of the Swedish philosopher, Christopher Jacob Boström, with a translation and a critical commentary.

Chapter I answers the question, "Who is Christopher Jacob Boström?" After graduation from the university, Boström was professor in the department of philosophy at Uppsala from 1828 to 1863, except for four years as tutor at the Swedish court. One of the most popular lecturers, he brought the study of philosophy at Uppsala to the highest level that it has ever enjoyed.

In chapter II there is a presentation of Boström's historical relations, his unique contribution, and the validity of his ideas. The philosophers by whom he was chiefly influenced are Plato, Berkeley, Leibniz, Kant, Schelling, Fichte, and Hegel. Boström claims, however, to have gone beyond them all in bringing rational idealism to what he considers to be its ultimate position, in which it is freed from all empiricism and realism.

Chapter III contains a summary of Boström's philosophical system. His is a psychological and epistemological approach to the problem of reality, and his system may be called a "logical thought-structure." Originally there is only the Infinite Reason and its con-

tents, i.e., only God and His eternal ideas, which are rational beings. The sensuous world in space and time is only a phenomenon for man of the non-sensuous, or real. Man is a finite-rational being, whose purpose is to attain his eternal idea in God. Although Boström holds that his philosophy of religion corresponds essentially with Christianity, he rejects such doctrines as the Trinity, revelation, and vicarious atonement.

Chapter IV, dealing with Boström's influence, indicates that for half a century his influence controlled philosophical thinking in Sweden, but that it has not reached far beyond his own nation. It began to wane toward the end of the nineteenth century; but the formation, in 1908, of a Boström society to perpetuate and promote his thought and memory is evidence of the fact that there is still interest in his philosophy.

Chapter V is a selected translation of Boström's general Introduction to his Philosophy of Religion which, in its entirety, includes Theology, Anthropology, and Philosophy of Religion. For Boström philosophy in itself is the highest science, dealing with the principles of the other sciences. It is divided into theoretical and practical, theoretical philosophy dealing with the true, and practical philosophy with the good. Theoretical philosophy includes Theology, Anthropology, and Ethnology. Practical philosophy is the doctrine of

reason as purpose and law, whose unity is religion, and is divided into the Science of Religion in a Restricted Sense, Ethics, and Political Science.

Chapter VI contains Boström's brief introduction to his Philosophy of Religion, which, being essentially practical, is the doctrine of religion as it exists in and for man. God leads man to rationality, and gives him reason's form, content, and life.

Chapter VII deals with the Human Religion and Religious Activity as the Worship of God. Religion for man is man himself as present in all his functions, and comprises them in their harmonious development for his highest end. Devotion is man's entire being completely filled by God. Piety is the state of mind in which one freely subordinates one's activity to the religious demands on it.

The subject of Chapter VIII is The Religious Man in His States. It is divided into four sections. Section one deals with the religious man's relation to Deity. Man is relatively identical with, and relatively opposed to, God, but approaches relative unity with God's idea of man, which is perfection.

Section two discusses the religious man's relation to himself. Since he discovers that all of his powers are in or from God, he strives to make them moments in the service of religion. In the moral activity, which

is a free self-development for the attainment of life in God, religion appears as faith in the possibility of the good, and gives man power to labor for it. Religion may interpret itself in philosophy, and philosophy gives greater clarity to religion, without destroying faith.

The third section deals chiefly with the problem of evil. Evil is of two kinds: physical and moral. Physical evil does not have its ground in man's free will, whereas moral evil reaches to man's inner being. Since God does not immediately produce the sensuous world, but this is done through man by his imperfect perceptions, to demand a perfect world would require man to be perfect. God is not responsible for evil, since He did not create man. With the higher development of man, evil will disappear, because it is not essential to man. Evil is a self-conscious and free activity. Man is not evil by nature, but becomes morally evil through himself by the misuse of freedom of choice. The ground of good and evil is found in man's will in relation to reason and sensuousness. To be good is to be rational. Inherited sin is the influence on man of what has preceded him in the immoral behavior of others. Evil does not possess an eternal substance, since the thought of the eternal existence of evil does not harmonize with the thought of God as the absolute end of all life.

Section four deals with man's relations to other forms

of life and to their totality. The consciousness of immortality in man is grounded in his consciousness of his personality. Since man's struggle is intent upon a goal that has not yet been attained, the necessity arises of a continuation of life in order to reach it. Several forms of development are necessary, because man does not feel completely satisfied in any moment of his existence. Therefore it follows that a higher life than the present belongs to his existence, and man must conclude from this necessity that other forms of life are included in God's idea of him. Blessedness is an inevitable consequence of morality. Endless punishment is at variance with the very idea of absolute good. Death is only phenomenal, an expression of man's finiteness, and a consequence of man's temporariness. In relation to a succeeding life, it is a transition.

Chapter IX deals with Religion as It Appears in Time, and is divided into two sections. Section one deals with false and incomplete forms of religion. Imperfect forms of religion arise through an imperfect relationship between reason and sensuousness. Atheism is theoretical or practical empiricism in religion. Indifferentism is found in a life which is not influenced by God. Formalism is placing essential importance on a certain dogma, or on an external mode of action. The pietist has religion in his heart, but this piety is apt to satisfy his vanity in the thought

of being God's pet. Mysticism is in danger of stopping at the beginning of religious life--at the standpoint of feeling and immediate intuition. The danger in quietism is that the duties of life are neglected. Superstition arises when the religious activity in man is tainted with the sensuous, or in thinking of God anthropomorphically. This superstition is found in the popular concept of prayer, faith in miracles, in special revelation, in predestination as an arbitrary act of God, and in man's being led to a fall by an evil spirit. The imagination about guardian angels is a sensualizing of man's own higher nature.

The second section discusses the effect of religion on man, and the means for it. The activity of religion consists in realizing one's self in the sensuous. The only real sacrifice man makes is to bring sensuousness into harmony with reason. All arbitrariness on the part of God must be separated from grace, because salvation is not conceivable without man's free co-operation. Man has the power to convert himself, either in this present life, or in some other form of life, but not without the help of God, because it is God who is present in man and causes conversion. All knowledge is revelation, and there is no special revelation, because the higher consciousness of what is true and right is revelation from God, and no revelation needs anything else to be recognized as divine than that it is true.

The conclusion of this work may be summarized as follows:

1. Boström has established himself as an independent thinker in bringing his rational idealistic philosophy to its logical position, namely, that ultimately nothing exists except God and His eternal ideas.

2. Boström vindicates his claim to being a rational idealist; his system is a logical thought-structure in which space, time, action, and change are excluded from the true and original existence.

3. Boström is a personalist; the principle of his philosophy is found in the idea of self-consciousness, which seeks the true and fundamental reality in the eternal and personal. With him self-consciousness is life, and life is self-consciousness.

4. In this study it has been discovered that Boström is especially critical of Hegel, but that he, nevertheless, resembles Hegel in many respects, as, for example, in the doctrine that to be is the same as to be for someone, or to be perceived, and in his emphasis on reason as the highest approach to God. He differs from Hegel in the fact that his system leaves no room for development.

5. Boström's rational theology is in several respects unacceptable to biblical orthodoxy, since he rejects such doctrines as the Trinity, vicarious atonement, and revelation. His use of the Bible is in harmony with liberal

theology. The chief criticism of Boström is that he makes his rationality the criterion of truth.

6. Boström's philosophical system is of interest as a chapter in the history of philosophic thought; but there are also elements in it, such as his idealistic personalism, that will be of abiding interest to those who try to see beyond appearance to the reality that is its essence.

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1. In the Swedish alphabet the concluding letters are å ä ö.

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Victor Emanuel Beck was born in Watonwan County, near St. James, Minnesota, March 30, 1894. He graduated from Gustavus Adolphus college in 1914, ranking third in his class. The following year was spent with the Intercollegiate Prohibition Association and the Minnesota Prohibition Party. He attended the Chicago Lutheran Seminary, 1915-1916, and the Augustana Seminary, 1916-1918. He was ordained in the Lutheran ministry June 9, 1918. He served as pastor of churches in Ansonia, Connecticut (1918-1921), Fort Dodge, Iowa (1921-1929), Mankato, Minnesota (1929-

1940), Worcester, Massachusetts (1940--). He attended Yale University, 1919-1921, receiving the M. A. degree in Germanic languages in 1921. He received the B. D. degree from Augustana Seminary in 1925. Among the boards on which he has served are The Board of Directors, Iowa Lutheran Hospital, Des Moines; The Board of Christian Service of the Lutheran Minnesota Conference, and The Minnesota Council of Religious Education. He is at present vice-chairman of The Board of Parish Education of the Augustana Synod. He has written two quarters of the Augustana Bible Study Quarterly, published a small volume of poems, and contributed to various publications of his Church, as well as to such magazines as The Homiletic Review, The Expositor, and Church Management. He has written the words for two choir anthems that have been published, and made several translations of anthems from the Swedish. He was married to Elizabeth Nelson of Chesterton, Indiana, June 28, 1922. She passed away March 19, 1939. On June 3, 1941, he married Esther M. Anderson, Dean of Women at Gustavus Adolphus college. He has four children, Robert Nelson, senior at Clark University; Paul Victor, just returned from Military Government service in Japan; Lawrence Herman, freshman at Upsala college; and Lois Elizabeth, at home.

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